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4Introduction to the Portfolio
The portfolio consists of the academic, clinical and research work 
completed during the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology training programme 
(PsychD). These assignments, reports and projects are divided up into 
three respective dossiers. The contents of each dossier are summarised 
overleaf on the Contents page.
The portfolio as a whole reflects the ethos of the University of Surrey 
Clinical Psychology training programme: dossiers cover client groups 
across the lifespan (including people with learning disabilities), a range of 
presenting problems, and the use of the three main therapeutic models 
(cognitive-behavioural, psychodynamic and systemic). The importance the 
programme affords training as an Applied Psychologist is evident in the 
emphasis on the development of reflective practice, and research skills and 
knowledge. Service User and Carer involvement is also a significant 
priority, evident across the dossiers.
Work within each dossier is presented in chronological order, reflecting the 
development of knowledge and skills acquired over the course of training.
All clinical material presented has been prepared with the informed, written 
consent of the individuals concerned. It has been suitably anonymised, by 
changing or removing identifying details as far as possible, in order to 
protect their confidentiality.
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Abstract
Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) is a widely-offered treatment for 
Borderline Personality Disorder. It is based on a particular psychological 
model of the disorder. This paper reviews the model and its evidence. 
Other forms of evidence for the application of DBT (including efficacy 
studies and service user opinion) are discussed. Limitations of the evidence 
base are considered, with personal reflections and suggestions for future 
research.
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The core features of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), as specified by 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000), are pervasive and persistent instability and 
impulsivity in interpersonal relationships, intrapsychic states (including 
mood and self-image) and behaviours (including self-damaging 
behaviours). For a diagnosis of BPD, individuals must meet five (or more) 
criteria over a significant period of time. These criteria include: frantic 
efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment; a pattern of intense 
unstable interpersonal relationships (including shifting from the idealization 
to the devaluation of others); identity disturbance; potentially self-damaging 
impulsive behaviours e.g. eating disorders, substance abuse; recurrent 
deliberate self-harm (DSH) or suicidal behaviour or threats (‘parasuicidal 
behaviour’); affective instability; chronic feelings of emptiness; 
inappropriate, intense anger; and stress-related dissociation.
The lifetime population prevalence of BPD is estimated at 1-3%. Research 
suggests that 10% of psychiatric outpatients and 20% of inpatients meet 
criteria for a diagnosis of BPD. Individuals with a diagnosis of BPD 
therefore tend to use a significant amount of the resources of local health 
services (Alwin et al., 2006). Often this includes presenting at accident and 
emergency services or requiring inpatient admissions due to parasuicidal 
behaviour; 7.5% of people with a diagnosis of BPD commit suicide 
(Linehan & Heard, 1999). Research also indicates that BPD is present in 
20% of the female prison population, and that it is the second most 
common personality disorder amongst women in prison (Singleton et al., 
1998).
BPD is therefore a complex disorder with potentially serious consequences 
for the individual meeting criteria for diagnosis and also their local health 
services. However, it has historically been difficult to offer individuals with 
BPD an effective intervention (Alwin et al., 2006). This has, in part, been 
due to difficulties engaging this client group. It has also been due to a lack 
of evidence for effective treatments. A perception amongst health 
professionals that personality disorders per se are ‘unbeatable’ may also 
have contributed to the previous state of affairs (Alwin et al., 2006). In any 
case, the significant distress of clients presenting with BPD, the substantial
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impact on their social and professional networks, and the financial costs 
involved in their care, created a great need for an effective treatment 
(Swenson, 2000).
The publication of “Personality disorder: No longera diagnosis of exclusion” 
by the National Institute for Mental Health in England (NIMHE, 2003) 
marked a change in the national policy context which created a need for 
National Health Service (NHS) Trusts to provide services for personality 
disorders. It aimed “to ensure that people with [a personality disorder], who 
experience significant distress or difficulty as a result of their disorder are 
seen as being part of the legitimate business of mental health services” 
(p2). This addressed, at a policy level, some of the attitudinal and cultural 
factors within the NHS which may have previously prevented the 
development of appropriate services, by placing pressure on Trusts to 
develop those services regardless.
NIMHE were able to initiate this change because of developments in 
research into treatments for BPD. The National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) has recently published guidelines which 
summarise the available research evidence and treatment 
recommendations for BPD (NICE, 2009). In terms of the provision of 
psychological treatment, services are required to use an integrated 
approach with an explicit theoretical basis, which is shared with the service 
user. This may include twice-weekly psychotherapy sessions. Any 
psychological intervention should not be brief (of less than 3 months 
duration). Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993) is 
specifically mentioned, as a therapeutic approach which meets these 
criteria, as a consideration for female patients for whom reducing DSH is a 
priority.
Outline of DBT
This review cannot cover the details of the DBT intervention in depth. 
However, the broad aim of DBT is to create a validating relationship in 
which maladaptive behaviours are extinguished, and more adaptive ones 
are learnt and reinforced. The therapeutic relationship is given more explicit 
prominence than in other forms of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT),
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both because it provides validation for the client, and also because it serves 
as a reinforcer. However, the techniques of DBT are important as a vehicle 
for change. Therefore, both perspectives (that the content of therapy is 
crucial and that the relationship itself is a therapeutic process) are present 
in DBT, in a dialectical fashion (Swales & Heard, 2007). “The dialectical 
position... is a philosophical position. Thus, it can be neither proved nor 
disproved” (Linehan, 1993, p64). However, it is a key part of DBT, and 
requires a brief explanation. In short, dialectical thinking involves looking for 
the valid or true points in opposite positions (the ‘thesis’ and ‘antithesis’). 
These points are then reconciled in a ‘synthesis’. The main example of this 
in DBT is the dialectic between the therapist’s acceptance of the client 
(validation) and facilitating change (learning new skills). Whilst validating 
how the client’s responses are understandable in the context of their 
biology, past invalidating environment and present context, the therapist 
assists the client in developing alternative ways of managing the 
undesirable effects of emotional dysregulation (Koerner, 2006). Strategies 
used include teaching new skills, applying reinforcement or extinction, 
exposure techniques and cognitive restructuring. The strategy selected 
depends on what the therapist identifies (using a formulation and 
behavioural analysis) as contributing to a maladaptive response such as 
DSH (Linehan, 1993). Only Skills Training will be outlined further, as other 
strategies are generic CBT strategies.
The skills that are taught in DBT are Mindfulness, Distress Tolerance, 
Emotion Regulation and Interpersonal Effectiveness. Skills are taught in a 
separate modality from individual psychotherapy (usually in a 
psychoeducational group). This emphasises the importance of skills 
acquisition and obviates skills training being side-tracked by crises and 
other individual issues that can better be dealt with in individual therapy 
(Scheel, 2000). Individual psychotherapy is used to assist the client in 
strengthening the skills, as well as generalising them to their particular 
circumstances (Swales & Heard, 2009). Skills generalisation is also 
facilitated by the third modality of telephone coaching: clients are 
encouraged to call their individual therapist in-between weekly sessions 
(within agreed parameters) if they find themselves at a point where they
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require further support with selecting or applying a DBT skill (Linehan, 
1993). Behaviour is targeted according to a target hierarchy (in descending 
order: life-threatening behaviour, therapy-interfering behaviour, quality of 
life-interfering behaviour), monitored by the client using a ‘diary card’ 
(Harned et al., 2006). Linehan (1993) developed this hierarchy to assist 
therapists in making principle-driven decisions when confronted with a wide 
range of differing problems brought by clients with BPD.
Evidence for DBT
Prior to the publication of UK guidelines recommending DBT as a 
psychological treatment for BPD, it had already gained widespread 
popularity as such (Feigenbaum, 2007). To date, DBT has been found to 
be efficacious in seven well-designed randomized-controlled trials (RCTs), 
conducted across four independent research teams. It has also 
demonstrated effectiveness in non-randomised trials (Lynch et al., 2007). 
These studies tend to demonstrate that DBT leads to reduced parasuicidal 
behaviour, reduced therapy drop-out, decreased anger, hopelessness and 
depression, and less usage of medical services. The findings of initial 
studies were limited by the non-specific differences between DBT and the 
control condition (treatment as usual) e.g. greater amount (in DBT) of 
supervision, therapist allegiance/motivation, novelty of treatment and 
therapy structure (Feigenbaum, 2007; Turner, 2000). Later studies have 
attempted to control for these confounds by altering the control condition 
e.g. so that therapists in the control condition have an amount of 
supervision similar to that of DBT therapists, with similar results (Lynch et 
al., 2007). Studies not included in Lynch et a/.’s review include an 
Australasian pilot (Brassington & Krawitz, 2006) and the UK pilot 
(Feigenbaum, 2007). Both of these studies report similar findings, and 
address another limitation with earlier efficacy studies, which is that they 
were limited to the United States and were often carried out by the team 
which developed DBT originally. An independent researcher has concluded 
that DBT is the most well-researched treatment for BPD (Zanarini, 2009). 
These studies are a useful and necessary form of evidence supporting the 
provision of DBT by mental health services in response to the need 
discussed above. RCTs provide data about the efficacy of treatments, and
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this is necessary to inform evidence-based practice (EBP) at a service 
level, as clinicians need to be aware of which treatments are effective in 
order to provide care ethically and effectively (Bamford, 2009).
However, service users (SUs) can be concerned that the ‘evidence’ 
informing EBP is narrowly taken to mean only RCTs and meta-analyses, 
which can exclude SUs’ knowledge and experience (Beresford, 2006). This 
is even embodied in the National Services Framework for Mental Health 
(Department of Health, 1999a), in which Type I evidence is at least one 
good systematic review, including at least one RCT, whereas the opinion of 
service users is Type V in the hierarchy. On the other hand, Department of 
Health (DoH) guidance also indicates that SUs should be involved in 
service development (DoH, 1999b). There are two published UK studies 
which explore SUs’ experience of DBT, which are presented here as 
another form of evidence for its effectiveness. SUs reported that they found 
the structure of DBT positive (Hodgetts et al., 2007), and that it met a 
number of their needs that other services had not, including respecting the 
individual, operating professionally, providing a useful therapy, and 
providing a space in which SUs could identify with and support one another 
(Webb & McMurran, 2008). However, SUs also reported having limited 
choice about whether to engage with DBT or another form of therapy, 
having mixed views about skills training, finding the programme too rigid, 
not getting enough out of just one year of DBT, and being unsure as to 
whether the change they experienced was due to DBT (Hodgetts et al., 
2007). Both these qualitative studies are limited in how generalisable they 
are, due to their sample size and specific locations. However, they give 
some indication of the reality of what the ‘effectiveness’ of DBT actually 
means for SUs. Although experiences of DBT are not entirely positive, SUs 
do tend to acknowledge that it facilitates change if one makes an active 
commitment to it (Hodgetts et al., 2007).
However, in spite of this range of efficacy, effectiveness and SU evidence, 
questions have been raised about whether DBT’s popularity has begun to 
outstrip its evidence base. Questions raised include what the necessary or 
sufficient agents of change in DBT are, whether DBT is a therapy for BPD 
or just DSH, whether personality and/or political factors have influenced the
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popularity of DBT, and whether DBT is necessarily better than any other 
long-term treatment for BPD (Feigenbaum, 2007; Scheel, 2000; Turner, 
2000; Zanarini, 2009). This paper cannot answer all these questions, and 
so seeks to focus on the evidence for the model of BPD used to inform 
DBT, from the perspective of Applied Psychology.
This is because the link from evidence for a treatment back to evidence for 
the model on which that treatment is based is weak (Salkovskis, 2002). 
That selective-serotonin uptake inhibitors (SSRIs) have been demonstrated 
to have some effectiveness for treating depression in RCTs, for example, 
cannot prove that depression is due to a serotonin deficiency. Therefore, 
experimental studies which investigate the mechanisms of change in a 
particular treatment, and provide support for (or falsify) the theories 
underpinning particular models, is another form of evidence for treatments 
based on particular models (Salkovskis, 2002). This allows for the 
integration of broader scientific research with therapeutic outcomes (Lynch 
et al., 2006). This type of evidence not only strengthens the support for the 
treatment based on the model, but also allows greater understanding and 
so development of the model, and hence clinical innovation. DBT is 
explicitly a theory-driven model. The three theories that underlie it are 
behaviourist theory, dialectical theory and DBT model of BPD (Harned et 
al., 2006). “A comprehensive understanding of the theoretical foundation of 
the treatment is necessary to ensure both effective and adherent treatment 
delivery” (Harned et al., 2006, p68). This is largely because of the complex 
needs of BPD individuals and the varying difficulties they present with; a 
formulation is seen as essential for guiding the therapist in a coherent and 
effective way through therapy (Koerner, 2006).
Behaviourist theory is not specific to DBT, and dialectical theory has been 
discussed above. This paper will therefore seek to define the DBT model of 
BPD. It will then move on to explore the evidence for the theoretical 
components of the model. A review of every individual empirical research 
study relevant to each component part of the model is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Therefore, papers which discuss the model and its evidence at 
key stages in the existence of DBT were selected for review. An attempt 
was made to review a range of sources, including the seminal text on DBT
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(Linehan, 1993), later reviews e.g. Swales & Heard (2009), as well as 
different kinds of evidence (including meta-analyses of RCTs and SU 
opinion). The focus was DBT for BPD; DBT as adapted for other or 
comorbid disorders was excluded for pragmatic reasons.
BioSocial Theory of Borderline Personality Disorder
The model of the aetiology and maintenance of BPD that is used to inform 
DBT is termed the ‘BioSocial Theory’ (Linehan, 1993). As Linehan herself 
admits, this theory is ‘speculative’ (p65). However, it is important to have a 
full understanding of the theory underpinning DBT (which includes its 
theory of BPD), as this theory informs the therapy itself (Lynch et al., 2007).
Emotional Vulnerability
The BioSocial Theory is a transactional model comprised of two elements 
(Harned et al., 2006). The first is ‘Emotional Vulnerability’, which is 
presumed to be primarily physiological in basis (Scheel, 2000), although 
this requires further investigation (Swales & Heard, 2009). It is presumed to 
be akin to/a form of temperament, and so to have a significant genetic 
contribution, and to predispose the infant to have tendencies to behave in 
certain ways. However, it is possible that heightened emotional responses 
could also arise from early emotional trauma (Feigenbaum, 2007). This 
would be consistent with the abuse histories recounted by individuals with 
BPD (discussed below). In any case, Emotional Vulnerability is theorised 
to consist of (i) emotional sensitivity -  a lower threshold for responding to 
events in an emotional way; (ii) emotional reactivity - more intense 
emotional reactions when they occur; and (iii) slow return to baseline -  
taking longer than the average person to return to the pre-reaction level of 
feeling (Linehan, 1993). Linehan makes it clear that this theory is part of an 
overall attempt to link non-clinical psychology e.g. research into personality, 
genetics, temperament to clinical work.
Invalidating Environment
The second element of the transactional BioSocial Theory is the 
‘Invalidating Environment’. The Invalidating Environment is one in which an
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individual’s communication of their internal experience (such as thoughts 
and feelings) and their self-generated behaviour are persistently and 
pervasively invalidated (Harned et al., 2006). ‘Invalidation’ in this context 
includes ignoring, trivialising or punishing (Lynch et al. 2006). This 
construes the individual’s responses to events as invalid or wrong, and/or 
attributes them to socially unacceptable characteristics (Linehan, 1993). 
Examples of types of responses that are seen as invalidating include ‘you 
feel what you say you do not’, ‘you like what you say you do not’ and ‘you 
did what you said you did not’ (Linehan, 1993). Invalidation may include 
physical, sexual and/or emotional abuse; the second example of ‘types’ can 
be seen as an implicit message within sexual abuse.
Transaction
Neither element on its own is thought to lead to BPD; they transact in a 
number of ways that lead to the later problems which can fit within the 
diagnosis. This can be seen as a form of ‘reciprocal determinism’, a 
concept taken from social learning theory, exemplified in Chess and 
Thomas’ (1986) work on temperament, in which it is demonstrated that 
‘poorness of fit’ between an infant’s temperament and their primary 
environment can lead to later difficulties. The transaction in cases of BPD is 
theorised to be as follows (Linehan, 1993): the emotionally vulnerable child 
puts demands on their caregivers, who do not always react appropriately 
(invalidation). Invalidation is aversive, and therefore suppresses the 
undesired behaviour. However, the invalidating environment does not 
provide the child with positive reinforcement or modelling, so they are 
unable to learn how to express or manage their emotions in other ways. 
Therefore (given that the emotionally vulnerable child is particularly 
sensitive and intensely emotional when aroused), their emotional 
responses will sometimes escalate to the point to which caregivers are 
forced to respond. This intermittently reinforces the behaviour whilst also 
leading to learned helplessness (as punishment is erratic). This leads to 
behaviours which place a further strain on the caregivers, leading to further 
intermittent invalidation/reinforcement.
19
There are a number of consequences of this dialectical transaction for the 
individual. As the invalidating environment does not respond appropriately 
to the individual’s experience, they become unable to trust their own 
judgement or responses, and so as a consequence become more 
dependent on external cues as to how they should feel (Linehan, 1993). 
This process of ‘self-invalidation’ involves the individual learning to 
disregard, criticise or punish themselves and their emotions due to 
observational learning (Brown, 2006). As the suppression or avoidance of 
emotion has been encouraged, they have not been able to learn how to 
label, modulate or tolerate distress (Harned et al,. 2006). The ease of this 
suppression of emotion has been oversimplified (invalidating the 
emotionally vulnerable person’s experience of difficulty controlling their 
emotions), which further deprives the individual of learning ways in which to 
manage or tolerate their emotions (Koerner, 2006). Avoidance also 
deprives the individual of opportunities to learn how to address problematic 
situations, or learn that one is not always punished for expressing emotion 
(Linehan, 1993). The over-simplification of the ease of problem-solving also 
leads to self-hate following ‘failure’ and the inability to reward oneself for 
achieving steps towards a goal (Linehan, 1993). Furthermore, as extreme 
displays of emotion (including deliberate self-harm or suicidal behaviour) 
are the only ones responded to (intermittently, leading to the most powerful 
form of operant conditioning), more adaptive ways of communicating 
distress are not learnt. Individuals with BPD are therefore thought to 
oscillate between ‘apparent competence’ and extreme impulsive 
behaviours. Most BPD behaviours, within DBT, are thought to be either 
consequences of emotional dysregulation or attempts to modulate aversive 
emotions (the effects of this modulation reinforcing the behaviour). 
Therefore, within DBT, there is a strong emphasis on viewing parasuicidal 
behaviours as coping mechanisms, rather than attempts to ‘manipulate’ 
others (Linehan et al., 2006). These behaviours arise as a result of a lack of 
key self-regulation, interpersonal and problem-solving skills (Feigenbaum, 
2007). These capability and motivational deficits continue to inhibit skilful 
behaviour and reinforce maladaptive behaviour, both by acting upon the 
individual and their environment (Swales & Heard, 2009). They relate to the 
criteria for the BPD diagnosis as follows: Impulsive behaviour regulates
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affect and elicits help, but forms a negative impression with others (which 
can lead to future invalidating environments); emotional lability leads to 
difficulties establishing a stable sense of self, as does the inhibition of one’s 
emotions (leading to feelings of numbness or emptiness); and stable 
relationships are hindered by the individual’s inability to appropriately 
regulate, tolerate or express emotion, which in turn leads to further 
emotional experiences and invalidation (Linehan, 1993).
Evidence for the BioSocial Theory
DBT is based on a model of BPD which theorises that a transactional 
relationship between an individual’s primarily biological emotional 
vulnerability and an invalidating environment leads to difficulties with 
emotional dysregulation due, in part, to a number of emotional regulation 
and other skills deficits. Evidence for the BioSocial Theory of BPD should 
substantiate its two main elements: the presence of emotional vulnerability 
and the invalidating environment.
Emotional Vulnerability:
(i) High Sensitivity to Emotional Stimuli
Linehan et al. (2006) review two studies which support this component. 
These studies compared the recognition of facial affect between women 
diagnosed with BPD, non-BPD women who reported a history of childhood 
sexual abuse (CSA), and non-clinical controls. The studies found that 
women diagnosed with BPD were more accurate at perceiving others’ 
emotions, correctly identified changes in facial affect earlier on, and were 
more sensitive in general to facial affect. Selby & Joiner (2009) review a 
study which suggests that individuals with BPD are hypervigilant to 
emotional cues on a Stroop task. Together, these findings are taken to 
support the theory that people with BPD are more sensitive to emotional 
stimuli.
(ii) Intense Emotional Reactions
Linehan et al. (2006) and Harned et al. (2006) review a number of studies 
which suggest that individuals with BPD experience more intense emotional
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reactions. These studies include self-report measures, which suggest that 
individuals with BPD report more intense affective experiences than 
individuals with other personality disorders, and that this affective 
experience more strongly predicted later BPD symptoms than CSA. Brain- 
imaging studies suggest that individuals with BPD experience greater left 
amygdala activation in response to emotional cues such as facial 
expressions and recall of traumatic life events, and decreases in/no 
increased bloodflow to regulatory areas such as the anterior cingulate 
cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex. Selby & Joiner (2009) review 
experience-sampling studies which suggest that individuals with BPD 
experience greater emotional reactions compared to non-clinical controls. 
Together, these findings are taken to support the theory that people with 
BPD experience more intense emotional reactions.
(iii) Slower Return to Baseline
There is little to no empirical evidence for the aspect of the BioSocial 
Theory which postulates that individuals with BPD take longer to return to a 
baseline level of arousal after an intense emotional response (Harned et 
al., 2006). Linehan et al. (2006) report only one study which found that 
individuals with BPD reported increased duration of subjectively-perceived 
states of aversive tension.
Invalidating Environment
High rates (66-75%) of childhood physical, sexual and emotional abuse, 
neglect and/or the separation from or loss of a primary caregiver have been 
found (by self-report) in BPD populations. The number and type of these 
experiences have been found to distinguish BPD from other diagnostic 
groups (Feigenbaum, 2007; Harned et al., 2006). However, data on other 
forms of invalidation in the aetiology of BPD are lacking (Brown, 2006). 
Relevant to the maintenance of BPD, experiences of rejection and being 
left alone (which can be construed as forms of invalidation) have been 
found to precipitate negative affect (Selby & Joiner, 2009).
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Consequences of the Invalidating Environment
Parental invalidation (punishment or minimization of children’s emotional 
expression) has been found to correlate with children’s proneness to 
frequent and/or intense negative affect and decreased socio-emotional 
competence (Harned et al., 2006). Long-term effects of CSA include 
difficulties with emotional regulation (Harned et al., 2006). This includes 
labelling emotions: maltreated toddlers have been found to have difficulty in 
learning and using words that label their own internal states (Feigenbaum, 
2007).
Limitations of the Evidence Base
Efficacy Studies
Later studies addressed the limitations of earlier studies, such as control 
conditions which suffered from a number of confounds. Improving the 
quality of the control conditions also addressed an ethical issue inherent in 
RCTs; namely, the issue of randomly assigning people experiencing mental 
distress to a treatment of inferior quality. Later studies use a control 
condition that is different from DBT but offers a similar level of input, finding 
in favour of DBT. There is therefore an impressive amount of evidence for 
therapeutic gains which are attributable to DBT. However, the efficacy data 
continues to suffer from a number of limitations. Although all but one of the 
RCTs carried out included ratings of adherence to the model, none 
included competence ratings, because such a rating has yet to be 
developed (Lynch et al., 2007). This limits the potential to conclude that the 
effects found in those studies are due to specific DBT interventions.
Relatively few of the RCTs involve male and/or ethnic minority clients 
(Lynch et al., 2007). Also, the efficacy data focuses on Stage I (of IV) DBT 
(which focuses on DSH). Therefore, there is limited evidence for the 
complete vision of DBT, which is as a comprehensive treatment for BPD 
(Feigenbaum, 2007; Lynch et al., 2007; Widiger, 2000). This limitation has 
also been raised as a concern by SUs (Hodgetts et al., 2007).
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Intervention
There is limited evidence for specific components of DBT (Lynch et al., 
2007). There is also no data which identifies which components are 
necessary or sufficient for the gains demonstrated in efficacy studies 
(Linehan et al., 2006). Current data does suggest that skills training alone is 
not beneficial (Scheel, 2000). However, in defence of the skill-set, it was 
derived either from non-clinical research on emotion of from therapy 
procedures that had already been found to be efficacious for Axis I 
disorders (Linehan et al., 2006). Therefore, as components are drawn from 
areas of psychological research which have demonstrated their own 
effectiveness, one can argue that limited further evidence is needed 
(Turner, 2000).
BioSocial Theory
The BioSocial theory posits the development of emotional dysregulation, 
but is unclear as to why dysregulated behaviours are required to reduce 
negative affect rather than less destructive behaviours e.g. reading, talking 
to a friend (Selby & Joiner, 2009). Selby & Joiner (2009) posit that an act 
which produces significant physical sensations is required to break a cycle 
of rumination that leads to emotional dysregulation. Further research is 
needed to develop and substantiate the BioSocial Theory. In particular, 
more evidence is needed for ‘slow return to baseline' (particularly evidence 
that does not rely on self-report) and for the theorised consequences of the 
transaction between emotional vulnerability and an invalidating 
environment. It is admittedly a challenge to substantiate psychological 
models of disorders because prospective designs are often ruled out, 
recruiting large enough sample sizes can be difficult, and a significant 
amount of resources is required to research relatively specific aspects.
Summary and Reflections
I selected the topic of this review because I am providing individual DBT on 
my placement. I was sorry not to be able to include a discussion of the term 
‘Personality Disorder’, the language of diagnosis or the medical model; 
Pilgrim (2001) and Arntz (1999) discuss the issue. Leaving this aside, my
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impression was that “the empirical-minded, hypotheses-generating and - 
verifying frame that DBT case conceptualization sits within requires a 
flexible mind and skill at logical and scientific testing of hypotheses” 
(Koerner, 2006, p344). This seemed to make it an ideal treatment for 
Clinical Psychologists. Also, DBT seemed to be, at first glance, a 
psychological therapy strongly based on theory and evidence taken from 
not only clinical psychology but also non-clinical research. Therefore, I 
wanted to verify whether my impressions were correct. I also wanted to 
establish for myself whether the impression DBT has created (as the 
efficacious treatment for BPD) was really warranted.
My review of the literature suggests that the model of DBT draws strongly 
on a number of elements of non-clinical psychological research e.g. 
temperament, social learning theory, behaviourism. I personally believe 
Linehan is to be commended for making these kinds of theory-practice 
links. I believe that she is also to be commended for developing an 
approach which explicitly attempts to cultivate a non-pejorative 
understanding of people with BPD, as in my experience within the NHS, 
this has not been the approach of all professionals. DBT is based on a 
model which is both coherent and also attempts to be personally 
meaningful to the individual with BPD.
However, I was left somewhat disappointed by the amount of empirical 
evidence available to support this model and the approach based on it. 
Whilst there is some evidence for the BioSocial Theory, the ‘proof appears 
to be largely in the proverbial ‘pudding’ i.e. the evidence that supports the 
selection of DBT as a treatment approach for BPD continues, in the main, 
to be efficacy study data, just as with any other psychological therapy. As 
discussed, this is an important level of evidence, but from an Applied 
Psychology perspective, I had also hoped for more underlying evidence at 
the level of the model and its components. However, reviewing the 
literature has developed my appreciation of the difficulties involved in 
generating this kind of evidence, given the practical difficulties of such 
research. It has also made me question whether, at a service level, such 
research is necessary or recognised, given the current ‘gold-standard’ of 
RCTs. In reality, perhaps commissioners are unlikely to be interested in
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studies which demonstrate the validity of a model or specific components of 
an intervention (although these would be of use to clinicians applying the 
model to an individual). Rather, it appears to be the broader data of efficacy 
studies which continues to be of interest and use to the wider system. This 
data supports the application of DBT as one of a number of possible 
treatment options for BPD. However, claims that it is “the only treatment for 
BPD considered... efficacious’’ (Lynch et al., 2007, p201) are perhaps 
somewhat exaggerated, as there are a number of other possible treatment 
options (Zanarini, 2009), and SUs report being concerned by the limitations 
of DBT and the fact that it is often the only treatment offered (Hodgetts et 
al., 2007). Further research (outlined above) is needed to develop the DBT 
model and support its application in order to address these limitations and 
concerns.
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Problem-Based Learning Reflective Account I
Relationship to Change
Year One
March 2010
32
The Problem-Based Learning Exercise
The Presentation
The task was for each Personal and Professional Development (PPD) 
Group to develop a presentation with the title ‘Relationship to Change’. Our 
group focussed on resistance to change in a therapeutic context. This was 
done in a ‘theatrical’ style, using a role-play of a teaching session 
(incorporating a number of teaching aids, including a simulated video of 
therapy sessions).
We outlined two cognitive models of resistance (Leahy, 2002; Leahy, 2007) 
and some psychodynamic ideas about resistance (Auld et al., 2005; Freud, 
1933). We then presented a number of therapeutic perspectives on 
facilitating change/overcoming resistance (Auld et al., 2005; Buckley, 1996; 
Leahy, 2001). Rollnick & Miller’s (1991) Motivational Interviewing (Ml) was 
presented didactically. Some specific Ml techniques were then illustrated 
using role-play.
Development of the Presentation
Initially, the group had very broad discussions around the topic of ‘change’. 
Different types of, factors affecting and levels of change were considered 
e.g. health, motivation, developmental. A number of theories of or relevant 
to change were mentioned e.g. the Transtheoretical Model of Change 
(Levesque et al., 2001), Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1989), and 
Attribution Theory (Weiner, 1979). Between-session work was divided up 
equally between members (although amount of work actually done was 
self-determined); each researched areas of interest in order to inform 
further group discussion. This covered a wide range of topics.
‘Resistance to change’ and ‘Facilitating change/Overcoming resistance’ 
were identified as key themes of these topics in which members were 
interested. Members therefore agreed to carry out further research with a 
narrowed-down focus on these themes. At this point, the material which
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was eventually covered in the presentation was developed. Material on 
other types of change e.g. in an organisational context was therefore 
dropped during this stage. The group tried to keep in mind possible ways of 
incorporating everyone’s early contributions, but acknowledged that this 
would not be possible due to the limits of the presentation.
The Group Process
Throughout the above stages, the group had borne in mind how the ideas 
discussed could be developed to make an interesting final presentation. 
This was quickly developed over one session. This experience is hard to 
articulate as it was a creative brainstorm which developed in an organic 
way, building upon and combining the ideas of different members. This 
reflects a strength of the group process as a whole: we shared roles and 
work collaboratively.
As well as developing the presentation collaboratively, the group strived to 
include all members in the production of and carrying out the presentation 
itself. Some members showed more enthusiasm for some roles e.g. 
development of props, taking part in the role-play than others, and so roles 
were volunteered for rather than being allocated, perhaps with the 
exception of my role, which was quite prominent in the presentation and 
involved coordinating the other members and drawing things together. I 
wonder whether this could be seen as a form of parallel process (McNeill & 
Worthen, 1989), in which my role in the presentation reflected the role I 
may have taken in the group as a whole: I was not forthright, but would step 
in when it felt necessary and draw together the discussion to keep us 
focussed on the task. However, as was also reflected in the presentation, 
there seemed to be no need for a clear, consistent leader; people 
contributed more-or-less equally to the content of discussions, the structure 
of meetings and the direction the presentation took.
As a group, we reflected on how we seemed to have worked well together. 
Members had initially felt anxious about how the group would perform, 
about how broad the task appeared, and how they would be perceived by 
the other members. For some members, managing this anxiety and 
contributing to the group were made easier by the absence of the group’s
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course team facilitator, as they felt more able to take responsibility for the 
task and to be less concerned about being judged for their ideas when she 
was absent. We wondered whether being task-focussed, and the ability of 
members to relinquish control of their ideas and the direction the group 
took, facilitated the apparent ease with which we worked together on this 
exercise. The role I played in the group may have contributed to this, as I 
both attempted to focus the group on the task after lengthy discussions, 
and also was willing to let go of my ideas about the content and format of 
the presentation. However, I do not see myself as being the only group 
member who did this, as the other members also displayed a balance of 
being task- and relations-oriented (Hellriegel et al., 1992, cited in Furnham, 
1997), attending to the needs of both the task and the group, without 
unhelpfully prioritising themselves. At this point, it is difficult to say why this 
was; a serendipitous mix of personalities may have contributed.
Applying the Problem-Based Learning to Placement
The Content of the Presentation
Leahy’s (2007) model of emotional schemas has usefully informed my 
understanding of a number of clients’ difficulties. For example, exploring the 
beliefs a client presenting with depression has about low mood and the 
expression of negative emotions or critical sentiments associated with 
these, particularly within a family context, has helped me hypothesise about 
the role of these beliefs in the origins and maintenance of her difficulties, 
thus aiding my formulation.
The importance of developing a safe therapeutic relationship was 
emphasised in our presentation (Buckley, 1996). This has been useful to 
me, because I have concerns about my ability to develop the therapeutic 
relationship. I think that these concerns have arisen from comments by 
others (both in personal and professional relationships) that I can be 
reserved and that this can prevent forming a bond with me. It can also lead 
to others feeling judged negatively by me. The importance of validation 
within Ml (Rollnick & Miller, 1991) has helped me to address this concern. 
Validating client’s difficulties, their attempts to overcome them and their 
struggle with therapy has helped me to develop the therapeutic relationship
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with some clients. My concerns about my interpersonal skills have also 
been somewhat assuaged by positive feedback within the PPD Group.
The ideas we explored about formulating a client’s apparent resistance 
(Auld et al., 2005) have informed my work with one particular client with 
difficulties with obsessions, who stated (after two assessment sessions) 
that she couldn’t help but wonder whether a qualified therapist would have 
‘cured’ her by that point. Incorporating this statement into the formulation, 
as a function of her expectations about therapy, her beliefs about anxiety 
and her beliefs about the nature of intrusive thoughts, helped both to move 
therapy forwards in a positive direction, and also maintain a working 
therapeutic relationship from my perspective. I could have held on to my 
initial feelings that it was an attack on my competence, but having learnt 
about the importance of formulating apparent resistance helped me to 
reframe the statement in a less threatening and more productive way.
The Experience of Working in the Group
I found the initial sessions frustrating: “the discussion was very slow and 
unstructured... My own motivation can slip when there is no direction” (RJ, 
29/09/09)\  We seemed to reiterate discussions about change in general, 
go over a variety of topics and deviate from the task at hand. At the time I 
did not realise that others were experiencing similar anxieties; this only 
emerged in our group reflection at the end of the task. My frustrations with 
the rate of progress also turned out to be unfounded, as the group pulled 
together to produce a very pleasing presentation. Working on this task has 
therefore highlighted for me that it is not necessary for me to feel wholly 
responsible for trying to manage the group. I also learnt that there may be a 
number of processes going on e.g. Impression Management (Leary, 1995) 
that can lead to people downplaying their own abilities or concerns. I will 
therefore try to enjoy group work more by being more open to the ideas and 
abilities of others and by letting go of trying to control the outcome of the 
group’s work down to the last detail.
1 Dated Reflective Journal (RJ) entries are included to illustrate my thoughts.
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Another insight that I have gained from this exercise is that I could benefit 
from giving greater consideration to the views of others. My first placement 
evaluation suggestions that I am reasonably good at identifying my own 
learning needs and receiving constructive feedback. However, in group 
contexts there is the danger that I prioritise my own view and am not 
inviting enough of the views of others. This was, in fact, feedback I received 
on the group task as part of the selection process at Surrey. Thus, I need to 
actively elicit others’ perspectives and consider how these may improve 
upon my own. On placement, Dialectical Behaviour Therapy group 
supervision encourages me to take an approach in which I seek out the 
valid points in others’ perspectives and create a synthesis from these, 
rather than simply arguing my own case and trying to impose this view on 
others (Linehan, 1993). Therefore, this has given me an opportunity to 
address the above learning need, by actively seek out the validity of other 
professionals’ views.
On the other hand, I need to balance not being unnecessarily critical with 
taking an active role in groups. I feel like the role I have described (of 
taking a critical perspective and attempting to organise the group) is one I 
often take; at school one teacher described me as a ‘prophet crying in the 
wilderness’ because I took a view on a piece of literature that was contrary 
to all the other members of my class, and yet which he agreed with. 
Therefore, one of the insights I gained from working in the group was into 
my need to strike a balance between learning to manage my own 
frustrations and anxieties about the way a group works (when that is 
different from the way I would work as an individual) and pro-actively 
contributing to that group and offering my perspective on it in an 
appropriate way. I wonder how easy I will find it, both within the PPD Group 
and in other contexts, to explore my concerns and experiences about the 
issue at hand with the other members in a non-confrontational way. ‘‘[When 
I] was chair, [I] found it really frustrating that some people hadn’t taken 
responsibility... I tried to just keep bringing us back on track, being clear, 
inviting views etc. Not sure how impatient I seemed” (RJ, 20/10/09).
Considering this issue has informed my attempts to accept and appreciate 
the different approaches and perspectives of other multidisciplinary team
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(MDT) members on placement, whilst also trying to develop the confidence 
to endeavour to put across the psychological perspective in what can be 
lengthy and medical model-dominated discussions. “Still finding that 
balance between working at my individual maximum capacity and 
respecting the ways of other group members/not rubbing other people up 
the wrong way by being too forceful” (RJ, 28/10/09).
Evaluation of the Exercise
I believe that MDT work is an important aspect of being a Clinical 
Psychologist, as it is a key way of communicating the psychological 
perspective to a wider set of professionals, and thus having a wider and 
more significant impact on the experiences of service users and carers 
(British Psychological Society, 2007). This work is something that I find 
particularly challenging, given my concerns about how best to appropriately 
and effectively communicate a different perspective. Therefore, I am glad 
that the exercise gave me the opportunity to engage in reflection on my role 
and personal style in group settings. I would welcome further teaching on 
group and MDT work by the University. I also hope to learn from modelling 
by my current and future supervisors. I continue to experiment with 
exploring my own style in the PPD Group, on placement and within the 
cohort as a whole.
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Personal and Professional Development Group 
Process Account I
(Summary)
Year One 
September 2010
This account describes the formation and development of the group 
over my first year of training. The group worked well together on set 
tasks, as group members were not too competitive and were flexible 
about allowing their ideas to be dropped. However, it struggled to find 
purpose for and structure itself. This appeared to be due to a number 
of external factors: the group was convened by the Course and a 
number of set tasks were imposed on it. Furthermore, due to the 
stage of the development of the group and our period in training, it 
did not feel safe enough to address difficult group process issues 
within the group. However, we have now worked together to address 
these issues and plan for the future, to make the group more 
meaningful and useful to us.
I describe how, within the group, I felt that the role of 'organiser' was 
located within me, but how I initially struggled to be open within the 
group. However, I became more relaxed and confident with the 
group, which improved my engagement with it, learning from others 
and contribution to others' learning. Furthermore, I was able to apply 
my experiences within the group to placement, and received
feedback (both positive and negative) about the development o f my 
style in sharing a psychological perspective with MDT colleagues.
I reflect on the position the group is now in, and how this perhaps 
could not have occurred any earlier in the group’s life.
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Professional Issues Essay
Clinical psychologists are expected to take a 
clinical leadership role in mental health teams. 
What themes, approaches and evidence might 
inform our understanding of a clinical 
leadership position and its usefulness to
others?
Year Two
January 2011
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Introduction
I shall first discuss themes and approaches to defining and understanding 
what clinical leadership is and what it involves. Then I shall explore the 
evidence that it can be useful to others, including service users, carers and 
staff. I do not expect this essay to be a comprehensive review of the 
literature pertaining to the above issues; rather, I aim to put forward an 
argument that is sufficiently-supported by adequate available references. 
Throughout, I shall endeavour to make this argument specific to clinical 
psychology, particularly by drawing on my experiences to date as a trainee.
In this context, I shall conclude by deconstructing the assumption that 
‘clinical psychologists are expected to take a clinical leadership role’. I note 
that, although the definition of, and literature on, clinical leadership 
suggests that clinical psychologists are well-placed to fulfil this role to the 
advantage of service users and carers, whether clinical psychologists are 
expected to take on this role in practice is unclear. There is a need for 
trainee clinical psychologists to be better-prepared for leadership roles and 
for the profession as a whole to raise awareness within the National Health 
Service (NHS) that we can, and perhaps should, be clinical leaders.
What is a clinical leadership role?
The definition of clinical leadership has been contested (Llewelyn & 
Cuthbertson, 2009), which makes it necessary to develop a working 
definition for the purpose of this essay. Leadership in general has been 
defined as “making appropriate strategic interventions in order to motivate 
and give direction” (West, 2004, p52). Clinical leadership in particular is the 
application of this process in a clinical setting; thus, a clinical leader has 
been defined as “an expert clinician, involved in providing direct clinical 
care, who influences others to improve the care they provide” (Cook, 2004, 
p437). Leadership can occur at many levels, with definitions of clinical 
leadership tending to emphasise involvement at a local level: “Clinical 
leadership is about facilitating evidence-based practice and improved 
patient outcomes through local care” (Millward & Bryan, 2005).
As well as defining the role of the clinical leader themselves, papers on 
clinical leadership also draw attention to the importance that context plays 
in affecting the clinical leader’s ability to fulfil this role. For leaders to be 
effective, they have to have sufficient ‘followers’, both in terms of quality 
and quantity, whose trust and support they have gained (Cook, 2001). 
Consistent with field theory (Lewin, 1948 cited in Millward & Bryan, 2005), 
local factors e.g. professional credibility as perceived within the team will 
have a more significant effect on the behaviour of both leaders and 
followers than more distal factors. However, more remote factors e.g. 
organisational culture, national policy, economic conditions will also affect 
the followers’ relationship with the leader, their status and the resources 
available to them with which to inform their interventions (Millward & Bryan, 
2005). Clinical leaders’ relationship with these contexts that influence 
clinical leadership is seen as being bi-directional (Llewelyn & Cuthbertson, 
2009), which I understand as meaning not just that one must accept the 
influence of proximal and distal factors on the leader, but also that the 
leader can attempt to influence these factors in return in order to increase 
their ability to fulfil their role e.g. campaigning for a change in national 
policy in order to increase the availability of resources at a local level.
Based on these published definitions, my understanding of clinical 
leadership is therefore that it involves a practising clinician influencing 
others with whom they work in a purposeful way in order to improve the 
care that service users receive, in line with an evidence-base. The context, 
at both a wider (policy and political) and a local (service) level, in which the 
clinical leader operates is a significant factor affecting their fulfilment of this 
role, as the former will affect their autonomy as leaders, and the latter will 
mediate the effectiveness of their attempted interventions. Therefore, as 
well as influencing at a local level, clinical leaders may be required to act at 
a more distal level in order to enhance the effectiveness of their attempted 
interventions at a local level.
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What does a clinical leadership position involve?
My understanding of clinical leadership therefore includes both the qualities 
and behaviours of the individual clinical leader as well as the context in 
which they operate. In this section, I shall focus on the characteristics and 
skills required of clinical leaders in general; in a later section I shall discuss 
the contextual issues affecting clinical psychologists as clinical leaders in 
particular. There is an extensive literature on leadership characteristics and 
styles that it would be impossible to cover within this essay. Therefore, I 
shall attempt to outline and summarise a selection of approaches that 
appear to be relevant to considering what qualities and skills clinical 
psychologists as clinical leaders should possess and/or develop.
The NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement (NHS III) developed a 
Leadership Qualities Framework (NHS III, 2006a) that delineates a model 
of leadership developed by their research group. The research group 
developed the competency model by reviewing over 20 existing leadership 
models and integrating this with data gained from interviewing/consulting 
with over 200 people, including NHS and Department of Health staff, and 
patient representatives (NHS III, 2006b). Therefore, it is a theoretical model 
based on theory and opinion rather than one derived from empirical 
research into what qualities in a leader have been proven to facilitate 
effective leadership. However, it does provide a useful starting-point for 
outlining the extensive literature that exists on leadership qualities; I shall 
later review the empirical evidence for the effectiveness of clinical 
leadership.
The NHS Leadership Qualities Framework (LQF) lists fifteen qualities that 
successful NHS leaders possess. These are clustered into three groups. 
Box 1 outlines these qualities. These mostly appear to be self-explanatory, 
with some requiring a little further explanation: ‘Seizing the future’ refers to 
making the most of current opportunities to transform services in line with a 
vision for the future; ‘Leading change through people’ refers to attending to 
the needs of staff involved in change, using collaboration and the provision 
of information to influence and involve people; ‘Holding to account’ refers to 
measuring and maintaining performance standards; and ‘Collaborative
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working’ refers explicitly to working with all external as well as internal 
stakeholders, and with diversity.
‘Personal Qualities’
Self-belief 
Self-awareness 
Self-management 
Drive for improvement 
Personal integrity
‘Setting Direction’
Seizing the future 
Intellectual flexibility 
Broad scanning 
Political astuteness 
Drive for results
‘Delivering the Service’
Leading change through people 
Holding to account 
Empowering others 
Effective and strategic influencing 
Collaborative working
Box One: NHS Leadership Qualities Framework
The NHS LQF thus provides a useful list of qualities for all NHS leaders; 
another framework is being developed specifically for clinical leaders, which 
lists similar qualities arranged differently (NHS III, 2010b). However, these 
qualities to me seem to encapsulate the ‘what’ a clinical leader should be or 
do, rather than the ‘how’ they should actually implement clinical leadership 
(although the full LQF gives further details of each quality), which is an 
equally important issue. The ‘Personal Qualities’ cluster seems, to me, self- 
evident and self-explanatory in terms of what it requires; ‘Seizing Direction’ 
also (when one unpacks some of the jargon) refers to some straightforward 
personal qualities. ‘Delivering the Service’, however, which appears to refer 
largely to interpersonal processes, appears less straightforward to 
implement, so I shall discuss it further below.
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Drawing on the organisational psychology literature, West (2004) connects 
some of the domains of leadership captured in the ‘Delivering the Service’ 
cluster of qualities to specific leadership skills. In particular, he describes 
how leaders should communicate enthusiasm and optimism if they wish to 
motivate and influence others, which is supported by personality trait 
research which suggests that Extraversion predicts emergent leadership 
(O’Connor & Jackson, 2010). West (2004) also describes how leaders 
should attend to the psychological needs of their followers, both intra- and 
inter-personally, using active, opening and reflective listening. This is 
supported by qualitative research with nurses who reported experiencing 
effective clinical leaders as supportive and respectful, as well as pushing 
for change (Cook & Leathard, 2004). These skills are sometimes subsumed 
under the heading of ‘Emotional Intelligence’, which has been 
conceptualised as including empathy and relationship management skills 
(Llewelyn & Cuthbertson, 2009).
Thus, a clinical leader should possess a range of qualities and skills. Some 
relate more to the self: self-confidence, self-awareness and emotion 
regulation (including tolerance of uncertainty). Others are more 
cognitive/intellectual, such as critical thinking and political awareness, as 
well as possessing and being able to articulate a justifiable vision for what 
the provision of care should look like, at both an individual and a service 
level. A further set of skills suggests that clinical leaders should relate to 
others ‘charismatically’ (West, 2004): express positive emotions such as 
enthusiasm, appreciation and realistic optimism; and attend to the 
psychological states of those one is attempting to influence. Leaders must 
be able to apply these skills in order to initiate structure in a task-focussed 
manner whilst remaining persuasive of and considerate to others 
(O’Connor & Jackson, 2010). I shall consider later how these qualities can 
be mapped onto those of clinical psychologists; first, having defined clinical 
leadership and delineated qualities associated with it, I shall explore the 
evidence that clinical leaders possessing these qualities can be useful to 
others.
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Evidence for the utility of clinical leadership
Utility of clinical leadership to service users
It seems uncontroversial to state that the usefulness of a clinical leadership 
position should be evaluated by the extent to which it facilitates improving 
the experience of service users and carers (Ham, 2003). At the beginning 
of the 21st century, when some locate the beginning of the ‘renaissance’ of 
clinical leadership (Cook, 2001), the notion of the importance of having 
clinical leaders seemed to outstrip the evidence base i.e. calls were made 
to increase the number of clinical leaders, and investment was put into 
developing competency models and training programmes, whilst there was 
still a need for research into what leadership practices were actually 
effective (Cook & Leathard, 2004; Ham, 2003). (Sweeping, ideology- or 
public opinion-led changes that come before an evidence base has been 
developed or without applying appropriate evaluation methods seem to be 
de rigeur in the NHS, based on my experience.) However, there has been 
some research which allows me to present an outline of evidence which 
suggests that clinical leadership can indeed improve outcomes for service 
users.
A study correlating 184 service users’ satisfaction with their care and 
quality of life (self-reported) with the leadership styles of leaders from 31 
clinical teams (as rated by the leaders and their staff, totalling 616) found 
that both transformational and transactional leadership styles were 
positively associated with service users’ satisfaction and quality of life 
(Corrigan et al. 2000). Transformational and transactional styles can be 
construed as variations in the combinations of leadership qualities (as 
described above) that are applied both in response to the needs of the 
situation but also as is more congruent with the individual leader’s style. 
Transformational leadership is usually described as being more 
‘charismatic’ and attending more to the relationships with followers, both in 
terms of inspiring them with a vision of the future as well as motivating 
through attending to interpersonal relationships; transactional leadership is 
more task-focussed and succeeds by giving clear direction, guidance and 
rewards for achievement (West, 2004). Thus, it could be said that these
different ‘styles’ of leadership are different emphases on the range of skills 
clinical leaders should possess; Table 1 (taken from West, 2004) offers a 
way of selecting a style appropriate to the situation.
Table 1: Selecting Leadership Styles
Style Task
Requirements
Skill, 
Confidence 
& Motivation 
of Staff
Leader’s Activities 
(distinctive to this 
style)
Directive
Transactional
Unclear
Difficult
Low Provide goals, 
guidance & rewards.
Achievement-
Oriented
Transactional
Clear High Set challenging 
goals, communicate 
high expectations & 
provide rewards.
Supportive
(Transformational)
Clear Low Show concern.
Participative
(Transformational)
Unclear
Complex
High Consult before 
making decisions.
Preliminary evidence suggested that both transactional and 
transformational styles of clinical leadership could have a positive impact 
on service users’ experiences. A systematic review of 44 papers, with a 
strong and clear method (in terms of specified inclusion/exclusion criteria, 
search strategy, assessment of methodological quality, data collection and 
analysis), qualifies this picture (Pearson et al. 2007). Although no one 
leadership style is solely associated with positive outcomes for service 
users, transformational leadership is associated with more than any other, 
most notably patient satisfaction and quality of life. A separate systematic 
review paper, which analysed seven papers and had a similarly strong
51
method (although was weaker in that it was unclear how the relationship 
between leadership style and outcome was measured across the seven 
papers) also found that transformational leadership was associated with a 
reduced number of ‘adverse events’ (in a physical health setting) for 
patients (Wong & Cummings, 2007). This accords with a psychological 
position statement on clinical leadership in healthcare that concludes that 
there is greater evidence for the superiority of transformational leadership 
(Millward & Bryan, 2005). Whichever style they use, clinical leaders need to 
be authentic i.e. appropriately display their strengths, differences and 
passion to motivate and value followers (Johnson, 2009).
However, although there is evidence that clinical leadership is usefully 
associated with a number of positive outcomes for service users, this 
research is limited by being correlational. Therefore, there is a need for 
more quasi-experimental research e.g. a longitudinal study of a service, 
measuring performance at one period, with a leader who utilises one style 
(or no style), and then again after a period of time with a leader who utilises 
a different style. Future research could also benefit from using a wider 
range of service user outcomes e.g. actual therapy outcome measures.
Utility of a clinical leadership position to staff
Nonetheless, evidence suggests that good clinical leadership can have a 
positive effect on service users’ experience of services. In considering a 
clinical leadership position’s usefulness to others, it seems to me helpful to 
consider its usefulness to staff as well as service users, as this may help 
explain how clinical leadership can have positive effects for service users. 
Research has shown that local leadership factors (particularly the quality of 
the relationship of the leader with their ‘followers’) can affect staff 
‘outcomes’ such as intention to leave, absenteeism, staff turnover, job 
commitment and satisfaction (Millward & Bryan, 2005). The large 
systematic review outlined above supports this view and also adds ‘staff 
extra effort’ to this picture (Pearson et al. 2007). Therefore, there is strong 
evidence that clinical leadership can be useful to staff. However, further 
research is needed into how to cultivate an organisational culture which
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encourages staff to be effective ‘followers’ (Ham, 2003). Nonetheless, I 
shall now explore ways in which clinical leadership can be useful to staff.
Having a positive impact on staff experiences may be a key mechanism by 
which clinical leaders can affect service user experiences (Wong & 
Cummings, 2007). The most obvious component to this is whereby clinical 
leaders directly influence specific behaviours on the part of other clinicians 
that then lead to improved care for the service users. In addition to direct 
intervention, however, these behaviours may be indirectly mediated by the 
level of staff expertise in the service, which will be increased if staff 
turnover is reduced, as staff will remain in the service longer and so 
(theoretically/hopefully) consolidate their skills and knowledge and get 
better at their job. Staff turnover is likely to be reduced if job satisfaction is 
higher, which the research suggests good clinical leadership results in.
Furthermore, good clinical leadership is associated with effective team- 
working (Onyett, 2007). By facilitating effective team-working using the 
skills described above, a good clinical leader can improve the work context 
and improve patient care through their effect on the system in which the 
service user is involved (Wong & Cummings, 2007). One way in which 
good leaders appear to facilitate effective team-working is by increasing the 
valid contributions from all members of the team, regardless of their status 
(Nembhard & Edmonson, 2006). As defined above, a clinical leader will 
work collaboratively with all relevant stakeholders, which increases the 
expertise available to the team to deal with the tasks before it. By attending 
to group process and by showing invitation and appreciation for others’ 
contributions, a facilitative leader can increase the ‘psychological safety’ of 
all members of the team, which in turn increases their willingness to 
contribute, which in turn increases the team’s involvement in healthcare 
improvement initiatives (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006).
A final mechanism through which clinical leadership may be useful to staff 
and hence service users and carers is through the attention to the 
psychological needs and occupational development of individual staff 
(Alleyne & Jumaa, 2007). By providing space for staff to consider their own
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needs and how to meet these, clinical leaders can increase the capacity of 
staff not just to ‘get on with the day job’ but also to improve services.
Utility of a clinical leadership position from a service user 
and carer perspective
I had wished to explore how service users and carers had experienced a 
clinical leadership position, but there appears to be no published research 
on this. Accounts are available suggesting how experiences of meeting 
clinical psychologists directly have been helpful to service users (e.g. 
Anonymous, 2010), but there seem to be no accounts of how service users 
have experienced services as run by a good clinical leader, or even 
whether they have noticed the development of the role (although these may 
exist in sources to which I do not have access e.g. service user 
newsletters). The NHS Leadership Qualities Framework (NHS III, 2006a) 
was developed to include patient representative consultation, so I hope that 
the model of clinical leadership I have presented above is at least partly 
acceptable to service users. In any case, based on my experience, I 
assume that service users and carers are most concerned with the 
provision of good services, regardless of how these are achieved or led, so 
if clinical leaders, possessing the qualities and skills delineated above, can 
improve services (which the evidence suggests they can), then I imagine 
that this would meet with service users’ and carers’ approval.
Clinical psychologists as clinical leaders
I have discussed my understanding of clinical leadership in general and 
how it can be useful to others. I now wish to relate the above themes and 
approaches to clinical psychology in particular, and explore how clinical 
psychologists possess a number of the qualities attributed to clinical 
leaders. As a starting-point, I shall consider the British Psychological 
Society’s (BPS) Division of Clinical Psychology’s (DCP) Clinical Psychology 
Leadership Development Framework, which seeks to map the 
competencies identified in the NHS Proposed Leadership Competency 
Framework for Clinical Professionals (NHS III, 2010b), which builds on the
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NHS Leadership Qualities Framework (NHS III, 2006a), onto clinical 
psychologists (DCP, 2010).
The Clinical Psychology Leadership Development Framework states that 
the personal qualities of those in the profession, our professional skills 
(including core psychological competencies and relationship skills including 
engagement and collaboration) and knowledge can inform effective 
leadership. The complete document includes a wide range of competencies 
and what these would look like for psychologists; Table 2 gives an 
illustrative example for each domain.
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Table 2: Clinical Psychology Leadership Development Framework-
Illustrative Examples
Clinical Leadership Competency 
Framework
Domain -  Element - Definition
Example corresponding 
outcome for practising 
Clinical Psychologists
Demonstrating personal qualities
Managing yourself
Organising and managing themselves while 
taking account of the needs and priorities of 
others.
Facilitating team reflection 
using knowledge of team 
dynamics.
Working with others
Building and maintaining relationships
Listening, supporting others, gaining trust and 
showing understanding.
Emotional intelligence.
Managing Services
Managing people
Providing direction, reviewing performance, 
motivating others and promoting equality and 
diversity.
Engage with and 
supervise other 
professionals looking to 
use/adopt psychological 
ways of working.
Improving Services
Critically evaluating
Being able to think analytically, conceptually 
and to identify where services can be 
improved.
Lead on audit.
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Setting Direction Lead on the use of
Applying knowledge and evidence
literature reviews/outcome 
measures/data.
Gathering information to produce an evidence-
based challenge to systems and processes in
order to identify opportunities for service
improvements.
Broadly speaking, the Clinical Psychology Leadership Development 
Framework illustrates how the characteristics of the profession are 
consistent with those of clinical leaders, when compared with the definition 
of clinical leadership I offered above (Llewelyn & Cuthbertson, 2009): Self- 
awareness and emotion regulation (including tolerance of uncertainty) are 
vital parts of our development as psychological therapists, as is relating to 
others positively; considering ethical issues is an important part of training; 
critical thinking is a key skill for any psychologist; attending to the 
psychological states of others is a sine qua non of psychological­
mindedness; and clinical psychologists, as scientist-practitioners, are, by 
their training, oriented towards an evidence base and appropriate outcome 
measurement, which lends itself to evaluating and improving services. The 
personable personal qualities of those entering the profession and our 
training in psychological knowledge, reflexivity, critical thinking, outcome 
measurement, service evaluation and research, ethics and collaborative 
working would appear, to me, to strongly support clinical psychologists 
being clinical leaders in mental health teams (Lake, 2009).
However, these are documents written by clinical psychologists, so one 
might expect them to be biased in favour of our profession! Nonetheless, 
when one reads papers on clinical leadership written by non-psychologists, 
the self-evidence of the mapping of the qualities and professional skills of 
clinical psychologists onto those of clinical leaders seems obvious. For 
example, Cook (2001) writes how clinical leaders need to be trained in 
research, be able to “assess evidence, formulate solutions and evaluate 
their effectiveness” (p44) and reflect on their clinical experience, which 
seems to me to be describing clinical psychologists as reflective scientist-
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practitioners. Ham (2004) writes how clinical leaders need to be skilled in 
service evaluation and development, and to be able to see services from a 
patient’s perspective, which seems to me to be embedded in clinical 
psychology training and the psychological mindset. As a final example of 
non-psychologists defining and describing clinical leadership in ways that 
map neatly onto the qualities and skills of clinical psychologists, Cook & 
Leathard (2004) write how effective clinical leaders challenge the status 
quo, share knowledge, deal with systemic issues, manage themselves and 
others and are patient-focussed. Thus, by comparing the nature of the 
profession against the definitions of clinical leadership (including those 
offered by non-psychologists), one can see that clinical psychologists are, 
by nature and training, well-suited to be clinical leaders.
Are clinical psychologists really expected to take a 
clinical leadership role in mental health teams?
However, although clinical psychologists are well-suited to the important 
role of clinical leader, in my experience we are not thought of in this way, 
and so I wish to deconstruct this essay title’s assumption that ‘clinical 
psychologists are expected to take a clinical leadership role’, by exploring 
whether we are; if so, by whom; and if not, why not and what can be done 
about this.
The call for clinical leaders within the NHS has been a generic one: the 
Department of Health’s (DoH) Knowledge and Skills Framework, which 
embeds leadership qualities in clinicians’ roles as set by the Agenda for 
Change, does not specify particular professions as being suitable for 
leadership roles -  leadership qualities are tied to the band level at which a 
clinician is working, not their professional background (DoH, 2004). Even 
the BPS document New Ways of Working for Applied Psychologists 
(Onyett, 2007) states that no one discipline has the monopoly on being 
suitable for clinical leadership roles. This attitude is reflected in the wide 
range of professions that the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement 
consulted when developing the Proposed Leadership Competency 
Framework for Clinical Professionals: psychologists were simply one of
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over 30 professional groups consulted, which included optometrists, 
physiotherapists and chiropodists (NHS III, 2010b).
Furthermore, not only are clinical psychologists not singled out as being 
suitable for clinical leadership, we appear to be often neglected when it 
comes to this role. Based on my experience on placement, clinical 
psychologists are still thought of as psychological therapists, subservient to 
psychiatrists or other care coordinators, whose role is to take referrals from 
these other professionals as they plan service users’ care. This neglect of 
clinical psychologists as clinical leaders can be seen in the NHS Institute 
for Innovation and Improvement’s Case Studies of clinical leadership, which 
name other professionals, particularly nurses, in connection with mental 
health, but not psychologists (NHS III, 2010a). It seems significant that all 
of the literature on clinical leadership appears to be written either by or for 
nurses, and to be published in nursing journals. Furthermore, in practice, 
clinical leadership in mental health tends to be dominated by psychiatrists 
or nurses (Farhall, 2001).
Given that calls for clinical leaders in theory (within the wider NHS) do not 
specify clinical psychologists and that, in practice, clinical leaders appear 
not to be, for the large part, clinical psychologists (particularly outside of 
psychological services or departments), where does the ‘expectation’ that 
clinical psychologists take up a clinical leadership role come from? To me, 
it appears that calls for clinical psychologists to be clinical leaders in mental 
health services have come from within the profession. Pilgrim (2008) 
outlines how the Mowbray report (delivered in September 1989), a review 
of the profession for the DoH, called for the expansion of the role of 
psychologists as consultants whilst reducing their role as individual 
therapists. This call is reiterated within the New Ways of Working document 
(Onyett, 2007). The DCP’s Clinical Psychology Leadership Development 
Framework (DCP, 2010) is explicit about some of the drivers for this need 
to change the face of the profession: some are clinical (such as improving 
effective team-working and increasing service user access to appropriate 
psychological formulation and intervention), but there are also professional 
and strategic drivers i.e. the increase of non-psychologist psychological 
therapists with the advent of IAPT, the cuts to the NHS in response to
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current economic conditions, and the resulting need for clinical 
psychologists to justify themselves professionally and financially. Thus, 
there is not so much the ‘expectation’ for clinical psychologists to develop 
clinical leadership roles, but the necessity for our survival professionally. I 
feel having a self-serving motivation for developing the profession is 
unfortunate, but passionately believe that clinical psychology has a lot to 
offer service users and carers, and that this would be better achieved by 
sharing psychology and using it to inform mental health services at a wider 
level, beyond direct therapeutic interventions.
However, as noted above, whatever the motivations for clinical 
psychologists needing to take up clinical leadership roles, this does not 
appear to happen that much, or at least not to be well-publicised. Repeated 
opportunities for this to have occurred have been lost (Mowbray, 2011), as 
reflected in the latest crisis into which the profession is thrown by the 
advent of IAPT and the latest changes within the NHS (DoH, 2010). In spite 
of the existence of some accomplished and determined clinical 
psychologists succeeding in leadership roles in universities and 
psychological services, in my experience neither the reputation, authority 
nor power of the profession have been strengthened, and the activities in 
which clinical psychologists at the clinical coal-face within the NHS engage 
in remain largely the same as they have ever been i.e. direct interventions 
(Hassall & Clements, 2011).
A number of factors can be said to have contributed to this state of affairs. 
The original Mowbray Report was given only weak endorsement by the 
DoH, meaning that NHS Trusts did not have to support the development of 
the role of clinical psychologists at an organisational level (Pilgrim, 2008). 
The profession of clinical psychology is a small one (Llewelyn & 
Cuthbertson, 2009), which can make it harder for it to make and maintain 
changes to its image and status in the face of a lack of organisational 
support. It is difficult, if not impossible, for lone clinical psychologists, 
unsupported by the Trust in which they work, to make changes themselves 
(Kinderman, 2011). As well as at a Trust level, these politico-cultural 
obstacles to clinical psychologists taking on clinical leadership roles are 
added to by the hierarchy within the NHS, with psychiatrists and the
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medical model of mental distress continuing to be placed firmly at the top 
(Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006), which I have seen on placement e.g. in 
the way staff defer to the psychiatrist when developing a care plan, or in the 
way psychiatrists are referred to using their ‘Doctor’ title, whereas all others 
are referred to by first name, including in team meeting minutes.
However, in addition to the obstacles from without the profession, there are 
also a number of factors within the profession that can be said to have 
contributed to clinical psychologists not being expected to take on clinical 
leadership positions. Entrants to the profession tend to wish to ‘make a 
difference’ and help individuals that they meet i.e. provide direct therapy, 
rather than ‘put their heads above the parapet’ and ‘shake up’ services, 
which is unlikely to encourage them to become clinical leaders (Pilgrim, 
2008). This ambivalence about changing the role of clinical psychologists 
was acknowledged in the New Ways of Working report (Onyett, 2007). 
Furthermore, clinical psychology can also be a profession which 
encourages tentativeness and the rejection of the ‘expert’ position, which is 
justifiable when attempting to reduce power imbalances with clients, but 
which can lead to us not being assertive enough with regards to owning the 
expertise we do have and what we can offer services, with the result that 
clinical psychology as a profession has not been ‘sold’ to others, both to 
other professionals within teams, but also including the public and 
commissioners (Byron, 2010). Thus, from a trainee perspective, the status 
quo (of clinical psychologists as solely psychological therapists) is 
maintained by going on placements with supervisors who continue to do 
what they have always done. As a male within a female-dominated 
profession, I wonder whether gender differences contribute to these factors, 
given that women can be socialised to be less assertive and more caring.
In addition to the factors within the membership of profession, further 
reasons for clinical psychologists not being thought of as clinical leaders 
can be seen to stem from our professional body and training institutions. 
The profession has been slow to systematically encourage the 
development of leadership within itself (Llewelyn & Cuthbertson, 2009), in 
spite of it forming part of the curriculum for trainee clinical psychologists 
(BPS, 2007). This is reflected in the lack of preparation e.g. on specific
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leadership skills, particularly political ones, that trainees experience 
(Bullock et al. 2010) e.g. my mentor recently mentioned how it might be 
useful for trainees to be taught how to write business plans (Major, 
personal communication, 2011). Furthermore, the BPS has been criticised 
for not actively trying to increase the status of the profession e.g. by 
engaging with the media (Byron, 2010).
Clinical leadership: Where are all the clinical 
psychologists?
The definition and qualities of clinical leadership, particularly the use of self- 
, intellectual- and relational-skills to influence others to improve care in a 
service user-centred way in line with an evidence base, suggest that 
clinical psychologists can be very suitable for the role. Evidence suggests 
that clinical leaders displaying the personal qualities of clinical 
psychologists and the professional skills in which we are trained can make 
a useful difference to service users. However, the profession as a whole (in 
spite of notable individual examples) has not picked up the gauntlet thrown 
down by changes in the NHS, for various reasons. As others have noted, in 
order for the profession to survive, it will need to evolve. I hope to play my 
part in this evolution.
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Problem-Based Learning Reflective Account II
Parents with Learning Disabilities
Year Two
February 2011
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The PBL Task
The problem and how we approached it
We were presented with a scenario concerning two parents with learning 
disabilities. Their children were subject to child protection procedures due 
to issues of domestic violence. Social Services were assessing the risks to 
the children. A psychologist is asked to be part of this process, and we 
were asked to present their assessment.
As a group, we immediately wanted to do a fun, creative presentation. Our 
Year One PBL presentation had involved role-play, props and ‘theatre’; we 
wanted to apply the same creative energy to the process and make the 
task as enjoyable as possible. This link to our first PBL became 
symbolically represented in our re-use of a prop (a giant remote control) 
from the first PBL. Those of us who engaged with the task with this aim in 
mind from the beginning made it clear that this would be vital to keep our 
motivation going.
At the beginning, therefore, the group’s discussion focussed on how to 
present rather than what to present. The initial idea for the presentation (a 
Jeremy Ky/e-type daytime television chat show) was exciting and dramatic, 
but one group member felt strongly that this format could be perceived as 
being insensitive to and stereotyping of people with learning disabilities, 
especially those from a more disadvantaged socio-economic background. 
Although this critical perspective felt difficult for her to present to the group, 
it was thoughtfully received. Another group member responded with an 
alternative format, for a Panorama-style documentary. It was agreed that 
this would be both interesting to present but also a more sensitive way of 
exploring the perspectives of all those involved in the scenario.
Having agreed the format of the presentation, group members began to 
develop its content. Members were allocated (based on reported 
preference) a topic to research. As this material was pooled, people were 
allocated presentation roles (of a ‘character’ from the scenario), in order to 
flesh out what each person might want to say and incorporate all
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perspectives into the presentation. The initial research formed the 
theoretical background to what each character said.
In this latter stage, I took a leadership role, clarifying and reminding 
members of between-meeting actions. Members largely worked well 
independently, gathering a large amount of information. However, when it 
came to the point of collating slides for a run-through of the presentation, 
very few people sent them to me. At the beginning of the following meeting, 
several members were late. One member asked me whether she should 
print her slides off. At this point I lost my temper and crossly informed her 
that I was not responsible for what the group did and that since most 
people had not got their slides to me it wasn’t clear what we could do that 
session. After my angry outburst, we made a plan that was minuted very 
clearly, and the development of the presentation proceeded much more 
smoothly again.
The presentation itself received mostly positive feedback. Although the 
slides were somewhat crowded and omitted some salient theory, markers 
also commented that it included up to date research and critique, presented 
in a way that was both enjoyable and also allowed all perspectives to be 
articulated.
Critique of the group’s approach
Committing early to a motivational concept made it difficult for alternative 
views to be expressed. We did not consider other approaches, and 
although ours made it possible to articulate all perspectives, the format 
made it hard to address all points equally, particularly in terms of salient 
theory. Furthermore, although roles, when allocated, were not meant to be 
indicative of what members would have to do in the final presentation 
(rather to allow for the division of labour in developing the ‘show’s’ ‘script’), 
some members may have felt pressured to accept them as final. However, 
our approach helped make the work enjoyable as well as task-focussed. I 
believe that I contributed to this by taking a leadership role (as noted by 
other group members). However, the role became located very heavily in 
me, to the point that there was an unequal distribution of responsibility
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(although not work). Nonetheless, we again worked well together to 
produce a good presentation.
The Group Process
The way in which we engaged so much with one idea and remained task- 
focussed, particularly replicating some aspects of our previous PBL 
presentation, suggests to me that our group needed to operate from within 
a position of safe certainty (Mason, 1993). I wonder if, by focussing on the 
task at hand and remaining within a previously-tried way of doing things 
(one that feels familiar and, hence, safe), we were potentially avoiding a 
number of difficult things e.g. negative feelings about the task (we spoke of 
making it as ‘bearable’ as possible initially), negative feelings about each 
other. This avoidance of reflection within our group seems evident also in 
the fact that we opted to allocate the role of collating reflections to one 
member (to whom very few people forwarded on any reflections). I wonder 
what the effect of not reflecting nor doing things differently was on our 
learning, as this is a key part of Kolb’s Experiential Learning Cycle (Kolb, 
1984): in order to gain and learn from an experience, one has to reflect on it 
and experiment with doing things differently, before reflecting again on what 
one has learnt. I wonder if, to some extent, we got through the task but did 
not learn as much as we could have done if we had not kept our eyes so 
focused straight-ahead.
However, I know that, on my part, circumstances in my personal life meant 
that I had the minimum of effort and energy to devote to the many items of 
work we had at that time, which partly contributed to just wanting to ‘get my 
head down’. However, it can also be difficult to reflect as this involves 
accessing difficult feelings. Within our group, we often use humour, and this 
again suggests to me the difficulty of expressing an opposing view, which 
one member made manifest when she talked of how hard it was for her to 
go against the group’s initial idea for the format of the presentation. 
However, by encouraging and accepting her critical view, I believe that we 
helped her start to learn that it can be OK to express a differing view; she 
has gone on to repeat this in later PPD sessions.
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Reflecting and expressing difficult feelings can be avoided because of a 
fear about being the ‘difficult’ one in the group (Furnham, 1997). I am not 
sure whether this is particular to our group, as the phenomenon of 
‘groupthink’ or ‘false consensus’ (in which groups focus on one idea to the 
exclusion of other ways of thinking) is well-documented (Janis, 1972). 
However, I do think that at that point our group found it difficult (unsafe) to 
give and receive critical feedback. We have subsequently increased giving 
feedback in our PPD groups, partly in response to some of the issues 
raised by the PBL. In particular, my ‘explosion’ of resentment about feeling 
overly-responsible without corresponding work from some other group 
members has been referred to as ‘refreshing’ by other group members, as 
it allowed for the expression of negative feelings by others. An increase in 
risk-taking by a few key members, having known each other for longer, and 
changing the format of our PPD group to explicitly encourage more 
reflective space appear to have built on experience which occurred during 
the PBL task. Thus, although we may not have reflected that much during 
the PBL itself, it has contributed to a positive development within our PPD 
group as a whole i.e. an increase in giving/receiving feedback.
Feedback that I have received tends to suggest that I am perceived as 
reliable and organised. This benefits the group but seemed to leave it 
vulnerable to becoming dependent on me, and so not functioning as 
autonomously as it could have done (Yalom, 1995). Furthermore, I 
resented this, as it left me feeling taken for granted and only valued 
because of my positive work-related qualities, rather than as a whole 
person. This has also been discussed in later PPD sessions; it has been 
helpful both to reflect on how I can come across as ‘controlled’ but also how 
I can be valued for myself as a person. At the time of my outburst, I felt 
angry and resentful of people having both taken my activity for granted but 
also not respected me enough to comply with my requests. Subsequent 
discussions have helped me feel more valued by the group and appreciate 
the other factors that contributed to some degree of ‘slacking’ by other 
members.
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Applying the PBL
The presentation’s content became very relevant to my placement, as I was 
asked to carry out a neuropsychological assessment of the extent of a 
woman’s learning disability, in order to inform her involvement with social 
services, who were considering taking her child into care due to domestic 
violence issues. I felt fortunate to have had ‘practice’ of such a complicated 
referral, particularly given the ethical and emotional tensions around being 
involved in an assessment which could be used to contribute to someone’s 
child being taken away. It was also helpful to have explored the PBL social 
worker’s concerns in order to be able to understand the perspective of the 
real-life social worker, whom I experienced as aggressive and difficult to 
work with; knowing where he was coming from made it somewhat easier to 
validate and communicate with him. The literature we covered in our 
presentation informed my understanding of the impact of domestic violence 
(Humphreys, 2007), the difficulties a parent with learning disabilities can 
face (Cleaver & Nicholson, 2007), the ways having a learning disability can 
affect parenting ability (MacDonald, 2009), and the obligations on services 
to support parents with learning disabilities (Department of Health & 
Department of Education and Skills, 2006). It also prepared me for the 
possibility that I would need to act as an advocate for my client, and that 
she might benefit from an advocate after I had finished working with her 
(Tarleton et al. 2006).
The feedback I received on my style also informed my clinical practice in 
ways not related to the content of the PBL. I have tried to be more 
validating of, warm and creative with my clients. This has been particularly 
important on my Learning Disability placement, as many of my clients also 
have physical disabilities which affect their receptive communication.
More generally, the feedback I received about others’ experience of me 
during the task provided a learning opportunity for me both professionally 
and personally. My placement supervisor, in completing my mid-placement 
evaluation form, discussed with me how I can come across as ‘aloof, and 
how this can make it difficult for me to form relationships with other 
members of staff; she said that my relationships with clients were fine. This
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was concerning for me, as I am aware that psychologists, particularly if they 
wish to become leaders, need to relate to others ‘charismatically’ (West, 
2004): express positive emotions such as enthusiasm, appreciation and 
realistic optimism; and attend to the psychological states of those they are 
attempting to influence. Leaders must be able to apply these skills in order 
to initiate structure in a task-focussed manner whilst remaining persuasive 
of and considerate to others (O’Connor & Jackson, 2010). Leaders also 
need to make it safe for everyone to contribute to multidisciplinary work in 
order for it to be most effective (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006). It was 
also somewhat deflating to receive the above feedback from my supervisor, 
as I was aware that this was a learning need for me and had been trying to 
address it e.g. by consciously inviting others’ views. However, the feedback 
from the PBL was more helpful in that it both operationalised what I could 
do differently e.g. disclose more, use my sense of humour, and also 
affirmed that I was a liked and valued member of the group. This made it 
easier for me to accept the feedback, although it was still difficult to receive. 
It is particularly difficult as it makes me more self-conscious as a single 
person, thinking about how I come across to potential partners i.e. whether 
my ‘coldness’ is something that has contributed to me being single.
Evaluation
Although it was somewhat difficult to digest, the exploration of my 
interpersonal style was useful. I think it helped me learn when I expressed 
emotion in the group and received genuine feedback from others. This, in 
turn, has increased the feedback given within the group. Thus the 
experience of the PBL, and of reflecting on it, appears to have encouraged 
the group to move from a position of safe certainty to greater tolerance of 
safe uncertainty. For me personally, this has built on the previous PBL 
exercise, as whilst that gave an opportunity to reflect, this task has helped 
me both to validate and affirm my current value whilst also operationalising 
different ways of being. I hope that I will be able to experiment with doing 
things a bit differently in order to take on a more effective role in groups.
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Personal and Professional Development Group 
Process Account II
(Summary)
Year Two
July 2011
In reflecting on my experience of my Personal and Professional 
Development Group (PPDG) over Year Two, I outline the content of the 
Group, consider factors that affected this, reflect on the learning that 
occurred within this context, and connect this to my experiences within the 
NHS and my development over the previous two years of clinical training. I 
write in the first person to facilitate owning my reflections.
The account demonstrates how PPDG has contributed to my development 
as a Trainee in a number of ways. It has given me the opportunity to reflect 
on my role, both as leader and carer, within groups, and experiment with 
doing things differently. As well as receiving positive feedback about my 
potential to lead, I have also had the opportunity to take a step back from 
automatically trying to take care of group members. I describe how I have 
really appreciated being helped to feel ‘good enough’ by PPD. The insights 
and experience I have gained from it have helped me both professionally, 
in relating to colleagues and clients, and personally, in terms of relating to 
myself.
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CLINICAL DOSSIER
78
79
Summary of Clinical Placement Experience
Placement #1: Adult Mental Health: New Malden Community Mental Health 
Team
Providing psychological therapy (CBT and DBT) to clients with severe and 
enduring mental health difficulties. Range of problems, including 
depression, psychosis, OCD and 'borderline personality disorder'. Also saw 
clients from the local Primary Care IAPT service. I achieved good outcomes 
and received positive feedback from clients and their carers. I also provided 
guidance to Step 2 IAPT staff as to how to carry out behavioural 
experiments with clients, which they and clients found helpful.
Developed and ran a new 'Recovery' group on an inpatient ward with its 
Occupational Therapist. Developed and ran workshop on wellbeing for local 
carers (through local carers' support group). Developed and ran workshop 
introducing clinical psychology to local service users (at MIND cafe).
Carried out research project, surveying staff, service users and carers 
about carer involvement with the Team and how this could be improved. 
Presented findings to service with recommendations.
Presented qualitative research on OCD, conducted as part of Graduate 
Diploma in Psychology, to Qualitative Mental Health Research Network 
meeting in London.
Regular attendance at Team meetings, providing psychological input to 
discussions about service users.
Placement #2: People with Learning Disabilities: Redhill, Reigate and 
Horley Community Team for People with Learning Disabilities
Carried out a range of psychological work with clients with learning 
disabilities: mainly neuropsychological assessment, and behavioural and 
systemic interventions, but also CBT for anxiety/OCD and narrative work 
for depression. Work on this placement required a lot of adaption to the 
specific needs of the client e.g. language and visual format of formulations.
80
Teaching/training other staff on particular syndromes and how to manage 
challenging behaviour. This training had to be adapted to be appropriate 
and accessible for the care staff.
During this placement I also attended meetings, events and training on GP 
commissioning and marketing psychological services run by the University 
of Surrey, the Division of Clinical Psychology and Surrey and Borders NHS 
T rust.
Placement #3: Child and Adolescent Mental Health: Worthing Child and 
Adolescent Mental Health Service
Carrying out a range of psychological work. This included CBT, behavioural 
work, systemic family therapy, neuropsychological assessment and 
consultation to other agencies such as schools. Clients (5-17 years old) 
had a range of presenting problems, including OCD, anxiety, anger and 
eating disorders. They and their families tended to be from lower socio­
economic groups, with different religious and ethnic backgrounds (including 
Sikh and Christian). Several had long-term physical health problems such 
as epilepsy and chronic fatigue syndrome.
Regular attendance and contribution to Team and Psychology meetings. 
Involvement in multidisciplinary risk management of children at risk of 
abuse. Teaching other staff about CBT for OCD with children.
During this placement I also developed and co-facilitated a workshop on 
CBT for low self-esteem for members of the public, entitled "Evidence- 
based Advice on How to Feel Good About Yourself at a British 
Psychological Society event, 'Psychology For AH'. The workshop (which 
was over-subscribed) received very positive feedback from attendees.
Placement #4: Older Adults: Twickenham, Teddington and Hampton 
Community Mental Health Team for Older Adults
Provided therapy (mainly CBT, also with systemic elements) to clients aged 
65+ (including some who are 75+). Worked with family members/carers 
where appropriate. Range of presenting problems including Depression,
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GAD and relationship difficulties, often comorbid with multiple physical 
health difficulties. Supervised by BABCP-accredited Clinical Psychologist.
Psychological and neuropsychological assessment of clients, including 
those with dementia. Reported clinically sensitive findings to referrers and 
clients and their carers, verbally and in writing.
Trained and consulted to other staff e.g. in CM HT and care homes about 
Challenging Behaviour in Dementia, and on particular topics, such as how 
childhood sexual abuse may present in older adults. Participated in joint 
supervision.
Developed and ran a new 'Dementia Information and Support Group' as 
part of new Memory Clinic, to provide clients newly-diagnosed with 
dementia and their carers with appropriate information and support as part 
of their care pathway.
During this placement, I also took over as the Lead of the University Sub­
group of the Division of Clinical Psychology's Pre-Qualification Committee, 
and coordinated our involvement with the central BPS to support aspiring 
Clinical Psychologists e.g. by writing an article for the Psychology 
undergraduate student magazine 'PsychTalk'.
Placement #5: Brief Psvchodvnamic in Primary Care: Kingston RightSteps 
Psychological Services in Primary Care
Offering 1:1 weekly brief psychodynamic therapy (up to 15 sessions) to 
adult clients with Depression and Mixed Anxiety and Depression, of high 
complexity and severity. Clients of a range of ages and ethnicities 
(including Bulgarian and Korean).
Co-facilitating CBT-oriented clinical skills training for PWPs on OCD.
Working with Step 3 clinicians on service development projects including 
improving access to people with diabetes and from BME groups. This 
involved researching the literature for best practice guidelines, and 
contacting local services and BME groups to liaise directly.
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Adult Mental Health Case Report One (Summary)
Neuropsychological assessment of a man in his 
early 60s presenting with possible early 
dementia.
Year One 
May 2010
This report outlines the assessment of a White British man in his early 60s 
who was referred by his Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) for 
neuropsychological assessment. He was being seen by the CMHT for 
depression. Additional concerns had been raised about his behaviour, 
memory and concentration. These were investigated using the WAIS-III 
and 6 subtests of the WMS-IV. Test results suggested mostly above- 
average cognitive functioning, with the exception of memory (retrieval) and 
working memory. This could be a sign of possible early dementia. However, 
the interpretation of the neuropsychological tests was complicated by the 
client’s in-test behaviour; he became significantly distressed and appeared 
to stop trying. To try to make sense of this, additional information was 
gathered from the notes, the CMHT and meetings with the client. This 
information, together with the client’s reported improvements in cognitive 
functioning over the course of the assessment period, was incorporated 
into a psychological formulation which may explain the client’s concerns 
and behaviour better than an organic disorder. However, recommendations 
for further testing in the future have still been made, given that timeliness of 
dementia diagnosis can be very significant for prognosis.
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Adult Mental Health Case Report Two (Summary)
Cognitive-behavioural therapy with a White 
Australasian man in his 40s presenting with 
anxiety about blushing.
Year One 
August 2010
This report outlines the assessment, formulation and intervention for a 
White Australasian man in his 40s referred to a Primary Care Psychological 
Service by his General Practitioner due to his concerns about blushing. He 
was assessed using standardised measures (the CORE-OM, PHQ-9, GAD- 
7 and Social Phobia Inventory) and semi-structured interviews. His 
difficulties were formulated using the cognitive model of Social Phobia. 
Attachment style, relational issues and issues of difference were also 
considered.
I carried out 10 sessions of CBT with him. Interventions included attention- 
training, dropping safety-behaviours, Socratic Questioning, behavioural 
experiments and Padesky’s (1997) ‘Assertive Defence of the Self.
Evaluation using the above outcome measures suggested no significant 
improvement. However, the client reported having engaged in activities he 
had previously avoided. We also acknowledged how making significant 
changes to longstanding difficulties would have been unrealistic. The 
formulation provided a useful new perspective on his problems and the 
potential solutions to them. A summary of how he could maintain his
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progress and build upon it, with recommendations for future work, was 
produced.
Difficulties that affected the work, including missing sessions, claiming not 
to be able to engage in between-session activities (and then carrying them 
out), and working within an ‘Improving Access to Psychological Therapies’ 
service are considered. The reformulation takes into account wider issues, 
including potential schema-level difficulties. The impact of this work on 
myself and future work are also considered.
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Case Report Three: People with Learning 
Disabilities (Summary)
Therapy with a woman with Turner Syndrome 
presenting with ‘compulsive’ behaviours.
Year Two 
April 2011
This report outlines the assessment, formulation and intervention for a 
White British woman in her mid-20s referred due to her mother’s concerns 
about her removing and keeping objects. She was assessed using 
standardised measures (the CORE-LD and OCI-R) and semi-structured 
interviews. Her difficulties were formulated using a cognitive model of 
anxiety in people with learning disabilities. Attachment style and systemic 
issues were also considered.
I carried out 8 sessions of CBT with her. Interventions included developing 
coping strategies, cognitive restructuring and worry time. We planned to 
include behavioural activation, adjustment work and systemic work with her 
mother, but difficulties with attending sessions precluded this.
Evaluation suggested no significant improvement. The reformulation 
acknowledged how significant systemic issues were. Recommendations to 
the wider system, including for future psychological input, were made to 
address these.
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The impact of this work on myself and future work are also considered, 
particularly issues of systemic thinking, collaboration and working with 
complex systems.
Oral Presentation of Clinical Activity (Summary)
Development as a more creative practitioner, 
illustrated by work with a child with obsessive- 
compulsive disorder.
Year Two 
September 2011
This presentation outlines my development as a more creative and intuitive 
psychological therapist. I discuss an outline of my development as a 
trainee, including developing CBT knowledge, interpersonal skills and a 
balanced reflective-scientist practitioner approach to the work.
My development as a more creative practitioner is illustrated using a 
developmentally- and individually-appropriate application of a standard 
behavioural treatment for obsessive-compulsive disorder (exposure 
response-prevention) with a child. The overall formulation of the child’s 
difficulties illustrates the development of my ability to think more 
systemically and work with more complex difficulties. This includes 
attention to the family background, as mother herself had OCD and had 
perhaps modelled this way of responding to anxiety to her child. Father was 
North American and had experienced a strict, authoritarian upbringing, 
which appeared reflected in his relationship with rules and authority (which 
he sought to impose on his son).
The ERR element of the intervention plan is selected for illustrative 
purposes and presented in greater detail. It illustrates my ability to select an 
intervention that is evidence-based, and to adapt it so that it is
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developmentally-appropriate and takes account of the individual client’s 
interests, which makes it more engaging and intelligible for them.
The child engaged readily with the ERR programme. He and his parents 
reported a subsequent reduction in his OCD anxiety and behaviour. The 
interventions for other concerns are also discussed, including behavioural 
rewards system for disobedience at home, and parental systemic therapy 
to address the hypothesis that marital conflict was affecting the child. The 
behavioural elements of the work were more successful. The couple did not 
readily engage with work designed to address their own relationship.
Outstanding concerns, particularly about the child being scapegoated within 
the family and thus at risk of emotional abuse, were discussed with the 
MDT. It was agreed that the child would be offered further individual work 
within CAMHS to build his confidence, and that the family would be offered 
Family Therapy to address the dynamics within it. This was particularly 
important so as not to locate the problem within the child.
The clinical work and its contribution to my development are reflected on 
and illustrated using an audio clip from a supervision session at the end of 
the placement.
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Case Report Four: Specialist Placement (Summary)
Brief Psychodynamic Therapy with a woman 
with severe depression.
Year Three 
May 2012
This report outlines the assessment, formulation and intervention for a 
White Irish woman in her late 40s referred by her GP for Depression to her 
local Primary Care Psychological Therapies Service. She was assessed 
using standardised measures (the PHQ-9 and GAD-7) and unstructured 
interviews. Her difficulties were formulated using a psychodynamic model 
of depression. Attachment history and issues of childhood sexual abuse 
were also considered.
I carried out 9 sessions of brief psychodynamic therapy with her. The 
intervention employed the psychodynamic approach of using unstructured 
sessions to facilitate free association, and interpreting arising themes 
relevant to the focus of the brief work. These included how the patient shut 
down against loss, had difficulty forming a positive self-identity and showed 
signs of aggressive impulsive. The theory underlying how these issues 
were worked through in the transference is outlined in the report.
Evaluation suggested significant improvement, both on questionnaire 
measures and in terms of the patient’s self-report. However, we 
acknowledged that the patient had employed her defences to keep therapy 
at arm’s length and thus certain areas had been kept out of therapy in order 
to make it more manageable for her.
The learning from this work for future work is considered, particularly issues 
of the emotional impact of work on myself as therapist, and critical thinking 
about the evidence base and NICE guidelines.
RESEARCH DOSSIER
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Research Log
1 Formulating and testing hypotheses and 
research questions
Major Research Project
2 Carrying out a structured literature search 
using information technology and
literature search tools
Literature Review 
assignment (Year One);
Major Research Project;
Assignments and clinical 
work.
3 Critically reviewing relevant literature and 
evaluating research methods
Major Research Project;
Qualitative Research 
Project.
4 Formulating specific research questions Major Research Project
5 Writing brief research proposals Major Research Project
6 Writing detailed research 
proposals/protocols
Major Research Project
7 Considering issues related to ethical 
practice in research, including issues of
diversity, and structuring plans accordingly
Major Research Project
8 Obtaining approval from a research ethics 
committee
Major Research Project
9 Obtaining appropriate supervision for 
research
Major Research Project;
Service-Related 
Research Project.
10 Obtaining appropriate collaboration for 
research
Major Research Project; 
Qualitative Research
96
Project
11 Collecting data from research participants Major Research Project;
Qualitative Research 
Project;
Service-Related 
Research Project
12 Choosing appropriate design for research 
questions
Major Research Project;
Service-Related 
Research Project
13 Writing patient information and consent 
forms
Major Research Project;
Service-Related 
Research Project;
Qualitative Research 
Project.
14 Devising and administering questionnaires Service-Related 
Research Project.
15 Negotiating access to study participants in 
applied NHS settings
Service-Related 
Research Project.
16 Setting up a data file Service-Related 
Research Project;
Major Research Project;
Quantitative Research 
lectures.
17 Conducting statistical data analysis using 
SPSS
Service-Related 
Research Project;
Major Research Project;
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Quantitative Research 
lectures.
18 Choosing appropriate statistical analyses Service-Related 
Research Project;
Major Research Project.
19 Preparing quantitative data for analysis Service-Related 
Research Project;
Major Research Project.
20 Choosing appropriate quantitative data 
analysis
Service-Related 
Research Project;
Major Research Project.
21 Summarising results in figures and tables Service-Related 
Research Project;
Major Research Project.
22 Conducting semi-structured interviews Service-Related 
Research Project;
Qualitative Research 
Project.
23 Transcribing and analysing interview data 
using qualitative methods
Service-Related 
Research Project;
Qualitative Research 
Project.
24 Choosing appropriate qualitative analyses Service-Related 
Research Project;
Qualitative Research 
Project.
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25 Interpreting results from quantitative and 
qualitative data analysis
Service-Related 
Research Project;
Qualitative Research 
Project;
Major Research Project;
Research Methods 
lectures.
26 Presenting research findings in a variety of 
contexts
Presenting Major 
Research Project, 
Service-Related 
Research Project and 
Qualitative Research 
Project to Trainees;
Presenting Service- 
Related Research 
Project to NHS service.
27 Producing a written report on a research 
project
Major Research Project, 
Service-Related 
Research Project and 
Qualitative Research 
Project.
28 Defending own research decisions and 
analyses
Major Research Project 
panel & viva.
29 Submitting research reports for publication 
in peer-reviewed journals or edited book
Major Research Project 
will be submitted to 
journal.
30 Applying research findings to clinical 
practice
Application of evidence- 
based therapies across 
all placements.
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Qualitative Report 
(Abstract)
What role do ‘the arts’ play in 
people’s lives? An Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis.
Year One 
June 2010
There has been much debate about the relationship people have had 
with art over time and across cultures. Traditionally, researchers 
seeking to understand people’s responses to art have constructed 
laboratory experiments to gauge the reactions of participants to 
artistic stimuli. A  qualitative approach would provide a richer account 
of individuals’ experiences. Each of the five researchers in the group 
recruited and interviewed one participant from their own social group. 
This sample of five participants consisted of four females and one 
male, all o f whom were White and British. The age range was 26-43 
years. The semi-structured interviews lasted 20 to 30 minutes and 
were digitally recorded, and later transcribed verbatim. The process 
of analysis followed the recommendations of Smith and Osborn 
(2008), with modifications to allow for the research to be carried out 
by a group: the group of researchers analysed one transcript
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together, then analysed the transcript o f their own participant 
separately. The group then produced superordinate themes together. 
Themes identified included the arts: being used as an emotional 
resource; as having meaning for the self; providing a connection to 
others; and broadening horizons. The credibility o f the analysis, the 
strengths and limitations of using a qualitative approach, and the 
effect of the process of carrying out the project on the researchers 
are reflected on.
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Service-Related Research Project
An evaluation of communication between 
Community Mental Health Team staff and the 
friends/family of service users.
Year One
July 2010
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Abstract
National and local policies promote mental health staff communicating with 
carers. However, research suggests that these policy ideals are often not 
reflected in practice. Nonetheless, guidance as to how best to communicate 
with carers does exist. Therefore, this survey sought to evaluate the 
performance of a Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) against a best 
practice framework.
17 participants (5 carers, 6 service users and 6 staff) were recruited via the 
CMHT. Participants completed a questionnaire or took part in an interview 
based on the questionnaire. Participants were asked to rate their 
experience of staff-carer communication, in terms of its frequency and their 
satisfaction with this. They were also asked to rate particular problems that 
can affect staff-carer communication and possible solutions to these. 
Qualitative data were also collected.
Findings suggest that practice within the CMHT is good but varies widely, 
as relatively low numbers of participants agreed in their ratings of particular 
items. Information that was communicated less frequently included that 
about psychological therapies, side-effects, support for carers and about 
the Team. More electronic media could be used where appropriate. Staff 
could also be more pro-active in eliciting information from carers. 
Satisfaction rates were nonetheless generally high.
Participants rated improving staff-carer communication as beneficial. Staff 
not having enough time, and the need to protect confidentiality, were two 
significant barriers to communication. Making better use of existing 
resources, particularly supplementing verbal information with written, were 
two suggested solutions.
The methodology of the survey, and possible improvements on it, are 
considered.
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Introduction
National and local policies promote the involvement of carers in health 
services. Department of Health (DoH) Carers Strategies state that carers 
should be provided with relevant local information in a variety of media, and 
be asked to provide information about the service user (SU) to services. 
Strategies explicitly state that staff should be pro-active in asking SUs for 
consent to share information, and give examples of what information might 
prove useful to carers (DoH, 1999; DoH, 2008). The DoH (2001) 
Implementation Guide for Community Mental Health Teams (CMHTs) 
reiterates this position, and explicitly sets it in a secondary care mental 
health context. This national position is reflected in a Trust-wide Carers 
Strategy (South West London & St George’s NHS Mental Health Trust, 
2010), local Council Information Sharing Guidance (Royal Borough of 
Kingston upon Thames, 2010) and in the CMHT Operational Plan (New 
Malden CMHT, 2009).
However, research (Carers UK, 2010; Lelliott et al. 2003) and informal 
discussions with CMHT members suggested that these policies were often 
not reflected in practice. The most commonly-cited reason for this disparity 
tends to be ‘confidentiality’. If staff do not differentiate between confidential 
and shareable information, or state that they cannot give the carer 
information because of ‘confidentiality’ in a way that is insensitive to the 
carer’s situation (Wynaden & Orb, 2005), this can be perceived as a 
deliberate block to carers’ involvement (Gray et al. 2008). This can be very 
negatively experienced by carers (Clarke, 2006). Other research suggests 
that professionals’ training tends not to prepare them for working with 
carers (Askey et al. 2009), and this can lead to them not knowing or 
considering what kind of information could be useful to carers nor how to 
provide it (Morris & Thomas, 2002). This is not helped by the policy 
documents themselves, which tend to be vague and not easy to translate 
into practical guidance (Slade et al. 2007); although information-sharing 
can raise a number of problems, policy documents tend to gloss over the 
details of how to address these (Pinfold et al. 2004).
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Nonetheless, examples of good practice are available (DoH, 1999; DoH, 
2008). Research has provided some ideas for how to address these issues 
(Gray et al. 2008). It has also explored what kinds of information carers 
might find useful (Askey et al. 2009; Cleary et al. 2005; Lelliott et a/.2003; 
Wald et al. 2003). However, this research tends to be small-scale and 
focused on carers’ perspectives, whilst carers’, SUs’ and professionals’ 
views and interests may vary (Gray et al. 2008). Slade and colleagues 
(2007) have addressed these issues with a large-scale study, exploring SU, 
carer and staff perspectives, specifically investigating issues around 
information-sharing. A further strength of this study is that it used multiple 
sources of data. Slade and colleagues have thus been able to develop a 
framework for best practice for sharing information about SUs with carers.
Therefore, given the policy drivers encouraging CMHTs to involve carers, 
the research suggesting that this can be difficult to implement and concerns 
to that effect raised by Team members, this service evaluation will explore 
how the Team is communicating with carers. It aims to evaluate staff-carer 
communication against the existing best practice framework/examples 
outlined above, from the perspective of staff, carers and SUs. As well as 
surveying the current satisfaction of these three groups, it also aims to 
explore their attitudes towards problems with, and possible improvements 
to, staff-carer communication.
Method 
Design
I designed a questionnaire (Appendix One) which could be completed by 
participants privately or used as the basis for an interview (telephone or 
face-to-face). A self-report measure was selected as the typical means of 
directly accessing the survey’s targeted views (Barker et al. 2002). The 
interview option was included to increase the collection of qualitative data 
using follow-up questions and by involving participants who might give fuller 
responses verbally (Barker et al. 2002).
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Questionnaire Design
The first half of the questionnaire asked participants to rate their experience 
of the type of information communicated between staff and carers, how this 
was communicated and when. In two columns next to examples of the 
above aspects of communication, participants rated how often they 
experienced each item (using the scale: 0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = 
Often, 3 = Most or All of the time) and their satisfaction with this (using the 
scale: 0 = Very Dissatisfied, 1 = Dissatisfied, 2 = Satisfied, 3 = Very 
Satisfied).
The second half asked participants to rate whether improving 
communication between staff and carers could improve the service (using 
the scale: No, not at all - No, not really - Yes, somewhat - Yes, strongly), 
how often they had experienced particular problems in communication (in 
one column, using the scale: 0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = 
Most or All of the time), and to endorse suggested solutions (in one column, 
using the scale: 0 = Not helpful at all, 1 = Not helpful, 2 = Helpful, 3 = Very 
helpful). Space was given after each question for participants to make 
further comments in response to an open-ended question on that domain.
Items were drawn from the existing carer communication literature (Askey 
et al. 2009; Carers UK, 2010; Cleary et al. 2005; Gray et al. 2008; Lelliott et 
al. 2003; Morris, 2001; Morris & Thomas, 2002; Slade et al. 2007; Wald et 
al. 2003; Wynaden & Orb, 2005); Text Box 1 gives examples. Relevant 
individuals2 were asked to comment on drafts. Helpful comments were 
received and incorporated on layout, formatting and the phrasing of some 
items. The final draft of the questionnaire was piloted with a carer, an SU 
and a staff member; no comments indicating that further changes needed 
to be made were received.
2 See ‘Acknowledgements’.
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Text Box 1: Sample Items
• Type: “Treatment information.”
• How: “Face-to-face.”
• When: “Care-Plan review meetings.”
• Problems: “Staff have found it difficult to contact friends/family.”
• Solutions: “Information leaflet about Confidentiality.”
Participant Recruitment
The survey was advertised in various ways e.g. waiting room posters, via 
local non-statutory carers’/SU organisations; participants were only 
successfully recruited via CMHT care-coordinators and the trainee 
approaching clients and/or their carers. (Only closed clients were selected 
by the trainee as it was felt that approaching clients currently in therapy 
might be unethical and interfere with the therapeutic process.) All staff were 
invited to participate. Sampling these three groups (carers, SUs and staff) 
was designed to increase the validity of the survey by evaluating 
communication from a variety of stakeholder perspectives.
Ethical Considerations
The project proposal was reviewed by University of Surrey staff. Ethical 
approval for the survey was not required as it was considered service 
evaluation rather than research (National Research Ethics Service, 2009). 
Informed consent was gained by giving participants the information sheet 
(Appendix Two) and discussing the survey with them; this was recorded 
using consent forms (Appendix Three).
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Administering the Survey
Participants were given the option of returning the questionnaire by post or 
the trainee contacting them to arrange an interview (whichever they 
preferred). Rather than recording interviews, the trainee read the 
questionnaire to the participant, noted their responses (including to follow- 
up questions) and checked these notes with the participant for accuracy at 
the end of each question (Askey et al. 2009). Table 1 summarises the ways 
people participated.
Table 1: Survey Administration
Total
% (n)
Carers SUs Staff
Questionnaire 76(13) 60 (3) 67(4) 100 (6)
Telephone Interview 18(3) 20 (1) 33 (2) 0
Face-to-face Interview 6(1) 20 (1) 0 0
Participants
5 carers, 6 SUs and 6 staff members participated. Table 2 summarises 
participant characteristics. Staff members represented every discipline in 
the CMHT: Nursing, Occupational Therapy, Psychiatry, Psychology, Social 
and Support Work.
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Table 2: Participant Demographics
Total
Number of Participants n 17
Age mean 50
years range 36-64
Gender Female 53 (9)
% (n) Male 47 (8)
Ethnicity White British 59 (10)
% (n) White Other 12(2)
Mixed -  White and Asian 6(1)
Asian 6(1)
Black African 6(1)
Other 12(2)
Length of Involvement with 
CMHT
mean 5 years
range 9 months -  
15 years
Sexual Orientation Heterosexual 53 (9)
% (n) Declined to answer 47 (8)
The response rate (based on the number of information sheets distributed 
by/to staff) was approximately 65%.
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Results
Data Analysis 
Quantitative Data
The quantitative data gathered in the survey were analysed to produce 
descriptive statistics. As there was great variability in the data, the mode is 
reported as it gives the best estimate of typical CMHT practice, and 
responses to some questions have been collapsed for the sake of 
parsimony and clarity. (Illustrative tables of un-collapsed responses are 
included in Appendix Four.) No inferential tests were carried out, as 
detecting differences between groups was not the aim of the survey.
Qualitative Data
Thematic Analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was used to categorize the 
answers to the open-ended questions. It was used because it is a flexible 
and simple method of reporting patterns within qualitative data. Rather than 
presenting the themes separately, quotations from the themes identified are 
used to illustrate the results. This is because the themes reiterated the 
issues already assessed by the questionnaire, whereas the illustrative 
quotations usefully expand the meaning of the quantitative results.
Findings
Staff-Carer Communication
Table 3 summarises the current frequency of staff-carer communication, 
and suggests a range of carer experiences and staff practices. The table 
shows what the most common response for each item was and how many 
participants endorsed that response e.g. for how often carers receive 
information about ‘Who to contact in a crisis’, the most common response 
was ‘Most or All of the time’, and 53% of participants endorsed this. Items 
are grouped by frequency-response (in descending order from ‘Most or All 
of the Time’ to ‘Never’) in order to suggest typical CMHT practice.
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Table 3: Overview of Staff-Carer Communication
Modal
Response
What, Way and When Information 
Communicated
Endorsements 
% (n)
Most or All of 
the Time
Who to contact in a crisis. 53 (9)
Face-to-face. 53 (9)
SU’s difficulties. 47 (8)
Confidentiality. 47 (8)
Care-coordinator sessions. 47 (8)
Treatment. 41 (7)
Support for friends/family. 41 (7)
Hospitalization. 35 (6)
Hospital discharge. 35 (6)
Assessment. 29 (5)
Often Risk-related. 47 (8)
How friends/family can help the SU. 41 (7)
Letter 41 (7)
Carers’ rights. 29 (5)
Sometimes Referral. 42 (7)
Psychological Therapies. 41 (7)
The Team (including who staff are). 41 (7)
Leaflet 41 (7)
Telephone 41 (7)
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Side-effects of medication. 29 (5)
CPA meetings. 29 (5)
Never Electronically 47 (8)
Satisfaction with staff-carer communication
Figure 1 presents satisfaction with staff-carer communication; most 
participants were at least ‘Satisfied’.
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Treatment.
Service user s difficulties.
How friends/family can help the 
service user.
Face-to-face 
Care-coordinator sessions.
Who to contact in a crisis.
The importance of respecting 
confidentiality.
Support for friends/family.
Risk-related. 
Letter 
Telephone 
Side-effects of medication. 
Rights of friends/family. 
Discharge from hospital.
Assessment. 
TheTeam (including who staff are).
Psychological Therapies.
Hospitalization. 
CPA meetings. 
Leaflet 
Referral. 
Electronically
20 40 60 80
% at least "Satisfied*
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Figure 1: Satisfaction with Staff-Carer Communication
Comments were made which illustrate these satisfaction rates:
“My experience has been of excellent communication.” (Carer)
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'We have constant contact. ” (SU)
“the team are particularly good at communicating with 
friends/family” (Staff)
Carer-Staff Communication
Table 4 summarises communication from carers to staff; a range of 
practices is again evident.
Table 4: Carer-Staff Communication
Modal
Response
What, Way and When 
Information Communicated
Endorsements 
% (n)
Most or All of the 
Time
Telephone 53 (9)
Face-to-face 53 (9)
SU’s difficulties. 47 (8)
Care-coordinator sessions. 41 (7)
Referral. 29 (5)
Assessment. 29 (5)
Often Side-effects of medication. 41 (7)
Sometimes Hospitalization. 47 (8)
CPA meetings. 41 (7)
Hospital discharge. 41 (7)
Risk-related. 35 (6)
Never Letter 35 (6)
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Members of all groups recognised that carers could provide useful 
information to staff:
“carers know a lot about patients... so can provide very useful 
information. ” (Carer)
“It's helpful for my [carer] to come to appointments as she can better 
explain how I'm feeling” (SU)
“The friends and family are often... in a strong position to... inform... 
professional interventions. ” (Staff)
However, there appeared to be a tension between this view and the fact 
that carers were often expected to be pro-active:
“not much information was available unless one went and asked for 
it.” (Carer)
“Often family members do not communicate what we perceive as 
important information until asked.” (Staff)
Satisfaction with carer-staff communication
Figure 2 summarises (again, high) satisfaction rates with carer-staff 
communication.
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Figure 2: Satisfaction with Carer-Staff Communication
Whether improving staff-carer communication would improve the 
service
77% of participants agreed that improving staff-carer communication would 
improve SUs’ care. In addition to providing information, carers can help 
SUs understand:
‘‘Sometimes I find it difficult to follow (what staff member is saying), 
so it's helpful for my [carer] to explain” (SU)
and cope:
“Promoting carer involvement can improve patient health” (Carer)
“It's helpful for [carer] to know how to help me cope” (SU)
“Sometimes a crisis arises and I feel I should have said something 
to the relatives before and we could have averted it. ” (Staff)
All the possible benefits from involving carers stem from the fact that:
117
“The friends and family are often a very important part of a SU's life 
and support network. ” (Staff)
Problems with communication
Figure 3 summarises participants’ experiences.
Staff not having enough time.
Not remembering to discussthe right 
information.
Not knowing what information is 
useful.
Staff have found it difficult to contact 
friends/family.
Staff not being trained.
The service user not being asked for 
their consent to share information. 
The service user not giving their 
consent.
Staff not knowing what is confidential 
and what can be shared.
t i l !
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
% experiencing at least 'Sometimes*
Figure 3: Problems with Communication
Staff not having enough time to communicate with carers, experienced by 
65% of participants, received 7 comments:
“Staff don’t have enough time due to resources." (Carer)
“Staff too busy" (SU)
“Because the assessment etc of the client and all the form-filling etc 
takes so long I can easily overlook the relatives. ” (Staff)
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The issue of respecting confidentiality and gaining consent to share 
information in order to protect the SU’s privacy was acknowledged by all 
groups and was the most-frequently made comment (17 times):
‘‘The issue around confidentiality is very difficult: need to respect 
someone's views and find a middle ground that helps both parties.” 
(Carer)
“I am happy for my [carer] to be involved, but there are some things 
you'd rather he didn't know (because they're personal), and I 
discuss this with my care-coordinator.” (SU)
7 don't think it's appropriate to communicate information at referral 
and at every meeting due to protecting confidentiality o f client.” 
(Staff)
This connected to a theme concerning staff’s potentially negative attitude 
towards communicating with carers:
“When I rang before, I was told I was a nuisance.” (Carer)
“In Adult services, I/we very rarely meet with carers/friends/family so 
communication is by definition very restricted. ” (Staff)
“they are in a strong position to... even sabotage professional 
interventions. ” (Staff)
Ways of improving communication
Figure 4 summarises participants’ views. A theme that emerged was that 
resources were available but under-used:
“a lack of awareness regarding resources sometimes acts as a 
barrier to my communication with carers.” (Staff)
“I am aware of leaflets re: confidentiality and about the team and 
should be used more. ” (Staff)
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Information Leaflet: Mental Health 
Difficulties S Treatments.
If consent is withheld, this should be 
communicated sensitively to the 
people involved.
Direct friends/family to other support.
Information Leaflet: The Team.
Provide friends/family Nvith further 
support.
Discussion and written agreement 
about: why to share information, and 
what kind of information to share.
Information leaflet: Confidentiality.
0 20 40 60 80 100
% rating at least Helpful'
Figure 4: Endorsements of Potential Ways of Improving 
Communication
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Discussion
Findings
This survey suggests that staff-carer communication within the CMHT is 
mostly good, but varies: although the modal response was often positive, 
the number of people endorsing it was often not very high. Particularly 
weak areas included the provision of information about side-effects, 
psychological therapies, support for carers and about the Team. Staff could 
also consider using more electronic media where appropriate. Information 
could be elicited from carers more frequently, particularly at 
referral/assessment. Carers, SUs and staff recognised the benefits of this, 
but staff need to be more pro-active in doing so, rather than expecting 
carers to volunteer useful information.
However, there was nonetheless a very high rate of satisfaction, with no 
participants expressing significant dissatisfaction. Particular strengths of the 
CMHT appeared to be in respecting confidentiality, engaging in telephone 
and face-to-face communication with carers, and communicating about 
SUs’ difficulties, treatment and crisis plans, particularly at care-coordinator 
sessions and when an SU is discharged from hospital.
Problems in communication had been experienced by many participants, 
although usually a significant minority had not experienced difficulties. Text 
Box 2 lists the most common problems.
Text Box 2: Most common barriers to staff-carer communication
• Staff not having enough time;
• Staff not knowing what is useful information for carers to have;
• Staff not being trained to interact with carers.
To address these issues, the CMHT will need to consider how to make 
better use of available resources e.g. existing information leaflets, in a 
systematic way, to increase consistency within the Team and ensure that 
staff maximise the use of their time in a way that is most beneficial to carers
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and SUs. Furthermore, staff may wish to consider what their own beliefs 
and practices are around involving carers in SUs’ care, as although the 
benefits of involving carers who were a significant part of SUs’ lives were 
identified, Team members vary in how they utilise these benefits. The 
above recommendations are summarised in Text Box 3.
Text Box 3: Recommendations
• Provide more information about:
o Side-effects; 
o Psychological therapies; 
o Support for, and rights of, carers; 
o The Team.
• Supplement verbal information with written;
• Discuss confidentiality issues with service users;
• Elicit information from carers more frequently and pro-actively;
• CMHT to consider how it can better make use of available 
resources e.g. information leaflets, websites.
Disseminating the Findings
I presented the findings at a Team Meeting (Appendix Five). Staff engaged 
positively with the findings; feedback is summarised in Appendix Six. 
Findings have also been posted to interested participants.
Strengths and Limitations of the Study
The questionnaire used was very thorough, based on previous research 
and piloted with three individuals. However, it was almost too-thorough, 
yielding a large amount of data that has had to be significantly reduced to 
be presented in a useful way. However, the mixed-methods approach 
allowed for clarification of points, as well as for a variety of people (with 
different communication, time and mobility needs) to be involved.
The survey benefitted from involving carers, SUs and staff, as this 
appeared to give a more holistic evaluation of the CMHTs performance. 
This was also enhanced by involving staff members from all disciplines. 
The survey also contributed to existing research by exploring the views of
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staff and SUs on carer involvement. However, future research could utilise 
larger sampler sizes and simpler measures to explore whether there are 
significant differences between the views of these groups.
It was disappointing that non-CMHT methods of recruitment did not yield 
any participants and that, in spite of the good response rate, the sample 
size was relatively small. This may have made the sample less 
representative e.g. SUs and carers selected by care-coordinators may have 
been more positive. However, views expressed (including those by staff) 
have not been wholly positive, again suggesting that a reasonably balanced 
evaluation of the CMHT has taken place.
This service evaluation has therefore provided a useful insight into how the 
CMHT is currently communicating with carers. It highlights areas of 
strength as well as where improvement is needed. Recommendations have 
been made as to how problems with communication can be addressed.
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Appendix One: Questionnaire3
Survey: Communication between Community Mental Health Team Staff and 
the Friends and Family of Service Users
A. This section asks about what communication is like now.
In this section, please rate your experience of communication in the two columns 
on the right-hand side. Please use the following scales to do this:
How Often: 0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = Most or All of the time
Satisfied: 0 = Very Dissatisfied, 1 = Dissatisfied, 2 = Satisfied, 3 = Very Satisfied
or put ‘NA’ (not applicable) if the question doesn’t apply to you or ‘Don’t know’ if 
you are unsure.
1. (a) Please rate your experience of the type of information that has been 
communicated from staff to friends/family:
How Often did How
you experience Satisfied are
this aspect of you with
3 Please note that the questionnaire and subsequent documentation have been 
reduced to fit the page margins required by University coursework. Therefore, the 
font size and layout are smaller and less clear, respectively, than in the actual 
documentation.
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General information about the service user’s 
difficulties.
Treatment information.
Side-effects of medication.
Information about Psychological therapies.
Information about the Team (including who 
staff are).
How friends/family can help the service user 
get better and/or stay well.
Information about the service user’s safety or 
the safety of others.
Who to contact in a crisis.
Information about the rights of the 
friends/family of service users e.g. benefits, 
carers assessment.
The importance of respecting confidentiality.
Information about support for friends/family 
of service users.
Other (please specify):
(b) Please make any other comments about the type of information 
communicated from staff to friends/family:
2. (a) Please rate your experience of the wav information has been 
communicated from staff to friends/family:
How Often: 0 = Never, I = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = Most or All of the time
Satisfied: 0 = Very dissatisfied, 1 = Dissatisfied, 2 = Satisfied, 3 = Very 
satisfied
communication?
(0-3)
this?
(0-3)
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How Often? Satisfied?
(0-3) (0-3)
By Letter
In a Leaflet
Over the Telephone
Face-to-face
Electronically e.g. by e-mail, on a website
Other (please specify):
(b) Please make any other comments about the way information has been 
communicated from staff to friends/family:
3. (a) Please rate your experience of when information has been 
communicated from staff to friends/family?
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How
Often?
(0-3)
Satisfied
?
(0-3)
When the service user is first referred to the Team 
e.g. by their GP.
When the service user first meets someone from the 
Team i.e. for assessment.
Sessions with the service user’s care-coordinator.
Care-Plan review meetings.
If the service user goes into hospital.
When the service user is discharged from hospital.
Other (please specify):
(b) Please make any other comments about when information has been 
communicated from staff to friends/family:
4. (a) Please rate your experience of friends/family communicating to team 
staff:
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How Often: 0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = Most or All of the time
Satisfied: 0 = Very dissatisfied, 1 = Dissatisfied, 2 = Satisfied, 3 = Very 
satisfied
How
Often?
(0-3)
Satisfied
?
(0-3)
General information about the service user’s 
difficulties.
Side-effects of medication.
Information about the service user’s safety or the 
safety of others.
By Letter.
Over the Telephone.
Face-to-face.
When the service user is first referred to the Team 
e.g. by their GP.
When the service user first meets someone from the 
Team i.e. for assessment.
During sessions with the service user’s care- 
coordinator.
At Care-Plan review meetings.
If the service user goes into hospital.
When the service user is discharged from hospital.
Other (please specify):
(b) Please make any other comments about your experience of 
communication from friends/family to Team staff.
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B. This section asks about improving communication.
5. Do you believe that improving communication between staff and the 
friends and family of service users would improve the care service users 
receive?
(circle the statement you most agree with)
No, not at all No, not really Yes, somewhat Yes,
strongly
What are your reasons for this?
6. (a) How often have you experienced the following?
How Often: 0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = Most or All of the time
Staff not knowing what is confidential information and what 
can be shared.
The service user not being asked by staff for their consent to 
share information with friends/family.
The service user not agreeing to staff sharing information with 
friends/family.
Staff not having enough time to communicate with 
friends/family.
Staff or friends/family not knowing what information is useful.
Staff or friends/family not remembering to ask for/give the 
right information.
Staff not being trained to interact with friends/family.
Staff have found it difficult to contact friends/family.
Other (please specify):
(b) Please make any other comments about potential barriers to good 
communication:
How
Often?
(0-3)
(a) Please rate how helpful you would find the following possible ways of 
improving communication:
0 = Not helpful at all, 1 = Not helpful, 2 = Helpful, 3 = Very helpful
Information leaflet about Confidentiality.
Information leaflet about the Team.
Information leaflet about Mental Health Difficulties & 
Treatments.
Discussion and written agreement between staff, the service 
user and friends/family about: why to share information, and 
what kind of information to share.
If the service user decides that they do not want information 
to be shared with friends/family, this should be 
communicated sensitively to the people involved.
Provide friends/family with further support e.g. needs 
assessments.
Direct friends/family to other support e.g. support groups. 
Other (please specify):
(b) Please make any other comments about possible ways of improving 
communication:
Helpfulness?
(0-3)
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C. This section is for you to express any other views on communication 
between staff and friends/family that the survey hasn’t already asked
about.
Some information about you:
This section is optional, but helps to set your answers in
context.
Age:
Length of involvement 
with New Malden 
CMHT:
Gender:
Staff/Service 
User/Friend or Family
(please underline)
Ethnicity:
Sexual Orientation:
Thank-you for taking part.
Please return to:
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
CMHT
Appendix Two: Information Sheet
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Communication between Community Mental Health 
Team Staff & the Friends and Family of Service Users 
Information about the survey
My name is. I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist based at Community 
Mental Health Team (CMHT). I am interested in the views of service users, 
their friends and family, and staff about communication.
I would like to survey these views, to help us improve the way we 
communicate with the friends and family of service users.
The purpose of this sheet is to provide you with information to help you 
decide if you would like to participate in the survey.
Aims of the survey
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I would like:
• To find out people’s views about the communication between CMHT 
staff and the friends and family of service users;
o By ‘service users’, I mean anyone who has been involved with
the Team due to difficulties with their mental health; 
o In this survey, ‘friends and family’ of service users means friends
and family closely involved in the care of that service user, 
sometimes referred to as ‘carers’; 
o By ‘communication’, I mean the sharing of different types of
information between people e.g. by letter, telephone or in 
person.
• To explore ways of improving communication, so we can make it as 
useful as possible to service users and their friends/family.
What will it involve?
I would like to ask you some questions about your experiences of 
communication between CMHT staff and the friends and family of service 
users. I shall write down your answers. I may also ask some further 
questions about your answers. I will not ask personal or distressing 
questions. This will take less than half an hour.
137
We can meet at, on Wednesdays-Fridays between 9am-5pm. Alternatively, 
we can do the survey over the telephone. We can discuss what would be 
convenient for both of us.
If you prefer, you can fill in the questionnaire by yourself e.g. at home, and 
return it to me, either by post, by handing it in at reception at, or by giving it 
to another member of staff.
Confidentiality
I have to keep signed forms from anyone who takes part to show that they 
agreed to the survey. However, these are kept separately from their survey 
answers. This means that only I will know the personal details of who took 
part.
I shall summarise the answers of all the people who take part in the survey.
I shall put these in a report, which is part of my coursework at the University 
of Surrey. I will also present my findings to the CMHT. The report may also 
be submitted for publication.
Any information I write down will be treated confidentially and will remain 
anonymous. No-one will be able to tell who took part from the final report.
Taking part in this survey could help improve communication 
between staff and the friends/family of service users, but is 
optional
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You do not have to take part in this survey, and can change your mind at 
any time. You don’t have to tell me why and this won’t affect the care you or 
anyone else receives at CMHT.
If you are interested in taking part in the survey, please contact:
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
CMHT
Please leave a message with reception, on my voicemail or with another 
member of staff if I am not available and I will get back to you.
It would be helpful if I could hear from you by.
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Appendix Three: Consent Form 
Communication between Community Mental Health 
Team Staff & the Friends and Family of Service Users 
Consent to participate in the survey
I have read the information sheet about the survey, and have been 
given a copy to keep. The survey has been explained to me, and I 
have had the opportunity to discuss it and ask questions.
I understand what my involvement in the survey will be. I understand 
that my involvement will remain strictly confidential.
I fully and freely consent to participate in the survey which has been 
explained to me.
I understand that I can change my mind about being involved with 
the survey at any time. I can also withdraw my answers from the 
survey at any time. This will not affect the service I or others receive 
from CMHT.
Participant’s name (BLOCK C APITALS):________________________
Participant’s signature :________________________________________
Researcher’s name:
Researcher’s signature:
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D ate :_______________________________________________ ___ _
Would you like to receive a copy of the survey’s findings? 
YES/NO
If you would be interested in receiving the results of this survey, 
please provide some contact information.
Participant’s contact details:
Appendix Four: Selected Un-collapsed Results Tables4
Table A: Staff-Carer Communication -  Frequency of Types of 
Information Communicated
Item Responses Total 
% (n)
Carers Service
Users
Staff
General
information about 
the service user’s 
difficulties.
Most or All of 
the Time
47(8) 20 (1) 83(5) 33
(2)
Often 35 (6) 80(4) 17(1) 17
(1)
Sometimes 18(3) 50
(3)
T reatment 
information.
Most or All of 
the Time
41(7) 20 (1) 67(4) 33
(2)
Often 35 (6) 60(3) 33 (2) 17
(1)
Sometimes 18(3) 20 (1) 33
(2)
Never 6(1) 17
(1)
Side-effects of 
medication.
Most or All of 
the Time
24 (4) 20 (1) 33 (2) 17
(1)
Often 29(5) 50(3) 33
(2)
Sometimes 29(5) 60(3) 17(1) 17
(1)
Never 18(3) 20 (1) 33
(2)
Information about Most or All of 18(3) 20(1) 17(1) 17
4 Only a selection of tables is presented to give an impression of the variability of 
the data. The mode for each group is emboldened.
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Psychological
Therapies.
the Time (1)
Often 18(3) 20(1) 17(1) 17
(1)
Sometimes 41(7) 20(1) 33(2) 67
(4)
Never 6(1) - 17(1) -
N/A 12(2) 20(1) 17(1) -
Information about 
the Team 
(including who 
staff are).
Most or All of 
the Time
29(5) 20 (1) 50(3) 17
(1)
Often 12(2) 17(1) 17
(1)
Sometimes 41(7) 60(3) 17(1) 50
(3)
Never 18(3) 20 (1) 17(1) 17
(1)
How
friends/family can 
help the service 
user get better 
and/or stay well.
Most or All of 
the Time
29 (5) 40(2) 33 (2) 17
(1)
Often 41 (7) 20 (1) 67(4) 33
(2)
Sometimes 29 (5) 40(2) 50
(3)
Information about 
the service user’s 
safety or the 
safety of others.
Most or All of 
the Time
24 (4) 20 (1) 33(2) 17
(1)
Often 47(8) 80(4) 33(2) 33
(2)
Sometimes 12(2) 33
(2)
Never 6(1) 17
(1)
Who to contact in 
a crisis.
Most or All of 
the Time
53(9) 60(3) 50(3) 50
(3)
Often 29 (5) 40 (2) 17(1) 33
(2)
Sometimes 6(1) - - 17
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(1)
Information about 
the rights of the 
friends/family of 
service users e.g. 
benefits, carers 
assessments.
Most or All of 
the Time
29(5) 20 (1) 33(2) 2
(33)
Often 29(5) 40(2) 33(2) 17
(1)
Sometimes 12(2) 33
(2)
Never 24 (4) 40(2) 17(1) 17
(1)
The importance of
respecting
confidentiality.
Most or All of 
the Time
47(8) 80(4) 50(3) 17
(1)
Often 24(4) 67
(4)
Sometimes 18(3) 20 (1) 17(1) 17
(1)
Information about 
support for 
friends/family of 
service users.
Most or All of 
the Time
41(7) 40(2) 50(3) 33
(2)
Often 18(3) 20(1) 17(1) 50
(3)
Sometimes 29 (5) 40(2) 17
(1)
Never 6(1) - 17(1) -
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Table B: Carer-Staff Communication -  Satisfaction
Item Responses Total 
% (n)
Carers Service
Users
Staff
General information 
about the service 
user’s difficulties.
Very
Satisfied
53
(9)
80(4) 67(4) 17
(1)
Satisfied 35
(6)
20 (1) 17(1) 67
(4)
Dissatisfied 6(1) 17
(1)
Side-effects of 
medication.
Very
Satisfied
29
(5)
40(2) 50(3)
Satisfied 53
(9)
40(2) 17(1) 100
(6)
Dissatisfied 6(1) - 17(1) -
N/A 6(1) 20 (1) - -
Information about the 
service user’s safety 
or the safety of 
others.
Very
Satisfied
29
(5)
60(3) 33(2)
Satisfied 41
(7)
20 (1) 17(1) 83
(5)
Dissatisfied 18
(3)
20 (1) 17(1) 17
(1)
By Letter Very
Satisfied
29
(5)
40(2) 33(2) 17
(1)
Satisfied 41
(7)
20 (1) 33(2) 67
(4)
N/A 6(1) 20 (1) - -
Over the Telephone Very
Satisfied
47
(8)
80(4) 67(4)
Satisfied 41
(7)
20 (1) 100
(6)
N/A 6(1) - 17(1) -
Face-to-face Very
Satisfied
53
(9)
80(4) 67(4) 17
(1)
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Satisfied 29
(5)
20 (1) 67
(4)
Dissatisfied 6(1) 17
(1)
When the service 
user is first referred
Very
Satisfied
29
(5)
40(2) 50(3)
to the Team e.g. by 
their GP
Satisfied 41
(7)
20 (1) 17(1) 83
(5)
Dissatisfied 6(1) 20 (1) - -
N/A 6(1) 20 (1) - -
Don’t Know 6(1) 17
(1)
When the service
Very
Satisfied
35
(6)
40(2) 50(3) 17
(1)
user first meets 
someone from the
Satisfied 35
(6)
20 (1) 17(1) 67
(4)
Team i.e. for Dissatisfied 6(1) 20 (1) - -
assessment. N/A 12
(2)
20 (1) 17
(1)
Sessions with the
Very
Satisfied
47
(8)
60(3) 67(4) 17
(1)
service user’s care- 
coordinator.
Satisfied 47
(8)
20 (1) 33 (2) 83
(5)
N/A 6(1) 20 (1) - -
Care Plan review 
meetings
Very
Satisfied
24
(4)
60(3) 17(1)
Satisfied 53
(9)
20 (1) 33(2) 100
(6)
N/A 12
(2)
20 (1) 17(1)
If the service user 
goes into hospital.
Very
Satisfied
24
(4)
40(2) 33(2)
Satisfied 41
(7)
33(2) 83
(5)
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Dissatisfied 12
(2)
40(2)
N/A 18
(3)
20 (1) 17(1) 17
(1)
When the service Very 24 40(2) 33(2) -
user is discharged Satisfied (4)
from hospital. Satisfied 47
(8)
40(2) 33(2) 67
f4)
Dissatisfied 6(1) 17
(1)
N/A 18
(3)
20 (1) 17(1) 17
(1)
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Appendix Five: Slides of Presentation to Team Meeting
Plan for the Session
• Background to the survey
CMHT Communication with » The survey
Carers
• Findings
A survey of current practice
• Recommendations
•  Questions & Feedback
Background to the survey Background to the survey
National Policies Local Policies
• Caring about carers: a national strategy for carers 
(Department of Health, 1999); • Trust-level;
• Carers at the heart of 21st century families and 
communities (DoH, 2008); ♦ Borough's Information Sharing Guidance;
• implementation Guide for Community Mental 
Health Teams (DoH, 2001). • CMHT Operational Plan.
Background to the survey The survey
Current Research Aims
• Polities often not reflected in practice iCarers UK, 2010; LeBiott e t
of. 2003) * To explore CMHTs staff-carer communication:
♦ Commonly-tired issues Indude:
-  Confidcntfalfty; -
-  Staff attitudes;
-  Staff training;
-  Lack of guidance.
— Get an idea of current practice;
— Explore experience of problems;
♦ Best-practica framework and guidance does exist 
-  e.g, Slade et of. (2007); Policy documents. — Evaluate attitudes towards solutions.
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The survey
Administering the survey 
• Questionnaire based on previous research;
Method PirtM pantaXM
QMtitfeeMlre 76(13)
telephone Interview i s m
Face-to*»btt<Nview 6(1)
The survey
Participants
• Carers, service users and staff involved:
-  Access a range of views;
— Hopefully holistic/balanced perspective on 
CMHT's activity.
Findings:
Staff- Carer Communication
Mom# Severn» ttte t Wdyarri Mtoft MbrnalicriGHWituricsted XMRespOW»
Moot or Ail of the Who to contact to •  crfc#*
SenA*u6ef1e<$f<tcuh#ei..................................
aspect forhienfa/IviWy,
HoepMzadarw . . . .
Oéscharp; fromheqjît*-
HbwWeWhrnîtf urihd^ the serweeueic
Highao/AiendVfamflr
PwchoIfltkëTtwei#*
The"6aifl 6nctudk«i**K>i*»flarel.
SdeVfecteolnwSciboa
OArreetirvs.
The survey
Participants
* 17 in total: 5 carers, 6 service users & 6 staff 
members;
• 1 staff member from each discipline.
Findings:
Staff- Carer Communication
0 13 30 30 40 to  w  TO W 100
Findings:
Staff-Carer Communication
•  Range of responses, suggesting great variety in carer 
experiences/staff practices.
• High rate of satisfaction with stafforer communication 
(with some areas for improvement!)
— ’M y experience has been oftxœ ltent communication, I  don't see 
hew t tc o M  be Improved.’  (Carer)
— ’ We have constant contact’  (Service User)
— I  think the team are particularly good ot communicating with 
ftiends/famfy’  (Stiff)
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Findings: 
Carer-Staff Communication
• Range of practices;
• Satisfaction generally high.
Findings: 
Carer-Staff Communication
Motfcal Response Inbnmtioetype^wayand
Most o f A fl o f the Time * * * * * *
tocetoC M
Service user's tfaffkufties. 47
On e-coordinator sessions.
Atrofcnal
AI assessment.
Often Side effects of medication. 41
HoephaKsKiea 47
CM meetings.
Distho^efrombospttaL
IttslMetated.
tto e r U tte r «
Findings:
Problems with Communication
Staff not having erfOtightbne.
Not remembering to discuss the right Wbfmation.
Nat knowing what '■rfurmatibn h  garfat
not being asterflof their i
■ not gM t^  their consent
Findings: 
Carer-Staff Communication
Cto m eeting. 
Discharge from hospital.
Findings:
Problems with Communication
Time/resources:
• “Staff dont have enough time due to resources." 
(Carer)
• “Staff too busy" (Service User)
• "Because the assessment etc of the client and all 
the form-filling etctakes so long I  can easily 
overlook the relatives" (Staff)
Findings:
Carer-Staff Communication
The benefits of communicating with carers:
•  The caras know a h t  about patients and spend a h t  of 
time with them, so can provide very useful Information. 
(Carer)
• *7r*s helpful for my [carer] to come to appointments as she 
can better explain how I'm feeling to the psychiatrist" 
(Service User)
•  The friends and family are often... in a strong position to... 
inform... professional interventions." (Staff)
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Findings:
Problems with Communication
Confidentiality:
• T h e  Issue oround co ifid e n tta B r/k  very d f fk u k :  need to  respect 
someone's views and f in d  a middle ground tha t helps both parties.'’  
(Carer)
•  'to m  happy fo r  rry  [carer] to  be tombed, bur there are some dihigs 
you'd rather he didn't know (because they're personal), and I  discuss 
thb with my care-coordinator.’  (Service User)
•  ' /  don't think Ids appropriate to  communicate information a t 
referral and a t every meeting; due to  protecting confidentiality o f  
c lie n t' (Staff)
Findings:
Problems with Communication
Expecting carers to be pro-active:
• “net much information was available unless 
one went and asked fo r jt.“ (Carer)
• “Often family members do not communicate 
what we perceive as important information 
until a$ked.“ (Staff)
Findings:
Problems with Communication
Staff attitudetowards carets:
• “When I rang before, I  was told I  was a  nuisance' 
(Carer)
• "In Adult services. I/w e very rarely meet with 
carers/frlends/family so communication is by definition 
very restricted." (Staff)
•  “they are in a  strong position to™ even sabotage 
professional interventions." (Staff)
Findings:
Problems with Communication
• “Because family and friends may often be scared 
or reluctant to engage with individuals having 
difficulties." (Staff)
• “Problems arise when the client and carer do not 
see the care needs in the same way". (Staff)
• "If the carer has their own mental health issues or 
in some cases is also a client of the CMHT." (Staff)
Findings: 
Improving Communication
Information lea flet; Motfa? Meaftfl D&ffcuflfes 8
If consent bw#t*eîd,tbî* should be 
<omnuflk3ted«RSNvelftothe people Involved.
Dseri friend Vkm fiy toother support. 
to ftM îiH ibnlfirffch ltie tfeam . 
Provide frtendsflamSy w ith further support.
DexusHOfi and w iittm  agreement SbOtitWhY to 
Sharo Wornofiorv and Hrtirt kind of UbfmtfkKL.
litfonro tto itea fle tC oflfidertb tty.
■ i » i i i i i i.
HE
T T
± ±
HE
HE
Findings:
Improving Communication
• “a  lack of awareness regarding resources 
sometimes acts as a barrier to my 
communication with carers." (Staff)
• “I am aware of leaflets re: confidentiality and 
about the team and should be used more." 
(Staff)
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Recommendations: Recommendations:
Staff-Garer Communication Carer-Staff Communication
1. Provide more information about:
— Side-effects of medication;
— Psychological therapies;
— Support for, and rights of, carers;
— The Team.
1. Consider eliciting information from, and 
Involving, carers more frequently:
— particularly at referral/assessment & CPA 
meetings;
2. Supplement verbal information with written;
— particularly with regards to risk &  slde-effects.
3. Discuss confidentiality issues with service users: 
— Don't wait far a crisis 1
2. Be pro-active in involving carers;
— Don't expect carers to volunteer information.
Recommendations:
Improving communication
• Thanks
1. CMHT to consider, as a whole, how it can
better make use of available resources e g. 
Information leaflets, websites.
• Questions
• Feedback
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Appendix Six: Presentation Feedback
Rating of: Responses
% (n)
Clarity 87.5% (7) Very Clear 12.5% (1) Clear
Usefulness 75% (6) Very Useful 25% (2) Useful
Presenter’s Style 75% (6) Very Good 25% (2) Good
Anticipated effect on 
practice
50% (4) A Lot 50% (4) Some
What was the most useful aspect of the presentation for you?
Reflecting on how much information I give carers.
The discussion about your findings.
Importance of involving carers in service users’ care and how to carry this 
out without upsetting service provided.
Points to improve with regards to team practice.
To discuss ways of making information leaflets more available.
Providing written information is important.
Recommendations of the survey. Discussion around difficulties and 
resolving this in communicating.
What was the least useful aspect of the presentation for you?
Too few patients/carers surveyed.
153
Do you have any ideas about how the presentation could have been
improved?
None (x8)
Please make any other comments you would like:
I look forward to taking this forward with a leaflet for carers.
I thought it was a very clear presentation -  and interesting.
Very useful, Q & A session was facilitated well.
Very helpful.
Nice style -  in presentation.
Very interesting & useful & stimulated discussion which is a very important 
thing.
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Abstract
Objective: To investigate whether there is a causal relationship between 
moral self-ambivalence and obsessive-compulsive behaviours, as this 
relationship has previously received only correlational support. Design: 
The study utilised a between-groups experimental design. There were three 
conditions, consisting of one experimental and two control groups. 
Participants: A non-clinical sample was used. For the final analysis, 198 
participants were recruited. Participants were recruited through the 
university and contacts of the principal researcher. Participants were 
randomly allocated to one condition and completed the study online. 
Procedures: Participants in the experimental condition completed two 
manipulation tasks designed to prime moral self-ambivalence; participants 
in the control conditions completed the same tasks designed to prime 
general uncertainty or to be neutral. All participants completed a task 
requiring them to present answers to moral dilemmas. The time taken to 
complete the moral dilemmas, and number of characters used to do so, 
was recorded. Statistical Analyses: Factorial, three-way ANOVAs were 
used to examine differences between the experimental groups. Findings: 
Priming moral self-ambivalence in participants high in moral self­
ambivalence who were also morally ‘self-sensitive* led to an increase in the 
time taken to respond to the moral dilemmas and the number of characters 
used to do so. The statistical significance of this finding varied depending 
on which covariates were controlled for and which groups were compared. 
The finding that number of characters used was higher in the experimental 
group was consistently significant. Conclusions: Moral self-ambivalence 
appears to play a causal role in obsessive-compulsive behaviour. Intrusive 
thoughts in individuals who are morally self-ambivalent and morally self­
sensitive may prime their anxiety about themselves, leading to compulsive 
behaviour designed to address this anxiety. The theoretical and clinical 
implications of this are discussed, together with limitations of the present 
study and how these might be addressed in future research.
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Introduction 
Project Aims and Overview
This project aims to provide experimental evidence for developments of the 
cognitive-behavioural model of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) that 
have so far received only correlational support. Recent developments in 
cognitive-behavioural models of OCD have focused on exploring possible 
vulnerability factors for developing the disorder (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007; Doron 
& Kyrios, 2005; Doron et al. 2007; Doron et al. 2008). Such research has 
been stimulated by the ongoing absence of a well-supported aetiological 
explanation for the disorder (Abramowitz et al. 2006; Marker et al. 2006), as 
well as critiques of the dominant cognitive model of OCD (Berry & Laskey, 
2012; Julien et al. 2007; Smith et al. 2012; Tolin et al. 2006). Some of the 
researchers behind these developments of the cognitive-behavioural model 
of OCD have begun to incorporate into it constructs relating to self-structure 
(such as self-ambivalence), which can be found in the psychodynamic 
literature (Doron & Kyrios, 2005; Kempke & Luyten, 2007). Previous 
research has found that constructs such as these are related to some OCD 
symptomatology (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007; Doron et al. 2007; Doron et al. 
2008). One published study has identified a causal relationship between 
one construct (moral self-sensitivity) and contamination-related behaviour 
(Doron et al. 2012b). However, no published studies to date have identified 
a causal relationship between another key aspect of self-concept (moral 
self-ambivalence) and OCD symptomatology. This project therefore aims to 
provide experimental evidence in support of these recent developments. 
Specifically, the principal aim is to test the hypothesis that a causal 
relationship exists between moral self-ambivalence and behaviours that 
can be considered analogous to some aspects of obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena. As this study is a preliminary one, both in terms of the 
methodology it uses and the constructs it explores, it will use a non-clinical 
population.
This introductory section begins by providing an outline of the 
phenomenology of OCD. The cognitive-behavioural model of OCD is then 
presented, both in its established form and then with more recent
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developments which incorporate ideas related to moral self-ambivalence 
and self-sensitivity. The psychodynamic constructs relevant to these 
developments are elaborated upon. The current research evidence in 
support of these aspects of the updated cognitive-behavioural model are 
presented, which leads on to the rationale for the research question and 
specific hypotheses of the current study.
Phenomenology of OCD
OCD is a psychiatric diagnosis, central to which are the experiences of 
distressing obsessions and/or compulsions. Criteria for the diagnosis are 
given in Table 1, based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Revised 4th Edition (DSM IV-TR; American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 2000). Obsessions are defined as persistent, intrusive, 
unwanted, distressing thoughts, images or impulses. Compulsions are 
defined as deliberate, repetitive behaviours or mental acts (APA, 2000). 
Common obsessions include concerns about physical and/or moral 
contamination, doubt, symmetry/exactness and thoughts of harming others, 
committing undesirable sexual acts and blasphemous thoughts. Common 
compulsions include checking, cleaning, hoarding, so-called ‘obsessional 
slowness’ and physical or mental rituals such as counting or repeating a 
specific phrase (McKay et al. 2004). Thus, from this information it is clear 
why OCD is considered a heterogeneous disorder: the nature and 
intrusiveness of people’s obsessions and/or compulsions can vary widely 
(De Silva & Rachman, 2004).
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Table 1: Summary o f DSM-IV-TR Diagnostic Criteria fo r OCD (APA,
2000)
A. The person experiences either obsessions or compulsions: 
Obsessions defined as:
Recurrent and persistent thoughts, impulses, or images that are 
experienced as intrusive and distressing; not simply excessive worries 
about real-life problems; that the person tries to ignore, suppress or 
neutralise; recognised as a product of their own mind.
Compulsions defined as:
Repetitive behaviours or mental acts that the person feels driven to 
perform in response to an obsession or according to rigid rules; 
intended to reduce distress or prevent a feared outcome; but are 
excessive or not realistically linked to what they are designed to affect.
B. At some point, obsessions or compulsions are recognised as 
excessive or unreasonable. Note: This does not apply to children.
C. Causes significant distress or social impairment.
D. The obsessions/compulsions are not the same as another Axis I 
disorder e.g. concern with appearance in Body Dysmorphic Disorder.
E. The experiences cannot be explained by the use of substances or the 
presence of a medical condition.
These experiences can be highly distressing and impairing, in severe 
instances taking up many hours of a person’s daily time and affecting their 
employment, relationships and quality of life (De Silva & Rachman, 2004). 
OCD is considered one of the most incapacitating anxiety disorders (World 
Health Organization, 1996). Its lifetime prevalence is estimated as being 
between 1% and 3% of the general population (Torres et al. 2006). Thus, 
research that contributes to developing models that underpin therapeutic 
approaches and, hence, to developing direct treatments, is of substantial 
importance.
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Although classification of OCD uses a medical psychiatric model, 
psychological approaches have contributed substantially to the 
understanding of, and therapeutic response to, the emotional distress 
described above (Frost & Steketee, 2002). Over-reliance on a broad 
psychiatric model, particularly given OCD is considered a heterogeneous 
disorder, may limit the effectiveness of treatment for OCD and the research 
on which it is based (Smith et al. 2012). This is because the psychiatric 
model groups together a mixed range of presentations that may have 
different psychological processes underlying them (Smith et al. 2012). 
Therefore, it is important to consider briefly the limitations of psychiatric 
diagnosis and how this study intends to focus on particular psychological 
processes contributing to specific OCD presentations.
There exist trenchant critiques of psychiatric diagnostic systems in general; 
critiques tend to focus on three areas of concern (Bentall, 2009): Firstly, 
questions have been raised as to whether diagnostic categories have 
validity. It has been argued that they reify particular forms of distress as 
one diagnostic entity without research to substantiate the existence of 
these proposed entities, such as ‘schizophrenia’. The existence of this 
diagnostic entity is called into question, given the variation in the 
experiences of people diagnosed with it and lack of any clearly-identified or 
-replicated biological or genetic underpinnings of the ‘illness’. Secondly, 
medical diagnoses of psychiatric ‘illness’ have been criticised for reducing 
mental distress to biological factors, whilst ignoring the significant causal 
role psychosocial factors (such as trauma or discrimination) play in the 
development of distress. Thirdly, even the utility of diagnoses (given the 
limited success or specificity of pharmacological treatments for mental 
distress) has been questioned. A debate over the appropriateness and 
ethical status of psychologists using psychiatric diagnoses to group 
together and treat/research potentially disparate experiences is ongoing 
(Pilgrim & Coles, 2011). Whilst it is beyond the scope of this paper to enter 
into this debate in full, the most relevant issue from the debate centres 
around the fact that differing experiences may have different psychological 
processes underlying them, even if they are grouped together under the 
same medical rubric (Doron & Moulding, 2009).
165
Recent research supports this conceptual separation of underlying 
psychological processes from apparently similar constellations of 
‘symptoms’: in a study of 44 patients with a diagnosis of OCD, different 
symptom dimensions were correlated with different obsessional beliefs 
(Smith et al. 2012; Table 2). Therefore, throughout this paper, attention will 
be paid to which specific obsessive-compulsive ‘symptoms’ are related to 
the particular psychological constructs under scrutiny, rather than assuming 
that all ‘OCD’ experiences can be grouped together and are contributed to 
equally by the same factors. The study will focus on contamination
(Rachman, 2004), which will be explained below, in the context of a critique 
of the established cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) approach to OCD 
and its recent developments.
Table 2: Which obsessional beliefs strongly correlate with severity of 
the four major OCD symptom dimensions (Smith eta l. 2012)
Symptom Dimension Obsessional Belief
Contamination Responsibility/Overestimation of 
Threat
Harm Responsibility/Overestimation of 
Threat
Unacceptable Thoughts Importance of Thoughts/Need to 
Control Thoughts
Symmetry Perfectionism/Intolerance of 
Uncertainty
Cognitive-behavioural Models of OCD
Cognitive-behavioural approaches to OCD have produced a considerable 
amount of empirical evidence, both for theoretical models of the 
maintenance of the disorder and also for effective therapies (Frost & 
Steketee, 2002). Because there has been such systematic empirical 
research into these models and therapies, cognitive-behavioural
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approaches now constitute the bulk of psychological theory about OCD 
(Kempke & Luyten, 2007). Therefore, cognitive-behavioural models of 
OCD, and the efficacy of therapy based on it, will now be outlined.
There is no one cognitive-behavioural model of OCD, but the dominant 
ones share a focus on misappraisals of otherwise normal intrusive thoughts 
(Veale, 2007). For the sake of parsimony, this paper will group these 
different ‘appraisal’ models (Clark & Beck, 2010) together as generically as 
possible and refer to ‘the’ cognitive-behavioural model of OCD. In the 
cognitive-behavioural model of OCD, intrusive thoughts (as distinct from 
obsessions) are seen as being a normal part of experience. This 
perspective is based on studies which show that this kind of thought 
(unpleasant and involuntary) occurs in up to 90% of the general population 
(Rachman & De Silva, 1978; Rassin & Muris, 2006). What leads to the 
thoughts becoming obsessions (persistent, recurring and intensely 
distressing) is theorised to be the person’s reaction to them. Again, 
experimental studies have supported this notion, demonstrating that 
attaching a negative meaning to the experience of having the intrusive 
thoughts and attempting to suppress them increases the distress they 
cause and their frequency (Gibbs, 1996; Horowitz, 1975). Compulsions are 
theorised to arise as a means for the person to respond to the 
misappraised meaning they have attached to the intrusive thought, and to 
manage the distress this causes (Clark, 2004). This response leads to the 
negative reinforcement of compulsions and the maintenance of the belief in 
the significance of the intrusive thoughts; the self-perpetuating cycle this 
contributes to is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Intrusive Thought | Misappraisal
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intrusive 
thoughts going
Responses to Distress:
• trying to remove or keep out thoughts;
• compulsions related to meaning of thoughts;
• avoidance of triggers.
Figure 1: Cognitive-behavioural model of OCD (Clark & Beck, 2010)
Several years ago, the Obsessive-Compulsive Cognitions Working Group 
(OCCWG), a task-force of international OCD researchers, developed a 
framework of six unhelpful beliefs that contribute to the misappraisal of 
otherwise normal intrusive thoughts (OCCWG, 1997). Table 3 details these 
cognitions. Some of the beliefs relate specifically to the nature of thoughts, 
such as ‘Need to control thoughts’ and Thought-Action Fusion’; others 
relate more generally to anxiety, such as ‘Overestimation of threats’ and 
‘Intolerance of uncertainty’; and others concern standards of behaviour, 
such as ‘Over-inflated personal responsibility’ and ‘Perfectionism’. Beliefs 
relating to the nature of thoughts attribute meaning to the content and 
occurrence of intrusive thoughts themselves; for example, a person with 
OCD might consider that thinking about child abuse is the same as 
committing child abuse and believe it is a risk factor for themselves 
committing child abuse. Beliefs relating more generally to anxiety increase 
subjective perceptions of threat; for example, seeing pieces of broken glass 
on the ground and thinking that someone might seriously injure themselves 
on them, and not being able to put this thought out of one’s mind until the 
glass is cleared up. Beliefs relating to standards of behaviour are 
demanding for the person with the belief; for example, in the above 
scenario involving broken glass, the person might see themselves as
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wholly responsible for clearing up the glass. This problem is exacerbated 
(evidence suggests) by the tendency for people with OCD to believe that 
not acting to prevent harm is as morally culpable as acting to cause harm 
(Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000): they believe that harm arising from omission is 
the same as from commission.
Table 3: Beliefs underlying unhelpful obsessive-compulsive 
responses to intrusive thoughts (OCCWG, 1997)
Belief Meaning
Over-inflated Intrusions are appraised in terms of potential harm
personal to oneself or others, for which one is seen as being
responsibility responsible, leading to attempts to prevent harm
occurring.
Overestimation of The probability of the likelihood of harm occurring is
threats over-estimated, leading to the avoidance of non­
threatening situations because they are perceived 
as sources of potential threats.
Need to control Thoughts are seen as something that can, and
thoughts should, be under complete conscious control of an
individual at all times. If not, this is taken to mean 
that a person is out of control or dangerous. 
Perfectionism It is believed that perfectionism exists and should be
attained. In OCD, this is particularly associated with 
self-criticism (for not being perfect), and with actions 
needing to be performed until they ‘feel’ right. 
Intolerance of The individual experiences a significant amount of
uncertainty anxiety when an outcome is not guaranteed, and
cannot tolerate this anxiety. 
Thought-Action Thoughts are taken as the equivalent of actions.
Fusion (TAP) There are two subtypes: Morality TAP -  Thinking
unacceptable thoughts is taken to be the same as 
committing them; and Likelihood TAP -  Thinking a 
thought is taken to increase the likelihood of it 
coming true.
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Subsequent factor analysis suggested that these cognitive domains were 
not representative of beliefs in clinical samples (Woods et al. 2004). The 
Working Group then went on to develop three factors (combining the above 
six) that better fit with data from a large clinical and non-clinical sample 
(OCCWG, 2005): Responsibility/Threat Estimation, Perfectionism/Certainty 
and Importance/Control of Thoughts.
Prima facie, these beliefs are not unique to OCD; for instance, both 
hypervigilance to threats and intolerance of uncertainty are often present in 
other anxiety disorders (Tolin et al. 2006), and perfectionism is common in 
a range of other disorders (Egan et al. 2011). Historically, inflated 
responsibility has received more theoretical and clinical attention than have 
the other unhelpful beliefs (Rhéaume et al. 1995). It is a central part of the 
cognitive-behavioural model of OCD and its contribution to obsessive- 
compulsive behaviours has been demonstrated to be a factor distinguishing 
OCD from other anxiety disorders (Salkovsksis et al. 2000). However, 
more recent research has identified that some of the other domains can 
significantly predict OCD symptoms, particularly perfectionism (Moretz & 
McKay, 2009; Wu & Cortesi, 2009) and meta-cognitive beliefs (Solem et al.
2010). These researchers suggest that research into, and the application 
of, the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD needs both to attend to these 
other factors and also to be more specific in the links made between 
particular beliefs and specific OCD symptoms.
Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) based upon the model outlined thus 
far involves helping clients to develop an alternative, less distressing 
explanation for their intrusive thoughts and to develop alternative, less 
distressing responses to them (which reduce rather than maintain the 
frequency and intensity of obsessions). A key aspect of this therapeutic 
approach includes assisting clients with exposing themselves to the triggers 
for their obsessions without responding with their typical compulsions 
(Veale, 2007). This approach has been shown to be efficacious in a 
number of studies (Schruers et al. 2005), and is now a well-established and 
internationally-recommended treatment for OCD (Abramowitz, 2006; 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2005). However, there 
is evidence to suggest that 30% of individuals referred for CBT do not
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benefit from it, and only 55% see a benefit in the long-term (1-6 years after 
treatment), meaning that further work is needed to improve therapy for 
OCD and the models on which it is based (Abramowitz, 2006).
Critique of the 'appraisal’ model
One possible reason for the limited success of CBT may be that there is 
inconsistent evidence for the ‘appraisal’ model of OCD on which it is based, 
suggesting that the model itself may only partially explain OCD (Julien et al. 
2007; Tolin et al. 2006). The dominant cognitive model of OCD is based on 
the two premises that intrusive thoughts are a normal part of experience 
(the continuum hypothesis; Clark and Rhyno, 2005), and that dysfunctional 
beliefs (which lead to misappraisals of otherwise normal thoughts) lead to 
them escalating into obsessions (Julien et al. 2007). A review of 13 studies 
concluded that, although these studies found that between 72-100% of the 
non-clinical population experienced intrusive thoughts, serious 
methodological limitations may have over-inflated their estimated 
prevalence (Julien et al. 2007). These limitations include overly-inclusive 
definitions of intrusive thoughts given to participants that may have led to 
them reporting distressing thoughts that are not intrusive (such as 
rumination or worry); samples that are predominantly female and student, 
both of whom experience more distress and so who are more likely to 
experience intrusive thoughts than the general population; and assessment 
measures that are based on discussion with non-clinical participants, rather 
than using clinically-observed obsessions as examples of intrusive thoughts 
for participants to report. A later review acknowledges these limitations to 
the continuum hypothesis, but concludes that, in spite of inconsistencies in 
methodologies, intrusive thoughts that are comparable to obsessions are 
experienced by non-clinical participants (Berry & Laskey, 2012). In support 
of this, the review cites research which uses a diary method to ask 
participants to record intrusive thoughts as they occur over a two-week 
period, rather than asking them to endorse items on a retrospective 
questionnaire (Wells & Morrison, 1994), and which screens the items for 
obsessive content (Clark & Purdon, 2009). This gives an estimated 
prevalence rate of 41%. Both clinical and non-clinical groups report themes 
of harm, accident and unacceptable sex; contamination appears to be
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uniquely upsetting (based on a comparison of the two groups) for clinical 
participants (Garcia-Soriano et al. 2011). Thus, the first premise on which 
the CBT model of OCD is based is only partly supported by the evidence: 
obsessions do appear to be more frequent versions of otherwise normal 
intrusive thoughts, supporting the continuum hypothesis, but they are also 
somewhat different in content, more spontaneous and lead to different 
responses (Berry & Laskin, 2012).
The second premise of the CBT model, which seeks to account for these 
differences between obsessions and intrusions in terms of dysfunctional 
appraisal-related beliefs, also only receives partial support. Although 
prospective studies show that the presence of dysfunctional beliefs does 
predict the development of OCD symptoms in parents (Abramowitz et al. 
2006), it does not account for all the variance in OCD symptoms (Coles et 
al. 2008; Wheaton et al. 2010) and, most importantly, these beliefs are not 
clearly specific to OCD (Tolin et al. 2006). In a comparison of 89 OCD 
patients with 72 anxious patients and 33 non-clinical controls, only 
Importance/Control of Thoughts was endorsed more highly by OCD 
patients when controlling for anxiety and depression (Tolin et al. 2006). A 
weakness of this study is that 36 of the OCD group had another comorbid 
anxiety disorder, suggesting that a lack of clear distinction between the 
groups may account for the overlap. The study conflicts with a number of 
others (both correlational and experimental) that have found high 
responsibility in OCD (e.g. Cougle et al. 2007). A recent review concludes 
that there is evidence for the role of obsessional beliefs informing 
misappraisals of otherwise normal intrusive thoughts into obsessions, but 
that there is no one coherent model and that the mixed evidence, 
particularly from clinical samples, suggests that other factors and greater 
specificity in research are required (Smith et al. 2012).
One area of research which may illuminate another factor that could be 
incorporated into the cognitive model and which may explain some of the 
above variability in findings is research into thought suppression. Thought 
suppression is another key aspect of the cognitive model of OCD, as it was 
theorised that, due to dysfunctional beliefs, attempts to suppress intrusive 
thoughts were made that were counter-productive and led to an increase in
172
thought frequency (Salkovskis, 1985). Again, later reviews have presented 
a more complicated picture: A meta-analysis of 28 studies (Abramowitz et 
al. 2001) found a small-moderate (d=0.30) ‘rebound’ effect of suppression 
(meaning more of the suppressed thoughts occur after attempts at 
suppressing have ended), but with no immediate enhancement effect on 
frequency of suppression (meaning suppression does not lead to an 
increase in frequency during the suppression period). However, the thought 
suppression effect is inconsistent across studies, with some replications 
and some contrary findings (Purdon, 2004). Methodological limitations that 
affect this include the order in which participants are asked to express or 
suppress a thought; the instructions participants are given; and how 
intrusions are recorded (with more covert measures, such as clicking a 
mouse, leading to more reports than an overt measure such as ringing a 
bell; Purdon, 2004). Efforts to suppress thoughts do appear to be motivated 
by negative appraisals of the meaning of the thought (Purdon, 2004), which 
supports the appraisal model of OCD. However, it is questionable as to 
whether these efforts lead to increased frequency of the intrusions and, 
hence, obsessions. Rather, it seems that obsessional thoughts are, at least 
in part, upsetting because they (and unsuccessful attempts to suppress 
them) are taken as evidence of a negative aspect of the person’s self 
(Purdon et al. 2005). This is based on a study of 50 participants with OCD, 
whose own personal most upsetting obsessional thought was primed 
(addressing a limitation of earlier studies that experimentally imposed 
intrusions might not be personally meaningful and so easier to suppress; 
Purdon, 2004), and who were either instructed to suppress or not suppress 
the thought. Suppression did not increase frequency, but unsuccessful 
attempts at suppression were associated with more discomfort (Purdon et 
al. 2005).
This discomfort has been explored in terms of its meaning for the self. It 
has been theorised that intrusions are interpreted in terms of what they 
might mean about a person’s self, specifically a ‘feared self (Aardema & 
O’Connor, 2007). A study of 28 participants with OCD found that they rated 
their most upsetting obsession as contradicting an important aspect of their 
self (Rowa et al. 2005), which replicated a finding with 64 non-clinical
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controls (Rowa & Purdon, 2003). In particular, people with OCD have been 
found (in a comparison of 24 people with OCD, 21 anxious controls and 16 
non-anxious controls) to uniquely draw negative inferences about 
themselves as a result of the intrusion, particularly in terms of their own 
morality (Ferrier & Brewin, 2005). Thus, people with OCD have been found 
to have a ‘feared self (Carver et al. 1999) that is seen (by them) as being 
dangerous to themselves or others by virtue of being immoral.
Developing the cognitive-behavioural model to include self- 
concept
In sum, recent developments of the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD 
have sought to include ‘higher order’ cognitive-behavioural vulnerabilities 
(Doron & Kyrios, 2005), given the critique of the appraisal model of OCD. 
One aspect of this development has been to focus on the meaning that 
intrusive thoughts have for the self-concept of the person with OCD. This 
development echoes the earlier work of Guidano & Liotti (1983), which 
attempted to integrate psychoanalytic and cognitive-behavioural 
approaches (Kempke & Luyten, 2007). This earlier work also sought to 
explain the evident symptoms and maintaining factors of OCD in terms of 
broader, underlying factors. Both approaches, in exploring underlying 
factors, also seek to address the question of why particular intrusions 
activate an individual’s concerns and not others (Doron et al. 2007), and to 
integrate self-perception into the cognitive-behavioural model (Doron & 
Kyrios, 2005; Guidano & Liotti, 1983).
The explicit inclusion of self-perception variables into a cognitive- 
behavioural model connects with an element in the definition of the OCD, 
which states that obsessional thoughts must be appraised as ego-dystonic, 
that is, inconsistent with a person’s sense of self (APA, 2000). In fact, 
although self-concept is not an important aspect of the dominant model, 
cognitive theorists had already previously highlighted that the content of the 
obsession is of importance (Rachman, 1997), particularly if individuals have 
an ambivalent self-view (Clark, 2004).
The finding that intrusive thoughts may escalate into obsessions because 
they contradict aspects of the self has been theoretically connected to the
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key OCD belief domain of inflated responsibility (Salkovskis, 1999) and, in 
turn, to a specific valued aspect of the self -  the moral aspect of the self 
(Doron et al. 2009). Inflated responsibility is defined as a belief that one is 
instrumentais responsible for the prevention of harm (Salkovskis, 1999) 
and, hence, results in a pressure on oneself to ‘do the right thing’. The fact 
that placing pressure on oneself to ‘do the right thing’ (both in terms of 
preventing harm but also perfectionism) has been found to be important for 
people with OCD has been taken to imply the significance of the moral 
dimension of the self for them (Doron et al. 2009).
The Contribution of Contemporary Psychodynamic 
Perspectives
These findings and theoretical developments begin to converge with 
contemporary psychodynamic perspectives on OCD, in which ambivalent 
representations of self and others are central (Kempke & Luten, 2007). 
Contemporary object relations theories explain how moral self-ambivalence 
leads to negative moral evaluation of the self (in response to intrusions) as 
outlined below. In the terms of these ‘object relations’ theories, ‘internal 
objects’ are mental representations (cognitive-affective schemas) of self 
and others (Segal, 1973). People with OCD are theorised to have 
ambivalent representations. In particular, self and others are thought to be 
represented mainly in terms of negative part objects. ‘Part objects’ are 
internalised particular qualities or functions that are a property of a whole 
external ‘object’ (person), such as hyper-morality or being punishing (Klein, 
1946/1975). The theory that people with OCD have mainly negative part 
objects means that an individual’s internal objects (how they have mentally 
internalised significant others) are reduced to one particular part property 
(quality) e.g. punishing, rather than being related to as whole 
objects/people who have many properties, both good and bad, for example 
a parent who both punishes when one has done something wrong but also 
unconditionally loves the child (Kempke & Luyten, 2007). There are two 
important consequences (within this contemporary psychodynamic 
approach) of self and others being reduced to these particular functions 
and being related to most strongly in these terms.
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One consequence is that, because the part objects are mainly negative, the 
individual with OCD has powerful negative internal impulses (such as the 
aggressive drive) of which the individual’s highly critical and demanding 
internal substructures are unaccepting. This concords with more traditional 
psychoanalytic views, which conceptualised OCD mainly in terms of a 
harsh ‘superego’ (internalised conscience) punishing the self for having 
unacceptable impulses (Fenichel, 1945). Recent research on ‘latent 
aggression’ in people with OCD has now begun to support this theory 
empirically (Moritz et al. 2009; Moritz et al. 2011). Freud’s (1909/1955) 
theory of OCD was that latent aggression, that is, hostility towards certain, 
usually significant others, provoked feelings of anxiety and so was not 
expressed openly. Instead, the aggression is expressed through fantasies 
or disguised forms. The ‘hypermorality’ displayed by people with OCD 
(comparable to the cognitive concept of inflated responsibility; Moritz et al.
2011) is therefore understood as a ‘reaction formation’ to these 
unconscious feelings of hostility -  an unconscious attempt to over­
compensate for them (Fenichel, 1945). Moritz et al. (2011) summarise four 
papers which found that people with OCD experienced more anger which 
they did not display compared to people without OCD and people with other 
anxiety disorders. They then extended this with their own research, which 
compared people with OCD, people with another anxiety disorder and non- 
clinical controls on an instrument devised to assess latent aggression 
(amongst other dimensions) -  the Responsibility and Interpersonal 
behaviours and Attitudes Questionnaire (RIBAQ; Moritz et al. 2009). Items 
assess excessive worry and responsibility e.g. “When there is thunder and 
lightning outside, I am truly worried that someone might get hurt”, latent 
aggression and calculating behaviour e.g. “Often, I feel almost hate against 
people who I am supposed to love” and suspiciousness/distrust e.g. “I am 
suspicious against people I have just met”. The three subscales have 
reliability scores of alpha = .87, .70 and .75 respectively. Furthermore, the 
latent aggression subscale does not correlate with a measure of aggression 
(the Maudsley-Obsessive Compulsive Inventory aggression subscale; 
Hodgson & Rachman, 1977), indicating that latent aggression is not the 
same as aggressive obsessions. The strength of the psychometric 
properties of the RIBAQ thus endorse the findings of the research, which
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were that in both a self-identifying sample and a sample formally diagnosed 
with OCD, latent aggression was particular to OCD when compared against 
other psychiatric groups (Moritz et al. 2009; Moritz et al. 2011). Latent 
aggression could explain why people with OCD experience different, more 
spontaneous intrusions -  these would be understood psychoanalytically as 
reflecting the individual’s exaggerated concern about their own undealt-with 
aggression towards others whom they fear would punish or abandon them 
if they found out about their aggressive feelings (Moritz et al. 2009). 
Heightened latent aggression would also qualify the understanding of the 
role of inflated responsibility. It would suggest that inflated responsibility 
does not just give rise to obsessions (via misappraisals), but is also a 
reaction to them, designed to compensate for the meaning for the self 
which the intrusions have.
The meaning for the self which intrusions provoke is an uncertain one for 
the individual with OCD: it is not immediately clear to them whether the 
intrusive thoughts are providing evidence about the feared self. This is 
important because the second consequence of having mainly part objects, 
which connects more clearly to current, empirically-supported cognitive 
models, is that it becomes very difficult for the individual to tolerate 
ambiguity. Relating to oneself and others in terms of only part objects 
(particular qualities or functions) is, in developmental terms, immature, 
because it corresponds to the stage at which experiences can only be seen 
as all-good or all-bad (Klein, 1952/1975). Without developing the capacity 
to relate to oneself and others as whole objects (people with a variety of 
good and bad qualities), an individual will become ‘stuck’ (within this 
theoretical viewpoint) at the stage of viewing the world in dichotomous 
terms. If an experience (such as having an intrusive thought) does not 
clearly belong within one of two dichotomous categories (such as “I am a 
goodjbad person”) then it will provoke anxiety, because the individual has 
not learnt that ambiguity is not necessarily a sign that a negative part object 
is present or about to occur, nor learnt to tolerate the co-existence of both 
positive and negative feelings/impulses towards their objects (Segal, 1973). 
Thus, in terms of people with OCD, having mainly negative part objects 
results in low ambiguity tolerance and controlling attempts to restore
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external certainty in order to stabilise one’s internal world in response to the 
potential threat represented by negative intrusive thoughts (Kempke & 
Luyten, 2007).
Early experiences which lead to critical part objects may also lead to 
insecure attachment. Insecure attachment may influence beliefs about the 
self and the responses used to manage anxiety (Mikulincer & Shaver,
2007). Thus, attachment style may also be significant for the development 
and maintenance of OCD (Doron et al. 2009). In a sample of 446 students, 
it was found that attachment anxiety and avoidance had a mediated 
relationship with OCD symptoms via OCD-related beliefs, controlling for 
depression (Doron et al. 2009). This relationship was replicated using a 
sample of 30 people with OCD, 20 anxious controls and 32 community 
participants (Doron et al. 2011). Such research suggests that insecure 
attachment may contribute to OCD by increasing the likelihood of negative 
perceptions of the self as incompetent in particular domains, as opposed to 
viewing the whole self as inadequate, which would lead to depression 
(Doron et al. 2011): sensitivity to rejection (caused by insecure attachment) 
in relation to one’s performance in particular domains of the self (such as 
morality) may contribute to anxiety about intrusions. Attachment style also 
influences the selection of strategies to manage emotional distress 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007), which may explain why not all those who are 
sensitive about their morality respond to intrusions in a way that escalates 
them into obsessions: insecurely attached people are more likely to be 
hypervigilant for threat, have difficulty suppressing distressing thoughts, 
and believe in the importance of controlling themselves and being perfect 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). These responses have been shown to 
contribute to OCD (Purdon, 2004), and so insecure attachment may also 
contribute to OCD via these responses (Doron et al. 2011). Intriguingly, 
Doron et al. (2012a) cite experimental evidence that would strengthen this 
theory, alluding to a manipulation increasing feelings of insecure 
attachment, with the result that this influences contamination-like washing 
behaviour (Doron et al. in press, cited in Doron et al. 2012a), but no further 
details of this are available at this time.
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Moral Self-Sensitivity and Self-Ambivalence
In sum, a body of research suggests that negative appraisals of the self as 
a result of intrusions may be significant in the development of OCD. 
However, this research does not explain why people with OCD make 
negative self-judgements in response to threatening mental intrusions 
(Bhar & Kyrios, 2007); in fact, social psychological research suggests that 
people ordinarily reject negative information about themselves in order to 
protect their sense of self-worth (Sherman & Cohen, 2002). Research 
integrating aspects of more contemporary psychoanalytic approaches to 
OCD, together with research into attachment and OCD, has begun to 
specify some potential vulnerability factors for developing these responses 
to intrusions (Doron & Kyrios, 2005). This research views the self as a 
multidimensional construct (Doron et al. 2008), and begins to specify which 
aspects of the self may be particular vulnerability factors for OCD.
The two vulnerability factors to be examined in this paper are self-sensitivity 
and self-ambivalence. Individuals with OCD are hypothesised to be 
‘sensitive’ in particular self-domains (that is, placing a great deal of their 
self-worth on particular areas, yet not feeling competent in those areas). 
They therefore react to intrusions that activate this sensitivity (if the content 
of the intrusion relates to or contradicts the sensitive area) in ways which 
attempt to compensate for it (Doron & Moulding, 2009). For example, 
someone who is ‘sensitive’ about their likelihood of committing immoral 
acts, and who has an intrusive thought about being a paedophile, might 
react by avoiding all schools altogether. Research suggests that people 
with OCD are particularly sensitive in the domain of morality, and this 
sensitivity of self (after controlling for depression) has been shown to be 
strongly related to contamination/washing obsessions and compulsions, 
over-estimation of threat (vigilance for intrusions) and an inflated sense of 
responsibility (Doron et al. 2008).
A second vulnerability factor is thought to be self-ambivalence. Self­
ambivalence is defined as uncertainty about and preoccupation with a 
dichotomous self-construct i.e. one is unsure and concerned about which 
half one is of two polarised extremes of one character dimension such as
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morality e.g. Good or Bad (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007). In cognitive terms, this 
can be conceptualised as the existence of contradictory beliefs about the 
self, such as “I am a good person” and “I am a bad person”, resulting in 
uncertainty about one’s self-worth and attempts to become certain about 
the ‘truth’ about oneself (Guidano & Liotti, 1983). This concept can also be 
understood in terms of self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), in which 
anxiety is thought to arise from discrepancy between an ‘actual/own’ self 
and an ‘ought/other’ self. This form of anxiety is conceptualised as 
unconscious fear of the threat of punishment from the ‘other’ for not 
meeting up to their standards (Higgins, 1987). Supporting this view, people 
with OCD have been found to have a more ‘inarticulate’ sense of self; that 
is to say, their self-concept is less likely to integrate their ‘actual’ and ‘ideal’ 
selves (Makhlouf-Norris et al. 1970, 1972), and an association has been 
found between moral self-ambivalence and OCD symptomatology in clinical 
populations, when comparing 73 OCD patients, 53 anxious controls, 225 
non-clinical undergraduates and 43 non-clinical community controls (Bhar & 
Kyrios, 2007). This association was strongest for responsibility beliefs and 
beliefs about the importance of thoughts (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007). However, 
this study did not find a difference between OCD patients’ and non-anxious 
controls’ levels of self-ambivalence. However, a later study addressed a 
limitation with this study, which was that the anxious control group reported 
higher levels of depression and comparable levels of obsessionality to the 
OCD group (Loverseed, 2010). The later study controlled for this, and 
found that, although anxious participants scored more highly on self­
ambivalence than non-clinical controls, participants diagnosed with OCD 
scored even higher than anxious participants (Loverseed, 2010). The latter 
study’s conclusion (that highly-elevated self-ambivalence does distinguish 
OCD from other anxiety disorders) is strengthened by the comparison of 24 
non-clinical controls, 19 anxious controls and 26 OCD participants based 
on standard diagnostic interviews (as opposed to allocating participants to 
groups only by self-report; Loverseed, 2010).
Self-ambivalence is theorised to interact with self-sensitivity and so 
contribute to OCD because insecurity of self-definition is likely to lead to 
attempts (in the form of unhelpful beliefs and behaviours) to establish the
180
‘truth’ about oneself in the face of threats to sensitive areas (Bhar & Kyrios, 
2007; Guidano & Liotti, 1983). In this context, the unhelpful beliefs identified 
in Table 3 are thought to act as protective strategies to ensure that one’s 
self is moral (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007; Guidano & Liotti, 1983).
Thus, the above research supports a theorised link between [1] moral self­
sensitivity and self-ambivalence, and [2] obsessive-compulsive inflated 
responsibility beliefs and contamination obsessions and compulsions. This 
link is conceptualised as follows: morally-undesirable intrusions are 
experienced indicative of a negative moral self for those who are concerned 
and unsure about their own moral status, leading to external attempts (such 
as washing) to make themselves feel internally ‘clean’ (Rachman, 2004). 
This link has been supported empirically in a range of studies that 
manipulate a participant’s sense of morality and then assess urges to clean 
and actual cleaning behaviour. For example, 148 female undergraduates 
were asked to listen to a tape describing a kiss, either consensual or non- 
consensual, with a man who was described in either moral or immoral 
terms. Even in the consensual condition, the immoral nature of the man 
was reported to lead to a feeling of mental contamination, and some 
participants engaged in washing behaviour as a result. Although the 
number of participants who engaged in actual washing behaviours was not 
statistically significant, the urge to was, and this was related to feelings of 
moral impurity (Elliott & Radomsky, 2009). This link between concern about 
one’s moral status and washing behaviour has been found in a clinical 
sample: In a qualitative study of 20 people with OCD, it was found that 
people with OCD may fear ‘morphing’ (that they may acquire the 
characteristics of an immoral person through contact with or thinking about 
them), and that they engage in complex mental and physical rituals to 
alleviate the feelings of anxiety this fear gives rise to (Coughtrey et al.
2012).
However, the above experimental research has supported only a general 
link between a threat to morality and mental contamination. The research 
supporting the specifics of the theory concerning moral self-sensitivity and 
moral self-ambivalence to date has largely been correlational, and calls for 
experimental studies to test whether the relationship between self-
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ambivalence, self-sensitivity and OCD is causal (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007; 
Doron et al. 2008).
The one published experiment which challenged participants’ self­
perception in the moral domain i.e. which increased moral self-sensitivity, 
found that doing so led to a reported increase in an urge to conduct OCD- 
like contamination-related behaviour (Doron et al. 2012b): In a series of 
three studies with non-clinical Israeli participants (total number across all 
three studies = 282), experimenters asked participants to reposition items 
on a graph on a computer, with the labels of the graph written such that 
they indicated the participant’s level of morality or sports ability, or no 
quality (with text boxes filled with Xs and Ys). Variations across the studies 
included whether negative or positive information about the self was 
presented (whether their score appeared high or low on the graph), and 
whether the information was self- or other-relevant (whether the graph was 
explicitly about theirs or someone else’s morality). This task was used to 
challenge participants’ self-perception of morality (with the other groups as 
controls). Participants were then asked to read five scenarios assessing 
contamination concerns, such as “You have had visitors over for dinner. 
Later, you realize that you didn’t wash your hands before handling the 
meat, and you worry that your guests may get food poisoning. ” They were 
then asked to assess the strength of their urge to act in response to this 
worry, and the likelihood of them acting. Those who were given negative 
information about their moral self reported increased urges and likelihoods 
of acting. This study showed that it was not just the priming of morality- 
related concerns, but specifically of self-relevant information, that affected 
participants. Furthermore, it controlled for self-esteem, stress, anxiety and 
depression. However, it only assessed reported urges to act, and did not 
measure self-ambivalence.
Therefore, the need for exploring whether the relationship between moral 
self-ambivalence and OCD is causal remains. Moral self-ambivalence may 
be one factor that explains why only some people who are morally self­
sensitive also go on to develop OCD. Furthermore, as the one published 
previous experiment only uses self-report, it needs to be established that
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this causal link actually has an effect on behaviour. This line of research 
could potentially inform an improved treatment approach.
Rationale, Research Question and Hypotheses
Several obsessive-compulsive domains have been found to be associated
with moral self-sensitivity and self-ambivalence (over-estimation of threat, 
beliefs about the importance of thoughts, self-reported contamination 
obsessions and washing compulsions). One domain has been selected 
here, in order to develop a parsimonious study. As previous research has 
most strongly supported an association between self-sensitivity and self­
ambivalence, particularly in the moral domain, and inflated responsibility, 
this study will therefore seek to explore that relationship specifically.
Building on previous research, this study will explore whether there is a 
causal relationship between moral self-ambivalence and behaviour taken to 
reflect an increased sense of inflated responsibility. As this is the first (to 
the best of the author’s knowledge) experiment to manipulate moral self­
ambivalence, the study uses a non-clinical population. There is theoretical 
justification for using a non-clinical population for preliminary studies into 
OCD, given that the disorder can still, to some extent (given the critique 
above) be considered to lie on a continuum that extends into the general 
population (Clark & Rhyno, 2005). Non-patients have been found to share 
features with OCD patients (Burns et al. 1995). There is therefore also 
empirical justification, and precedent, for using a non-clinical population to 
test a methodology before using it with a rarer, more vulnerable population, 
given that findings in a non-clinical population are typically replicated, albeit 
sometimes with slight variations, in people with OCD e.g. Arntz et al. (2007) 
replicated Mancini et al. (2004) using a clinical population; Doron et al. 
(2008) replicated Doron et al. (2007); Rowa et al. (2005) replicated Rowa & 
Purdon (2003).
Hypotheses:
1. Experimentally manipulating moral self-ambivalence will increase 
behaviours analogous to obsessive-compulsive behaviour; 
specifically, behaviour that reflects inflated responsibility beliefs;
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2. This increase will be greater among participants who score highly
on the measures of moral self-sensitivity and self-ambivalence.
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Method 
Design
The study utilised a between-groups experimental design. A non-clinical5 
sample was used. There were three conditions, consisting of one 
experimental and two control groups. Questionnaire measures were used 
to assess variables relevant to the study’s hypotheses and to control for 
other variables which may have confounded the results. The effect of the 
experimental manipulation on participants’ responses in a moral decision­
making task was measured.
Participants
Power Calculation
Previous research suggested that the size of the relationship between 
moral self-ambivalence and obsessive-compulsive symptomatology was 
between medium and large (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007). If looking at the 
relationship between moral self-ambivalence and the whole range of 
obsessive-compulsive symptomatology, it was medium (r = 0.47; Bhar & 
Kyrios, 2007; Table 2 in that paper); if one examines the relationship 
specifically between moral self-ambivalence and inflated responsibility, the 
correlation is large (r = 0.59; Bhar & Kyrios, 2007; Table 2 in that paper). 
Hence, a ranged estimate was used for the final power calculation for this 
study. Initial calculations used the more conservative medium effect size. 
An a priori ANOVA power calculation using G*Power (Paul et al. 2007) 
indicated that 158 participants would be needed in order to detect such a 
medium effect size (see Table 4).
5 ‘Non-clinical’, for the purpose of this study, means that participants were not 
recruited from a population specifically defined as ‘clinical’ e.g. with a diagnosis of 
or self-defining as having OCD, such as people who attend OCD support groups. 
However, this wider population may include people who would also belong to a 
narrower, ‘clinical’ population.
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Table 4: Sample size power calculation
Input Parameters
Effect size (/) .25
alpha .05
Power .80
Number of groups 3
However, as described above in the Introduction, given the study’s 
hypotheses that the effect would be greater in morally ‘sensitive’ 
participants, it was plausible that the experimental manipulation might only 
influence the dependent variable among participants who were ‘sensitive’ in 
the moral domain (approximately 27% of the population, according to 
Doron et al. 2008; Table 5 in that paper). For this reason, 158 participants 
was considered a minimum requirement. Instead, the aim was to recruit up 
to a maximum of 244 participants. This figure represents the number of 
participants required to detect a large effect {f = .40) assuming that only 
27% of participants tested provide ‘useable’ data. 66 participants would be 
required to detect a large effect, and so 244 participants in total would be 
required to provide 66 (66 divided by 0.27 = 244). 158 participants would 
still be sufficient to detect a medium effect size without limiting the analyses 
based on moral self-sensitivity.
Recruitment
A total of 249 adults were recruited for the study.6 Participant demographics 
are given below. Participants were recruited via email advertisements to 
personal contacts of the researcher and undergraduate students at the 
University of Surrey, and by posting the link to the study on Facebook.
6 The ‘Data Screening’ section gives details of the total number of participants who 
commenced or completed the study and how some were excluded from the final 
analysis.
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Participants were given an optional incentive of being entered into a prize 
draw (for four prizes of £25).
Demographics
Participant characteristics are given in Table 5. As a large number were 
excluded in the data screening phase, only the characteristics of those who 
were included in the final analysis are presented. The sample was largely 
White British and female. Few participants reported having dyslexia. One­
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Chi-Square tests showed that there 
were no significant differences in the means or distribution of age, gender, 
ethnicity and dyslexia across the experimental conditions. (Response 
categories were collapsed into a binary form for the Dyslexia and Ethnicity 
variables to meet the requirement for Chi Square tests to have a minimum 
cell count of >5.)
Table 5: Participant Demographics
Experimental
Condition
Uncertainty
Condition
Control
Group
All Comparisons
Age (Mean 
Years)
SD in
parentheses
21.77 (5.89) 21.21
(4.82)
22.58
(7.47)
21.94
(6.33)
F (2, 246) = 
1.06, 
p = 0.35
Gender 
(% male)
21.7 39.5 31.7 31.3 f  = 5.30, 
p = 0.07
Ethnicity 
(% White 
British)
73.9 85.5 80.8 80.1 X2 = 3.11, 
p = 0.21
Dyslexia 
(% No)
92.8 96.1 95.2 94.7 X2 = 4.90, 
p =0.30
Measures
All measures are included in Appendices l-V.
Self-Ambivalence Measure (Moral Ambivalence subscale) [Appendix I]
The Self-Ambivalence Measure (SAM; Bhar, 2004) was developed as an
operationalised measure of the concept of self-ambivalence (Guidano &
Liotti, 1983). Furthermore, it is the measure that has been used in previous
research which correlationally links self-ambivalence and inflated
responsibility (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007). Therefore, it was selected as the
measure of self-ambivalence for this study also.
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The SAM is a 19-item self-report measure of ambivalence about self-worth, 
morality and social acceptance. Within each of these domains of 
ambivalence, items assess self-uncertainty (e.g. 7 question whether I am a 
moral person’), dichotomous self-appraisals (e.g. 7 tend to think of myself 
in terms of categories such as ‘good’ or ‘bad”) and preoccupation about 
self-worth (e.g. 7 am constantly worried about whether I am a good or bad 
person’). Respondents are asked to rate the extent to which they agree 
with items using a 5-point scale (on which 0 = “Not at all” and 4 = “Agree 
totally”).
The SAM consists of two subscales: self-worth ambivalence (SA) and 
moral ambivalence (MA). Because the Moral Ambivalence subscale was 
the one that most strongly predicted participant endorsement of beliefs 
indicative of an inflated sense of responsibility in previous research (r2 = 
.061 for MA vs. r2 = .031 for SA; Bhar & Kyrios, 2007), only this subscale 
was used in this study, as inflated responsibility is the key OCD-related 
belief under examination. The Moral Ambivalence subscale has six items. 
Its internal consistency was high in a non-clinical sample (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .85, mean item-total correlation = .63; Bhar & Kyrios, 2007). It has 
moderate test-retest reliability (r = .57), although the data for this comes 
only from a clinical sample (of 43 patients with a diagnosis of OCD) over a 
10.8 week period (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007). However, as noted above, the 
SAM has been used in research with both clinical and non-clinical samples, 
and so it was felt appropriate to use it with a non-clinical sample in this 
study.
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (Checking and Contamination 
subscales) [Appendix II]
Previous studies (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007; Doron et al. 2007; Doron et al.
2008) have used the Padua Inventory-Revised (Pl-R; Burns et al. 1996) to 
measure participants’ experience of OCD-related distressing intrusive 
thoughts and compulsive behaviours. They have also used the revised 
Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; OCCWG, 2005) to measure 
participants’ endorsement of OCD-relevant beliefs. In these prior studies 
these two measures were correlated with the measure of self-ambivalence 
and were, in effect, comparable to the measures of the dependent variable
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in the present experimental study. As obsessive-compulsive behaviour is 
being assessed using a task, rather than questionnaires, measures of 
obsessive-compulsive beliefs and behaviour were therefore not required to 
assess the effect of the experimental manipulation.
However, it was important to assess participants’ baseline levels of 
obsessive-compulsive contamination concerns and related behaviours, 
because these have previously been found to be strongly associated with 
moral sensitivity (Doron et al. 2008). Therefore, the baseline levels could 
affect responses to the morally-sensitive task that constituted the 
dependent variable. The same is true of obsessive-compulsive checking 
beliefs and behaviours, as these are associated with an inflated sense of 
responsibility and are the behaviours assessed in experimental 
manipulations of inflated responsibility (Arntz et al. 2009; Bouchard et al. 
1999; Ladouceur et al. 1995; Ladouceur et al. 1997; Mancini et al. 2004). 
Therefore, measures of Contamination and Checking behaviours were 
included so that comparisons could be made between groups to ensure 
there were no significant differences between groups on these factors, or to 
allow for these variables to be controlled for if they were not evenly- 
distributed between groups.
The Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al. 2002) is 
an 18-item self-report scale measuring distress caused by a range of 
compulsive behaviours. Items consist of statements about OCD-relevant 
behaviour e.g. “I repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches 
after turning them off. ” Respondents are asked to rate the extent to which 
each item has distressed them over the past month, using a 5-point scale 
(on which 0 = “Not at All” and 4 = “Extremely”).
The OCI-R was selected for this study because it is briefer than the Pl-R 
and yet has comparable overall internal consistency (respectively, 
Cronbach’s alpha = .84; Huppert et al. 2007 vs. alpha = .88; Burns et al. 
1996). The OCI-R also concentrates on behaviours rather than obsessions 
or beliefs (Clark, 2004), which is more appropriate for the function of this 
measure in this study (as a control for potentially-confounding baseline 
levels of behaviour).
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Two subscales were used (with 6 items in total) to measure contamination- 
and checking-related compulsions. The Washing subscale has an alpha of 
.88, and the Checking subscale has one of .83 (Foa et al. 2002). Test- 
retest reliability for these subscales is .87 and .75, respectively, in a non- 
clinical sample (Foa et al. 2002).
Adult Self-Perception Profile (Moral subscale) [Appendix III]
Moral self-sensitivity has previously been operationalised and measured
using the Self-Perception Profile (ASPP; Messer & Harter, 1986). As this
study is an experimental extension of this previous research (Doron et al.
2007; Doron et al. 2008), the same scale has therefore been used to
measure this key variable.
The ASPP is a measure of how much individuals value specific areas of 
their self-concept e.g. physical appearance, intelligence, sense of humour, 
and how confident they feel about those domains. Within each of these 
domains, three items assessed perceived competence in the domain, and 
one assessed importance attached to it. For each item, respondents are 
asked to indicate which of two groups of adults they are most like and 
whether the description of that type of adult is “sort of true” or “really true” 
for them. A sample item, containing such a pair of descriptions, is “Some 
adults live up to their own moral standards BUT Other adults have trouble 
living up to their moral standards.”
As the hypotheses in this study relate to moral self-sensitivity, only the 
morality subscale of the ASPP was administered. Subscale reliability 
ranges from .76 to .92 in different studies (Messer & Harter, 1986; Doron et 
al. 2008).
Generalised Anxiety Disorder Assessment (GAD-7) [Appendix IV]
A measure of anxiety was included, as per previous studies (Bhar & Kyrios,
2007; Doron et al. 2008). Previous studies measured anxiety levels to 
control for whether anxiety accounted for the relationship between self­
ambivalence, self-sensitivity and obsessive-compulsive behaviour. In this 
study, anxiety was measured to ensure there were no significant 
differences between the three conditions. This is because the task involved
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decision-making, speed of processing and formulating responses, which 
can be negatively affected by anxiety levels (Cassady & Johnson, 2001).
Previous studies used the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 
1990). Although this is a well-validated, reliable and widely-used measure 
of anxious symptoms, it has 21 items. The GAD-7 (Spitzer et al. 2006) has 
seven items and excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .92). 
Test-retest reliability is also good (intraclass correlation = 0.83). Thus, it 
compares favourably with the BAI, whose internal consistency is .92 and 
test-retest reliability is .75 (Beck et al. 1988). Therefore, the shorter, freely- 
available measure was used.
The GAD-7 is a seven-item self-report scale measuring anxiety levels, 
typically in a clinical context to inform a diagnosis of Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder. Items consist of problems indicative of raised anxiety levels e.g. 
“Feeling afraid as if something awful might happen.” Respondents are 
asked to indicate how often, over the last two weeks, they have 
experienced these problems, using a 4-point scale (on which 0 = “Not at all” 
and 3 = “Nearly every day”).
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) [Appendix VJ
A measure of low mood was included, as per previous studies (Bhar & 
Kyrios, 2007; Doron et al. 2008). Previous studies measured mood to 
control for possible influences of depression on the relationship between 
self-ambivalence, self-sensitivity and obsessive-compulsive behaviour. In 
this study, low mood was measured to ensure there were no differences 
between the three conditions. Again, this is because the task involved 
decision-making, speed of processing and formulating responses, which 
can be affected by low mood (Kring etal. 2009).
Previous studies used the Beck Depression Inventory-ll (BDI-II; Beck et al. 
1996). Although this is a well-validated, reliable and widely-used measure 
of depressive symptoms, it has 21 items. The PHQ-9 (Kroenke et al. 2001) 
only has nine items and yet comparable internal reliability (.89 vs .93). Test- 
retest reliability is also good (.84). Therefore, the shorter, freely-available 
measure was used.
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The PHQ-9 is a nine-item self-report measure of depressive symptoms. 
Items consist of the main symptoms of depression e.g. “Trouble 
concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or watching 
television.” Respondents are asked to indicate how often, over the past two 
weeks, they have experienced these symptoms, using a 4-point scale (on 
which 0 = “Not at all” and 3 = “Nearly every day”).
Experimental Manipulation
In the “Moral Self-Ambivalence” condition, a specific sense of moral 
uncertainty relating to the self was primed. Two priming tasks were used to 
attempt to increase participants’ sense of moral self-ambivalence. Priming 
was used because it is a well-established experimental method for 
temporarily increasing the salience of particular concepts for participants 
without them being made explicitly aware of this, described as a 
‘ubiquitous’ method that has produced a ‘plethora’ of findings over the past 
25 years (Bargh, 2006, p. 146). In spite of recent controversy sparked by a 
failure to replicate one of the seminal early priming experiments (Bargh et 
al. 1996; Doyen et al. 2012; Sutton, 2012), a recent comprehensive meta­
analysis of 167 studies has robustly shown that priming a concept affects 
participants’ behaviour in ways related to that concept, and concludes that 
it continues to be an important and valid experimental method for 
psychologists (Cameron et al. 2012). The effects of priming have been 
demonstrated to apply for traits (which are usually considered to be more 
fixed) as well as more fluid states or concepts such as mood (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000). Thus, it was considered to be an appropriate 
methodology for heightening a sense of moral self-ambivalence, which can 
be considered a more fixed self-structure than, for example, state levels of 
anxiety.
Two control conditions were used. In the “Neutral Control” condition, 
participants were asked to complete the tasks without any particular 
concept being primed, to keep the level of activity and number of tasks 
engaged in across the conditions the same. In the “Uncertainty Control” 
condition, a general sense of uncertainty was primed. The uncertainty 
control condition was included to permit comparisons between priming 
uncertainty in general and moral self-ambivalence in particular. If
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participants were to take longer to complete the dependent variable tasks, 
this could be due to general uncertainty rather than specifically to moral 
self-ambivalence. As priming moral self-ambivalence was also a novel 
experimental manipulation, examining whether there were differences 
between the experimental group and the uncertainty control group would 
also allow for exploring whether the novel manipulation had been effective 
or not. Priming was achieved using two tasks.
Manipulation #1: Unscrambling Sentences
The first experimental manipulation involved asking participants to 
rearrange 20 sets of five words into sentences (Appendix VI). This method 
has been used to repeatedly expose participants to words related to the 
target concept, thus priming it. Following published guidance for developing 
priming tasks (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000), 20 sentences were devised, half 
of which contained primes, and half of which were neutral. The primes were 
mixed up with the neutrals, to keep the participants unaware of the prime. 
The task began and ended with prime sentences, to exploit primacy and 
recency effects to keep the primes salient.
However, unlike standard sentence-based word-rearranging priming tasks, 
this task involved the whole sentence being the prime (rather than 
containing a word which was a prime). This is because it was difficult to 
prime moral self-ambivalence using only one word. Therefore, the priming 
sentences in the Moral Self-Ambivalence condition were based on the 
items in the Moral Ambivalence Scale of the SAM and the definition of 
moral self-ambivalence discussed in the literature (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007); for 
example, “I ’m either ‘good’ or ‘bad’”. Priming sentences in the Uncertainty 
Control condition were the same as in the Moral Self-Ambivalence 
condition, but changed to refer to general uncertainty rather than moral 
ambivalence; for example, “I ’m either ‘sure’ or ‘unsure’”. ‘Filler’ sentences 
were based on sample priming tasks and others devised by the author; for 
example, “What a great, colourful parrot”. The Neutral Control condition 
consisted entirely of non-priming ‘filler’ sentences.
Manipulation #2: Writing about three aspects of an experience
Because priming moral self-ambivalence was a novel experimental
manipulation, a second priming task was also used to increase the
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likelihood of priming taking place. The second task was based on research 
into attitudinal uncertainty (Grant & Hogg, 2012; Hogg et al. 2007; Hogg et 
al. 2010). This research has successfully used the following task to prime 
attitudinal uncertainty, and so was thought to be equally applicable to moral 
and general uncertainty. In this task (following Grant & Hogg, 2012, Hogg 
et al. 2007 and Hogg et al. 2010), participants were asked to think about a 
time they had an experience related to the prime, and then write a few 
words about three aspects of this experience. Participants in the Moral Self- 
Ambivalence condition were asked to write about a time when they were 
unsure as to whether they were a good or bad person; those in the 
Uncertainty Control condition wrote about a time when they were uncertain; 
and those in the Neutral Control condition wrote about a time when they 
had to make a decision (Appendix VII).
Manipulation Check
As is good practice with studies that involve priming, a check on whether 
the manipulation had been effective or not was included (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000). This consisted of an 11-point online equivalent of a visual 
analogue scale, on which participants were asked to rate how confident 
they felt about making the ‘right’ decision about the moral dilemmas they 
would make in the latter part of the experiment. This page of the study also 
asked participants to rate how well they had understood the study so far (a 
filler question) and how they rated their reading and typing speed (in case it 
was necessary to compare whether groups differed significantly on this, as 
this would affect response times; Appendix VIII). These secondary scales 
also served to make the manipulation check less obvious to participants.
Moral Decision-making Task
There have been a number of lab-based experimental tasks which have 
been used to examine analogues of compulsive behaviour in non-clinical 
populations following inflated responsibility being primed (Arntz et al. 2009; 
Bouchard et al. 1999; Ladouceur et al. 1995; Ladouceur et al. 1997; 
Mancini et al. 2004). These studies often employ a ‘pill-sorting’ paradigm, in 
which participants are asked to sort medication into different containers. 
The time taken to complete these tasks, together with a number of other 
observed behaviours (such as the number of changes made to the
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decision, how much the participant examines each pill etc.) are taken as an 
analogue of obsessive-compulsive checking behaviour. The present study 
sought to use a similar measure but in an online format.
Because the priming task and the variables in question relate to morality, 
instead of making decisions about sorting medication (although this 
involves a moral element, as it potentially causes harm to the recipients of 
the medication if a mistake is made), a decision-making task about moral 
dilemmas was used instead. Participants were presented with five 
scenarios and asked to decide whether a particular course of action is right 
or not, and to justify their answer (Appendix IX). Their time taken to 
respond, and the number of characters used in their response, were 
recorded. It was assumed that this would give two different but related 
measures of their decision-making behaviour, analogous to the lab-based 
findings mentioned above.
Furthermore, previous research has found that, although not necessarily 
related to OCD per se, moral reasoning patterns may be associated with 
inflated responsibility, as participants with higher scores on the 
Responsibility Attitudes Scale (Salkovskis et al. 2000) were less likely to 
make difficult moral decisions (Franklin et al. 2009). This is relevant 
because part of this study’s rationale and hypotheses involves postulating 
that moral self-ambivalence increases people’s OCD behaviour via a 
defensive inflated sense of responsibility (which serves to compensate for 
their sense of themselves as morally dangerous). Thus, using moral 
dilemmas was also supported by reasoning that responses to them would 
be affected by responsibility beliefs.
Scenarios were taken from previous research into moral reasoning (Greene 
et al. 2004). Although the purpose of the moral dilemmas in this study was 
to provide a decision-making task related to the domain of morality, rather 
than to explore moral reasoning patterns per se, it was relevant to consider 
research into moral reasoning and OCD when designing the task, lest this 
confounded the results of the present study. Previous research into moral 
reasoning in people with OCD has found that they do not differ from 
controls in terms of the decisions they make and the times taken to make
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these decisions (Franklin et al. 2009). However, this previous research 
simply asked participants to choose between one decision and another, 
without asking them to justify their decision. Therefore, the more 
demanding aspect of this task (justifying one’s moral decision) was 
included. This was also done because it was hypothesised that the amount 
written would correspond to the amount of effort put into compulsive 
behaviours.
Additionally, the nature of the scenarios themselves used the same pattern 
of dilemma, in that they all centred on utilitarian acts of commission. That is 
to say, each scenario asked participants to consider whether they would 
harm one person for the good of multiple persons (the utilitarian aspect), 
and whether they would carry out that particular harm (an act of 
commission). This was done for three reasons. Firstly, it ensured the 
dilemmas followed the same format, so timed responses across each one 
could be examined more consistently and aggregated to form a useful 
mean for analysis. Secondly, using utilitarian dilemmas follows prior 
research (Franklin et al. 2009). Thirdly, people with OCD have been found 
to make less of a distinction than do controls between harm caused due to 
acts of commission and acts of omission (Siev et al. 2010). That is to say, 
people with OCD judge themselves to be as responsible for harm caused 
by an act they carry out as for harm caused by an act or occurrence that 
they do not act to prevent. It was considered that using dilemmas which 
involved acts of omission could confuse the findings of this research, as 
interactions could occur between the above-identified moral reasoning 
pattern and the factors which are being investigated in this study. 
Furthermore, because this difference appears to be a distinction in moral 
reasoning between clinical and non-clinical populations, and this study is 
using a non-clinical population, it seemed more appropriate to use 
dilemmas focussing on acts of commission, as these are ones which 
usually concern non-clinical populations (Siev etal. 2010).
Piloting
The study was piloted with six trainee clinical psychologists from the 
researcher’s cohort in order to test the software, to get an estimate of how
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long it might take for participants to complete the study7, and to gain 
feedback as to whether there was anything unclear in the instructions and 
whether the deception or tasks were unduly distressing.
In response to feedback, minor changes were made to the information 
sheet to make it clearer. Instructions on the questionnaires were changed 
to make them more appropriate for an online format e.g. asking participants 
to ‘select’ a response rather than ‘circle’ one. The study was otherwise felt 
to be clear and accessible to participants.
Pilots also reported that they did not find the tasks or deception unduly 
distressing, although two did report that they found the moral dilemma task 
uncomfortable. They reflected that this may have been heightened by 
knowing that the researcher would know what their responses had been, 
which would not be an issue for anonymous participants in the actual study.
Procedures
Participants who had read the initial consent page and agreed to proceed 
were randomly allocated to the three conditions.8 All participants completed 
the same questionnaires, in the order in which they are listed in the 
Measures section above. Participants then completed the two manipulation 
tasks appropriate to the condition to which they had been allocated, in the 
order these are presented in the Manipulation section above. All 
participants then completed the identical moral dilemmas task. 
Demographic information was collected. The debrief page then followed, 
and after this participants either consented to submit their data or had a 
final opportunity to withdraw.
Ethical Considerations
A favourable ethical opinion was received from the University of Surrey’s 
Research Ethics Committee (Appendix X) before participant recruitment 
commenced. Four ethical issues were addressed in designing the study.
7 An accurate estimate of the time taken to complete the study overall was required 
by the University’s Ethics Committee for the materials advertising the study.
8 Due to the technical limitations of the online software available to the Department, 
straightforward randomisation was used; block randomisation would have been 
preferable (to ensure equal numbers of participants in each condition).
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The first issue was the potential distress caused to participants by 
presenting them with moral dilemmas. This issue was addressed in a 
number of ways. Firstly, by using a community sample, the study did not 
target a vulnerable population. Furthermore, similar tasks (presenting 
participants with morally evocative stimuli) have been carried out with 
vulnerable populations (participants with OCD), with no harm caused to 
participants (Franklin et al. 2009; Harkness et al. 2009). Secondly, 
participants were explicitly informed that the study would involve them 
being presented with these kinds of stimuli, and that if they thought they 
would find it distressing, then they should not proceed with the study i.e. 
participation was voluntary, informed consent was gained, and participants 
were informed of their right of withdrawal (Appendices XI & XII), as per the 
framework set out by the British Psychological Society (BPS) in their Code 
of Conduct and Ethical Guidelines (BPS, 2005).
The second ethical issue was the inherent deception. Deception was 
necessary for this study, otherwise the manipulation and test of the 
hypotheses would be compromised by the participant’s knowledge of the 
purpose of the experiment potentially changing their responses. The study, 
particularly its information and debrief pages (Appendix XIII), was designed 
to address this issue in accordance with BPS guidelines (BPS, 2005). The 
initial information participants were given about the study was largely true: 
they were asked to fill in some questionnaires and perform some tasks, 
including making decisions about moral scenarios. The deception involved 
concealing the true aim of the study, and the fact that their responses 
would be timed. Thus, the information given did not imply ‘a more benign 
topic of study’ than was in fact the case (BPS, 2005). The debrief revealed 
the deception. The participants were unlikely ‘to object or show unease 
once debriefed’ (BPS, 2005), as the topic of the study remained the same; 
this was confirmed by individuals who piloted the study. Furthermore, the 
potential benefit of the study - in terms of supporting developments of 
therapeutic models of OCD - was likely to be seen to outweigh this 
deception. Also, participants were given the opportunity not to submit their 
responses if they changed their mind about consenting to participate after 
the debrief revealed the deception.
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The third ethical issue was that of privacy, an issue additionally complicated 
by the fact of this study being internet-based (BPS, 2007). Because the 
study was internet-based, participants were able to complete it 
anonymously, but to be entered into the prize draw that acted as an 
incentive to participate they were required to supply an email address. This 
issue was addressed by giving participants the opportunity to complete the 
survey without supplying an email address, and storing email addresses 
separately from test results. However, this meant that participants were 
unable to withdraw their results when they had submitted them. Participants 
were informed of this fact, and the fact that they would need to supply an 
email address to obtain the incentive, in the information sheet. Participants 
could also withdraw at any point during the survey without being 
identifiable. Therefore, informed consent and giving participants control 
over whether they submitted an email address or not were used to address 
the issue of privacy.
The fourth potential issue was whether the experimental manipulation could 
cause any long-term changes in or harm to participants. However, priming 
effects have been shown to dissipate rather quickly (Bargh & Chartrand, 
2000), so this scenario was considered very unlikely.
With regard to all four of the issues identified, participants were given the 
email address of the principal investigator and his supervisor, both at the 
beginning and end of the study, so that they had a point of contact in case 
of any concerns. They were also signposted towards appropriate sources 
of support in both the information sheet and on the debrief page.
Statistical Analyses
Data Preparation
Participants who began but did not complete the study were not included in 
analyses.
Questionnaires were scored as per their published instructions.
Due to technological limitations, the number of words in the dilemma 
answers could not be counted. Therefore, the number of characters was 
used instead.
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As per previous literature (Doron et al. 2007; Doron et al. 2008), 
participants were coded as ‘Sensitive’ in the moral domain if they scored 
below the mean on the ‘importance’ items of the moral subscale of the 
Adult Self-Perception Profile and below or equal to the mean of the 
‘competence’ item of the subscale.
As previous research into moral Self-ambivalence has been correlational, 
no guidance has been published as to how to operationalise ‘High’ self­
ambivalence. Therefore, it was decided to define this as above 1SD above 
the mean of this sample. The mean of this sample was used, as published 
research shows that the mean can vary between different samples (Bhar & 
Kyrios, 2007).
Data Screening
The remaining participants’ data were examined for missing values and 
outliers.
Excluding Outliers
Outliers were screened in order to check whether the data met the 
requirements for parametric tests. This was also done to ensure the data 
included only those participants who had fully engaged with the priming and 
moral dilemma tasks.
Screening for outliers involved checking the priming tasks to ensure that 
they had been completed correctly; checking the moral dilemma answers 
for whether participants had made some attempt to justify their answer, to 
ensure that they were still engaged with the task; and analysing the time 
taken to complete the section of the study during and after the priming 
tasks, to ensure that they had not taken excessive amounts of time (which 
could mean the prime had worn off).
The data were examined to see whether there were significant differences 
between the response-lengths and response-times of participants with and 
without dyslexia, in case this meant they were less affected by the priming 
or confounded the findings in another way.
Because the first language of participants could affect whether they were 
primed by the tasks, and also how long they took to answer the moral
200
dilemmas and how much they wrote, tests were carried out to assess 
whether there were significant differences on these variables between 
those whose first language was English and those whose it was not.
Exploring Other Parametric Assumptions
There continues to be debate as to whether it is technically appropriate to 
analyse data from rating scales using parametric tests (Jamieson, 2004). 
However, it is both standard practice to analyse ordinal level data from 
such scales using parametric tests (Field, 2009), and it has also been found 
that such analyses are valid if the scale contains at least five interval points 
of approximately equal value (Lubke & Muthen, 2004). Therefore, 
questionnaire data could be analysed parametrically if they met the other 
assumptions for parametric tests, excluding the PHQ9 and the GAD7, 
which only had four interval points (which were also not exactly equal), and 
so would have to be analysed using non-parametric tests.
The two dependent variables (mean response times and mean number of 
characters for the dilemma response) were examined to see whether they 
met the assumptions for parametric tests. Normality was assessed using 
visual inspection of histograms, skewness and kurtosis values, P-P plots 
and Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk’s tests. It was important to use 
all these assessments alongside each other, as, in samples greater than 
200, single tests of normality can appear significant where there is actually 
not a problematic level of non-normal distribution (Field, 2009).
Other variables (OCI-R scores, speed and comprehension checks) were 
also assessed for normality.
Planned Tests of Statistical Significance 
Correlations
The correlation between the two aspects of Moral Self-Sensitivity 
(Importance and Confidence) and Moral Self-Ambivalence was examined, 
as it has previously been unclear what the overlap and distinction between 
these constructs might be.
Analyses of Variance (ANOVA)
Factorial, three-way ANOVAs were used to examine differences between 
the experimental groups. The first independent variable/factor had three
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levels (Moral Self-Ambivalence, Uncertainty Control, and Neutral Control). 
The second factor was Moral Self-Ambivalence (High or Not High), and the 
third was Moral Self-Sensitivity (Sensitive or Not Sensitive). The dependent 
variables were the number of characters participants used in their 
responses to the moral dilemmas, and their response times. In addition to 
having checked the parametric assumptions for the data overall, Levene’s 
test for homogeneity of variance was also checked for the ANOVAs.
As there were fewer than three conditions for Moral Self-Ambivalence and 
Moral Self-Sensitivity, it was not possible to carry out post hoc tests for 
these conditions. Independent samples t-tests were therefore carried out to 
explore the differences between these conditions.
Independent Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test
The non-parametric equivalent of an ANOVA was used to explore whether 
there were differences between the experimental conditions on the 
manipulation check and the baseline measures (OCI-R, Depression and 
Anxiety scores).
Hypothesis-specific Comparison
As detailed in the power calculation above, it was possible that the 
experimental manipulation would only affect those who were ‘Sensitive’ in 
the moral domain. Therefore, the above was carried out both on the whole 
sample and also separately comparing those who were Sensitive against 
those who were Non-Sensitive. In the latter analysis, the factors were 
simply Condition and Moral Self-Ambivalence.
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Results
Preparing the Data
Non-completers and Missing Values
A total of 429 participants commenced the study. 141 dropped out at 
various stages prior to the completion of the moral dilemma task. One was 
excluded from the analysis because they did not reach the debrief page 
and so cannot be considered to have given informed consent for their data 
to be used. A further 19 were excluded because they closed their web 
browser rather than clicking on the ‘submit’ arrow, which has to be taken as 
them withdrawing their consent after the debrief.
For the 268 completers, there were no missing values, as the software 
required participants to complete all answers before proceeding to the next 
page.
Excluding Poor-quality Data and Outliers
A further 18 participants were excluded from the analysis during the data 
screening phase, for the following reasons:
The priming tasks were checked to ensure that they had been completed 
correctly. One participant was excluded because they had completed a 
priming sentence incorrectly, in such a way that it would serve as the 
opposite of the desired prime.
Four participants were excluded because they did not complete the priming 
passages correctly: One wrote W  for each passage (experimental 
condition), one wrote about only one aspect of a situation (experimental 
condition), one wrote “I’d rather not say” (uncertainty control condition), and 
one wrote about a situation unrelated to that requested (experimental 
condition).
The dilemma answers were checked for whether participants had made 
some attempt to justify their decision. One participant was excluded as he 
put one-word answers for all dilemmas; another was excluded because the 
majority of her answers were one-word. One participant was excluded 
because the time of their answer for one dilemma was 10 times longer than
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the mean of their answers for the other dilemmas, without any 
corresponding increase in character length, suggesting that they had 
disengaged from the task for a period of time.
The time taken to complete the segments of the study during and after the 
priming tasks was analysed. This was to exclude participants who had 
taken too long to complete this section, as that would suggest that the 
prime had worn off. Participants greater than 3SD above the mean time 
were excluded. A total of 11 participants were excluded for this reason.
Participants with Dyslexia
Because having dyslexia could affect whether participants were primed, 
and also how long they took to answer the moral dilemmas and how much 
they wrote, tests were carried out to assess whether there were significant 
differences on these variables between those with dyslexia and those 
without.9 There was no significant difference between the response lengths 
(explored using an Independent Samples t-test) and response times 
(explored using an Independent Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test) of 
participants who identified as dyslexic and those who did not.10 Therefore, 
participants with dyslexia were not excluded from the final analysis.
Participants whose first language was not English
Because the first language of participants could affect whether they were 
primed by the tasks, and also how long they took to answer the moral 
dilemmas and how much they wrote, tests were carried out to assess 
whether there were significant differences on these variables between 
those whose first language was English and those whose it was not. An 
Independent Samples t-test was used to explore the difference on mean 
number of characters; an Independent Samples Mann-Whitney U Test was
9 Previous studies have provided mixed results as to whether people with dyslexia 
are equally susceptible to priming or not (Boada & Pennington, 2006; Ramus & 
Szenkovits, 2008). Therefore, it was considered more conservative to include 
participants with dyslexia in the study and assess whether there were significant 
differences between their responses at this stage, rather than exclude them 
outright.
10 At this point in the analysis, the mean number of characters were approximately 
normally distributed but the response times were not; hence, parametric and non- 
parametric tests were used respectively.
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used to explore the differences on mean response times. Table 6 presents 
the differences.
Table 6: Differences on dependent variables based on participants’
first language
Variable Test Used Mean
Difference
Significance 
level (p)
Mean
Response
Time
Independent Samples 
Mann-Whitney U Tests
33.40 sec* 0.03
Mean Independent Samples 35.18 0.03
Characters t-test characters**
^participants whose first language was English took less time to 
give their answers than those whose first language was not
English.
^participants whose first language was English wrote more than 
those whose first language was not English.
As ‘non-English’ participants’ response times and lengths differed from 
those of ‘English’ participants (with the former taking more time to write 
less), this suggested that including them in the analysis could negatively 
affect it. Participants whose first language was not English might not have 
been affected by the priming tasks and, even if they were, may not have 
been able to articulate their answers in as much depth. This would have 
concealed any effect of the manipulation in these participants. Therefore, 
participants whose first language was not English were not included in the 
analysis presented below. For this reason, 51 further participants (20.5% of 
the remaining sample) were excluded.
Exploring the assumptions for parametric tests
Having screened the data as above, 198 participants remained for inclusion
in the final analysis.
The remaining response time and response length data were positively 
skewed, and so log transformations were carried out. Log transformations 
were carried out because they provided a closer approximation of normality 
than square root transformations (Field, 2009). The transformed data were 
re-tested for normality within the three conditions. Both the transformed
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mean response times and mean number of characters were normally 
distributed, as assessed using visual inspection of histograms, skewness 
and kurtosis values, P-P plots and Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk’s 
tests. Both the Shapiro-Wilks and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests gave p > .05.
None of the potential covariates examined were normally-distributed. 
Anxiety, Depression and OCI-R scores were positively skewed; that is, 
most participants scored low on these measures. The other checks (of 
participants’ perceived understanding and competence) were negatively 
skewed; that is, most participants rated themselves highly on these 
measures. Therefore, non-parametric tests were used to examine whether 
these variables were equally distributed between the conditions. There 
were no significant differences between the conditions on these variables.
Planned Analyses
Correlations
The more confident a participant was in their morality (as assessed by the 
‘Competence’ questions of the Morality subscale of the Adult Self- 
Perception Profile), the less morally self-ambivalent they were (r = -0.51, p 
< 0.001). The more important morality was to a participant (as assessed by 
the ‘Importance’ subscale of the Morality questions of the Morality subscale 
of the Adult Self-Perception Profile), the more morally self-ambivalent they 
were likely to be (r = 0.24, p = 0.001).
Manipulation Check
An Independent Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test was used to explore whether 
there were differences between the experimental conditions on the 
manipulation check. The result suggested that there were no significant 
differences between the conditions (p = 0.12).
Inferential Tests
Three-way univariate ANOVAs were run for both dependent variables 
(response time and response length), with Condition (Moral Self- 
Ambivalence vs. Uncertainty Control vs. Neutral Control), Moral Self- 
Sensitivity (Sensitive vs. Not Sensitive), and baseline Moral Self- 
Ambivalence (High vs. Not High) as the independent variables.
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Main Effects
For both dependent variables, there were no significant main effects of the 
condition participants were allocated to, whether they were high in Moral 
Self-Ambivalence or whether they were morally Sensitive on either the time 
they took to respond to the moral dilemmas or the number of characters 
they used to do this (Table 7).
Table 7: ANOVA Results for Main Effects on both Dependent Variables
Factor Dependent
Variable
F-ratio P Partial Eta 
Squared
Condition Response Time (2, 186) = 
2.25
0.11 0.02
Response
Length
(2, 186) = 
1.47
0.23 0.01
Self-
Ambivalence
Response Time (1, 186) = 
0.02
0.89 0.00
Response
Length
(1, 186) = 
1.51
0.22 0.01
Self-
Sensitivity
Response Time (1, 186) = 
0.11
0.75 0.00
Response
Length
(1, 186) = 
0.04
0.85 0.00
Interaction Effects
There was a significant two-way interaction effect between the condition 
participants were allocated to and whether they were high in Moral Self- 
Ambivalence on their response times, F (2, 186) = 3.13, p = 0.05, Partial 
Eta Squared = 0.03, and on their response lengths, F (2, 186) = 4.122, p = 
0.02, Partial Eta Squared = 0.04. The interaction effect for response times 
remained significant when controlling for Anxiety and Checking behaviour, 
but approached marginal significance when controlling for Depression and 
Contamination behaviours, F (2, 182) = 2.62, p = 0.08, Partial Eta Squared 
= 0.03. The interaction effect for response lengths remained significant
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when controlling for Anxiety, Depression, Contamination and Checking 
behaviours, F (2, 182) = 3.47, p = 0.03, Partial Eta Squared = 0.04.
There were no other significant interaction effects, including on the three- 
way Condition x Moral Self-Sensitivity x Moral Self-Ambivalence 
comparison (Table 8). These results remained the same even after 
controlling for levels of Anxiety, Depression, Checking and Contamination 
behaviours.
Table 8: ANOVA Results for non significant Interaction Effects
Interaction Dependent
Variable
F-Ratio P Partial Eta 
Squared
Self- 
Ambivalence X 
Self-Sensitivity
Response
Time
(1, 186) = 
0.78
0.38 0.00
Response
Length
(1, 186) = 
1.03
0.31 0.01
Condition x 
Self-Sensitivity
Response
Time
(2, 186) = 
1.01
0.37 0.01
Response
Length
(2,186) = 
1.67
0.19 0.02
Condition x 
Self- 
Ambivalence X 
Self-Sensitivity
Response
Time
(2,186) = 
0.24
0.79 0.00
Response
Length
(2, 186) = 
1.00
0.37 0.01
Hypothesis-Specific Analysis
However, when the ANOVA was run separately in the Sensitive group and 
then again in the Non-Sensitive group (as per the second hypothesis), the 
interaction effect between the condition and level of self-ambivalence 
reached marginal significance only in the Sensitive group for Response 
Length, and becomes non-significant for Response Time (Table 9).
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Table 9: Further ANOVA Exploration of significant interaction effect 
between condition and self-ambivalence comparing sensitivity groups
Self-Sensitivity
Group
Dependent
Variable
ANOVA result of 
Condition x Self- 
Ambivalence 
Interaction
Partial Eta 
Squared
Sensitive Response
Time
F (2, 55) = 1.58,
p = 0.22
0.05
Response
Length
F (2, 55) = 3.08, 
p = 0.05
0.10
Not Sensitive Response
Time
F (2, 131) = 1.31, 
p = 0.27
0.02
Response
Length
F (2, 131) = 0.83, 
p = 0.44
0.01
Post Hoc Analysis of Significant Differences
The only significant interaction, between Condition and Self-Ambivalence in 
Sensitive participants when the groups were divided up, was explored. In 
the experimental Moral Self-Ambivalence condition, participants who were 
high in baseline Moral Self-Ambivalence took longer to respond and used 
more characters to do so than participants in any other combination of 
factors.11 Participants at all other levels of the factors were not significantly 
different from each other. The following tables make this comparison 
between the actual means in each condition clearer:
11 There was a marginally significant trend (Table 5) for the experimental condition 
to have a larger population of females. However, the significant findings cannot be 
attributed to this imbalance, as there was no significant difference between the 
genders on response time (t(196) = 1.46, p = 0.15) and response length (t(196) = 
0.32, p = 0.75).
209
Table 10: Mean Characters Used (per dilemma) by Sensitive 
Participants. (Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Moral Self- 
Ambivalence
Condition
Experimental Uncertainty
Control
Neutral Control
High 323.87 (121.29) 156.13 (131.81) 148.95 (66.69)
Moderate-
Low
136.47 (74.6) 113.10 (43.59) 218.47 (139.62)
Table 11: Mean Characters Used (per dilemma) by Non-Sensitive
Participants. (Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Moral Self- 
Ambivalence
Condition
Experimental Uncertainty
Control
Neutral Control
High 200.13(102.55) 175.8 (58.83) 138.52 (78.71)
Moderate-
Low
178.3 (126.55) 172.72 (88.66) 170.82 (75.02)
Table 12: Mean Response Time (in seconds) o f Sensitive Participants.
(Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Moral Self- 
Ambivalence
Condition
Experimental Uncertainty
Control
Neutral Control
High 158.48 (37.77) 81.17 (46.23) 100.30 (32.83)
Moderate-
Low
92.34 (37.07) 89.34 (41.18) 138.80 (95.67)
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Table 13: Mean Response Time (in seconds) of Non-Sensitive 
Participants. (Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Moral Self- 
Ambivalence
Condition
Experimental Uncertainty
Control
Neutral
Control
High 134.47 (82.55) 84.55 (20.96) 80.47 (30.73)
Moderate-Low 114.21 (80.62) 102.20 (42.34) 109.21(43.85)
These raw means (as opposed to the transformed means that were 
required for inferential statistical analysis) show that participants High in 
Moral Self-Ambivalence and Self-Sensitivity in the Experimental Condition 
used 323.87 characters to respond, whereas other participants’ mean 
number of characters ranged from 113.10 -  218.47. Their response times 
were 158.48 seconds on average, whereas other participants’ mean 
response times were in a range of 80.47 -138.80 seconds.
Independent samples t-tests (using the transformed means) were used to 
explore whether this difference was significant. Participants High in 
baseline Moral Self-Ambivalence and Self-Sensitivity in the experimental 
Moral Self-Ambivalence condition took significantly longer to respond 
(t(196) = -1.76, p = 0.04), and used significantly more characters to do so 
(t(196) = -2.01, p = 0.02) when compared against all other participants. 
These differences represent effect sizes of d = 0.59 and d = 0.7, 
respectively. This result was observed even though there were only nine 
participants who fulfilled the above three criteria.
211
Discussion
This study examined the relationship between moral self-ambivalence, 
moral self-sensitivity and an analogue of obsessive-compulsive behaviour 
in a non-clinical population. Moral self-ambivalence and self-sensitivity 
were investigated as potential contributory causal factors to OCD, building 
on previous correlational research that sought to develop the cognitive 
model of OCD (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007; Doron & Kyrios, 2005; Doron et al. 
2007; Doron et al. 2008). It was hypothesised here that experimentally 
priming moral self-ambivalence would increase the incidence of obsessive- 
compulsive-like behaviour of participants who were morally self-sensitive 
and high in baseline levels of moral self-ambivalence. The results 
supported this hypothesis: participants who were high in moral self­
ambivalence took longer to respond to moral dilemmas than participants 
who were low on this trait, and used more characters to do this, but only 
when their moral self-ambivalence was primed. Moreover, this difference 
was found only among participants high in moral self-sensitivity. This 
finding is interpreted in more detail below. The theoretical relevance and 
clinical applications of the findings are subsequently expanded. 
Methodological limitations and advantages of the experiment are then 
considered, together with possibilities for future research.
Study Findings
Findings suggest that participants who were already high in moral self­
ambivalence could be further primed to feel more morally self-ambivalent, 
and that this increased the time they took to respond to the moral dilemmas 
and the number of characters they used to do so (as evidenced by the two- 
way interaction between Condition and Self-Ambivalence). However, the 
time taken became only marginally significant when controlling for 
Depression and Contamination behaviours, whereas the number of 
characters used remained significant. This may suggest that response time 
was not as sensitive a measure as number of characters used, which may 
be a better analogue of compulsive behaviours such as checking. Time 
taken would also be more likely to be affected by low mood than number of 
characters used (given the effect of mood on processing speed). 
Furthermore, only the difference in number of characters used remained
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significant when comparing morally self-sensitive participants against non­
sensitive ones. The conclusion that this is due to a difference of sensitivity 
between response time and response length is supported by the fact that 
the effect size of response length is double that of response time (Table 9). 
The fact that number of characters used remained significant shows that 
the experimental manipulation did have an effect on participants high in 
moral self-ambivalence.
The fact that this effect was only significant among participants who were 
also morally self-sensitive supports the theory that both of these factors 
contribute to OCD. However, there was no significant three-way interaction 
(between Condition, Self-Ambivalence and Self-Sensitivity) when all 
participants, regardless of levels of self-sensitivity, were compared. 
Therefore, the role of self-sensitivity has to be interpreted more cautiously. 
It may be that the result did not appear significant because of the sample 
size used (given that it fell somewhat short of the maximum number 
specified by the ranged power calculation used). Within the whole sample, 
in the analysis exploring the interaction between the experimental condition 
to which participants were allocated, their baseline levels of moral self­
sensitivity and their moral self-ambivalence, there may simply not have 
been enough participants high in self-sensitivity for this comparison to 
reach statistical significance, even if there was an interaction effect. This is 
supported by the magnitude of the effect size when the analysis of the 
interaction between experimental condition and moral self-ambivalence 
was carried out on just those participants high in self-sensitivity.
The means used to explore interaction effects illustrated trends within the 
data which support the above conclusion. Participants who scored more 
highly on the scale measuring moral self-sensitivity tended to take longer to 
respond and to use more characters to do this than did participants 
classified as non-sensitive. This was most notable in participants also high 
in moral self-ambivalence, and was statistically significant (perhaps 
because this comparison involved fewer groups, and so had greater 
statistical power) and yielded large effect sizes. This might suggest that 
people for whom morality is important but who do not feel competent in this 
domain (morally sensitive) and who are also morally self-ambivalent use
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over-compensatory strategies as defences against the anxiety their 
uncertainty about their own morality (heightened by the experimental 
priming in this study) causes them.
However, there is some similarity or overlap between the concepts of moral 
self-ambivalence and self-sensitivity, as both relate to concern about one’s 
own morality. In this sample, the two were significantly correlated. The two 
may be related because actually the separate constructs are measuring 
parts of one underlying factor; or the two may have a causal relationship 
with each other. For example, someone unsure of their own morality 
(morally self-ambivalent) might become preoccupied with morality (morally 
self-sensitive). However, conceptually the two are different, as self­
ambivalence is explicitly a dichotomous self-concept, whereas self­
sensitivity refers to both morality as a priority but also a competence (not an 
identity); the two might happen to correlate because one would expect 
someone valuing morality in general to also be concerned with their own 
morality. The different contributions these two constructs may make to 
OCD and to each other need further investigation, as no definitive 
conclusions can be drawn on the basis of this study, nor on the basis of 
studies which have manipulated moral self-sensitivity (Doron et al. 2012b).
Nonetheless, the study’s findings support a causal role for moral self­
ambivalence in OCD. These findings will now be located within wider 
theoretical, clinical and research contexts, before considering further 
methodological strengths and limitations that qualify the findings and how 
these might be addressed in future research.
Theoretical Implications
Although this study’s findings have to be applied tentatively because this is 
a preliminary experiment on a non-clinical population, these findings further 
support recent attempts to update the cognitive model of OCD (Doron & 
Kyrios, 2005; Doron et al. 2009). The finding that experimentally 
manipulating and increasing moral self-ambivalence in participants who 
were morally self-ambivalent and morally ‘sensitive’ increased their 
obsessive compulsive-like behaviour is analogous to previous experiments 
which have demonstrated that experimentally manipulating levels of
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responsibility can similarly increase obsessive compulsive-like behaviour 
(Arntz et al. 2009; Bouchard et al. 1999; Ladouceur et al. 1995; Ladouceur 
et al. 1997; Mancini et al. 2004). Thus, this study’s findings suggest that 
manipulating a higher-order cognitive vulnerability such as self­
ambivalence has the same effect as manipulating a meta-cognitive belief 
that is a well-accepted component of the cognitive model of OCD 
(Salkovskis, 1999). This study builds on a body of research which suggests 
that negative self-appraisals are significant in the development of OCD 
(Doron et al. 2009; Ferrier & Brewin, 2005; Kempke & Luyten, 2007).
Therefore, this study provides further support for the notion that, behind the 
meta-cognitive beliefs identified as contributing to OCD, such as Inflated 
Responsibility/Increased Threat Estimation, Perfectionism/Need for 
Certainty and Importance/Need to Control Thoughts (OCCWG, 2005), 
‘higher level’ cognitive vulnerabilities might exist, such as moral self­
ambivalence (Doron & Kyrios, 2005). The wider theoretical implication of 
this study is that the current dominant cognitive models of OCD could 
benefit from being updated and expanded by incorporating constructs lying 
behind those belief domains which have, to date, been explored in more 
depth, such as inflated responsibility (Doron & Kyrios, 2005; OCCWG, 
1997; Solem et al. 2010). Incorporating such vulnerabilities and higher- 
order constructs would increase the explanatory power of the cognitive 
model of OCD, taking it beyond simply describing the existence of cognitive 
distortions which maintain the disorder. Establishing the existence of 
higher-order cognitive vulnerabilities contributes to the understanding of the 
aetiology of OCD (Marker et al. 2006), as well as broader factors that could 
be targeted in interventions (discussed in more detail below). Previous 
research into the aetiology of OCD has focussed on potential 
developmental pathways for inflated responsibility (Salkovskis et al. 1999). 
As the findings of this study support previous research (Doron & Moulding, 
2009) that implicates other factors as potentially key in the development 
and maintenance of OCD, developmental pathways towards self­
ambivalence may also be of significance for the cognitive model of OCD.
The findings of this, and other studies, can be incorporated into an updated 
theoretical model of OCD (Figure Two). Research into early experiences
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which contribute to the development of OCD is still sparse and largely 
theoretical, but (together with research into maintenance factors of OCD) 
suggests that developmental pathways may include experiences that lead 
to insecure attachment, valuing morality but not feeling adequately moral, 
and critical part objects (Doron et al. 2007, 2008, 2009; Kempke & Luyten, 
2007). These factors predispose an individual to being vulnerable to 
developing obsessions, which seem (latest research suggests) to develop 
from thoughts that are on a continuum with normal intrusive thoughts but 
are not the same as them (Berry & Laskey, 2012). Latent aggression (to 
which unintegrated critical part objects and insecure attachment may give 
rise) may lead to intrusive thoughts which are more violent in content and 
more spontaneous than in the non-clinical population (Moritz et al. 2011). 
Because of the content and lack of context of these intrusions, they press 
on sensitive concerns about valuing but not being competent at morality 
(Doron et al. 2007, 2008). They also take on meaning for the self, as the 
individual is unable to tolerate the uncertainty about their self that the 
thoughts provoke, and becomes preoccupied with this (Bhar & Kyrios, 
2007; Rowa et al. 2005). Intrusions already worsened by latent aggression 
thus take on moral meaning and indicate the presence of the individual’s 
feared self (Ferrier & Brewin, 2005). Because the thoughts have taken on 
this threatening meaning, the individual attempts to reason with them and 
make sense of them, leading to further misappraisals of the thoughts (Berry 
& Laskey, 2012). This leads to a sense of mental contamination (Rachman, 
2004). It is this sense of mental contamination which appears to drive 
responses to intrusions such as suppression, neutralisation and 
compulsions (Coughtrey et al. 2012). These responses only serve to 
worsen the frequency, duration and contents of the thoughts, either through 
rebound effects of thought suppression (Purdon, 2004) or because such 
attempts (and discomfort at their failure) worsen the individual’s mood, 
which leads to increases in intrusions and a decrease in the ability to 
respond to them rationally (Purdon et al. 2005). As these attempts to 
eradicate the thoughts can only fail, their continuing presence is taken as 
further evidence of the feared self (Ferrier & Brewin, 2005). Thus, a vicious 
cycle is formed in which obsessive thoughts are formed, reacted to due to 
underlying concerns about their meaning for the individual’s self, with
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resulting misappraisals and attempts to establish a moral self only serving 
to worsen the intrusions and escalate them into obsessions, accompanied 
by compulsions.
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Moral Self- 
Sensitivity
Moral Self- 
Ambivalence
Latent Aggression
Intrusions interact with 
concerns about 
competence in valued 
aspect of self.
Intrusive Thoughts: do occur in the 
non-clinical population, but more 
violent content and more spontaneous.
Intrusions have meaning for 
self;
Intolerance of uncertainty 
around self—identity.
Developmental experiences which lead to: insecure 
attachment, an emphasis on morality and critical part objects.
Misappraisal of intrusions.
Meaning for moral self: indicates presence of feared self.
Sense of mental contamination.
Attempts to suppress or neutralise thoughts (get rid of 
the evidence);
Punishing self for having thoughts;
Hypervigilance for thoughts (awareness of threat);
Compulsions (be rid of sense of moral contamination, 
and establish moral self).
Attempts may increase frequency, duration 
and content of thoughts, either directly or 
via effect on mood.
Z ü
Attempts fail to 
eradicate thoughts.
Figure 2: Updated model of OCD, incorporating cognitive and 
psychoanalytic research
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The findings of the present study support this model, building on previous 
research in a number of ways. That increasing participants’ sense of moral 
self-ambivalence only affected the responses of those participants high in 
self-sensitivity suggests that both are required, although this finding has to 
be interpreted cautiously given the varying levels of statistical significance 
across different comparisons and dependent variables. Furthermore, 
although related constructs (perhaps because similar developmental 
experiences contribute to them), this study has also shown that they are 
separate. Previous experimental research has challenged participants’ 
perceptions of their morality with explicitly negative information (Doron et al. 
2012b; Teachman & Clerkin, 2007), whereas this study was the first to 
demonstrate that the effect on behaviour may be related to attempts to 
respond to self-ambivalence. Priming moral self-ambivalence in this study 
conceptually takes the place (in the above model) of intrusive thoughts, as 
both are theorised to have meaning for the self and to lead to compulsive 
behaviour designed to address anxiety about this meaning. That this 
behaviour is, at least in part, an attempt to restore a more certain sense of 
morality is suggested by the increased length of participants’ responses to 
moral dilemmas, perhaps indicative of determined attempts to give a more 
thorough answer in an attempt to restore moral certainty. Although the 
above model does not rely on the continuum theory of intrusions (Clark & 
Rhyno, 2005), the evidence suggests that obsessions are on a continuum 
but are exacerbated by factors other than misappraisals (Berry & Laskin, 
2012; Smith et al. 2012). The current study supports the continuum theory 
because these findings were obtained in a non-clinical population.
Clinical Applications
The clinical implication of the above development of the theoretical model is 
that moral self-ambivalence should be addressed directly in clinical work. 
CBT for OCD has been effective but those who have not benefitted from it 
might benefit from an adaptation which addresses self-ambivalence as a 
potential underlying factor (Doron & Moulding, 2009). One of the aims and 
benefits of psychodynamic therapy is to increase the client’s level of self- 
awareness and improve the maturity, integration and development of their 
sense of identity (Lemma, 2003). However, as there is no evidence for the
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effectiveness of psychoanalytic therapy for OCD symptoms per se 
(Kempke & Luyten, 2007), it would be difficult to justify using this approach. 
Given the level of evidence for a CBT approach (Frost & Steketee, 2002), it 
may be more appropriate to consider an approach that integrates CBT 
techniques with the psychoanalytic attention to ‘macro-processes’ and self- 
structures (Westen, 2000). Such work could perhaps be modelled on 
current CBT for low self-esteem or personality disorders, which seeks to 
address underlying ‘core beliefs’ that relate to a person’s identity and how 
they relate to others (Davidson, 2008; Fennell, 2004). CBT for more 
enduring difficulties such as these involves techniques such as continua 
work (breaking down unhelpful beliefs into their component parts and 
evaluating these), exploring the advantages and disadvantages of holding 
the previous unhelpful beliefs and the new beliefs to be developed in 
therapy, and carrying out behavioural experiments (and recording these) in 
order to increase the examples of situations which strengthen the new 
beliefs (Davidson, 2008). These techniques might also prove useful in 
addressing an identity-related issue such as moral self-ambivalence.
Doron and Moulding (2009) have already recommended addressing clients’ 
self-view if they do not benefit from classical CBT for OCD. They suggest 
attempting to expand the client’s self-concept by helping the client develop 
additional domains of importance, in terms of the value and meaning 
attached to the domains, the skill in them and the amount of time involved 
in activities related to them. However, although further supported by this 
study’s findings, the developments of the theoretical model would need 
more support from research with a clinical population before it would be 
ethical to research or implement new forms of treatment. Further 
methodological limitations of the current study, and how these might be 
addressed in future research, will now be considered.
Methodological Evaluation
Sampling Strategy
Because a non-clinical population was used, it cannot be assumed that 
these findings would be the same in people with a diagnosis of OCD. There 
is a strong precedent for carrying out preliminary research on non-clinical
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participants and then replicating this with participants with OCD (e.g. Arntz 
et al. 2007; Doron et al. 2007; Doron et al. 2008; Mancini et al. 2004; Rowa 
& Purdon, 2003; Rowa et al. 2005). Often the findings are exactly replicated 
in the clinical population, which supports the theory that obsessive- 
compulsive experiences are on a spectrum (Clark & Rhyno, 2005). 
However, this is not always the case. For example, previous correlational 
research found that certain self-sensitivities (for example, sensitivity about 
job success) in addition to moral self-sensitivity were associated with higher 
ratings on measures of OCD in non-clinical but not in clinical populations 
(Doron et al. 2007; Doron et al. 2008). Therefore, one cannot assume that 
the findings of this study would be replicated in people who have met 
diagnostic criteria for OCD. Furthermore, the generalisability of the study is 
also limited (as with many psychological studies) by its usage of what was 
likely to have been a primarily student sample. The limitations and 
necessity of this approach are well-documented: for example, although it 
allows for easy recruitment of the reasonably large sample size required to 
detect an effect for this study, on the other hand it can skew the population 
sampled in terms of age and education level, which might confound other 
variables (Skitka & Sargis, 2005). However, as illustrated by the 
demographics summary, because this sample did not consist entirely of 
students (having also contacted associates of the principal researcher and 
used social networking sites such as Facebook), the age range is wider 
than typical. This somewhat widens the applicability of the study’s findings, 
given that solely student samples may not be representative of the general 
population with regards to obsessive-compulsive related cognitions and 
concerns because education, gender and age may affect the experience of 
these (Julien et al. 2007). Furthermore, the previous correlational research 
that this study sought to develop used a student sample. As the principal 
aims of this study were to build on prior research, the sampling strategy 
used was both justified and adequate to support its conclusions.
First Language and Priming
Not making having English as a first language an exclusion criteria limited 
the sample size available for analysis. Although guidance on using priming 
in experiments does not specify that they should be used only with
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participants whose first language is that in which the primes are written 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000), this is perhaps to be expected given the 
Western bias of psychology as a discipline (Henrich et al. 2010). One could 
expect that language-based priming tasks might not be as effective or, 
indeed, not have any effect at all on participants whose first language is not 
that of the primes, because the lack of familiarity with the language might 
mean that it has less of a subconscious effect. However, just because a 
participant’s first language was not English does not mean that they would 
not be fluent enough in English to be affected by exposure to English 
primes. Furthermore, it was assumed that university students, even if their 
first language was not English, would be proficient enough that the priming 
task and moral dilemma task would still be appropriate for international 
students. The research in this area is mixed, with some studies evidencing 
the potential for cross-language priming in bilingual participants and others 
not (Altarriba & Basnight-Brown, 2007). The review these authors carried 
out concludes that assessing whether a bilingual participant is suitable for 
cross-language priming experiments is not straightforward, because 
multiple factors may be affecting the mixed results across studies reported, 
such as level of proficiency and age of acquisition of the second language.
Therefore, because it was possible (but not definite) that participants’ first 
language not being English might affect their response to the priming task 
and dependent variable task, without it being practicable to assess 
language proficiency or history of language acquisition at the point of 
participation, participants’ first language was recorded. This allowed both 
for recruiting more participants but also for the screening out of participants 
whose first language was not English when analysis revealed that there 
was indeed a significant difference in responses between them and 
participants whose first language was English. Although recording 
participants’ first language allowed for a satisfactory analysis to be 
conducted on the remaining data, the sample size was compromised by 
having to exclude these participants (who made up 20.5% of the sample). 
This is relevant, because being within the range of participants required by 
the power calculation (rather than at the top end of it) may account for why
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there was no significant three-way interaction with Self-Sensitivity (as 
discussed above).
Experimental Manipulation
The manipulation check (which used a confidence rating to attempt to 
detect whether the priming tasks had been effective or not) did not 
demonstrate any difference between the experimental conditions. The 
priming tasks, although not novel in themselves, were attempting to prime a 
construct that has not previously been primed in published research. 
Therefore, the lack of a difference between the groups on this measure, 
together with the absence of a significant main effect of condition, initially 
suggested that the experimental manipulation may not have had an effect. 
However, further analysis showed that the priming tasks did in fact affect 
the expected group of participants - those high in moral self-ambivalence 
and moral self-sensitivity. The lack of main effect can perhaps be explained 
in terms of the complexity of the primed construct, the strength of the 
manipulation tasks12, or the lack of sensitivity of the manipulation check or 
moral dilemma tasks. These issues are considered further below.
A Novel Experiment
This study has demonstrated that it is possible to prime novel constructs 
that are central to this area of research, such as moral self-ambivalence, 
that have previously only been studied using questionnaires. Thus one of 
the strengths of this study is not only that it extended previous research by 
using an experimental methodology allowing for conclusions about causal 
relationships between the variables under scrutiny, but also that it did so 
using a novel method. The construct being primed had not been primed 
before, and the dependent variable task had not been used for the purpose 
for which it was used here. It has previously been used to study moral 
reasoning, but here proved a useful online analogue of laboratory-based 
tasks i.e. pill-sorting that have been used to approximate obsessive- 
compulsive behaviour (e.g. Arntz et al. 2007). However, it is possible (given
12 Using whole sentences as primes rather than single words in the unscrambling 
sentences task may have been too ‘obvious’ to some participants, which would 
reduce the effectiveness of the task (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). The second task 
(writing out passages) appeared to have variable success as a priming task, based 
on how well participants understood the instructions.
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the results of previous research using this paradigm when investigating 
moral reasoning in OCD that did not find a difference e.g. Franklin et al. 
2009) that the moral reasoning tasks are not very sensitive, or that they 
have a low ceiling effect. This possibility might make it advisable to 
consider using other dependent variables in future research in this area, in 
order to facilitate detecting an effect of the experimental manipulation. A 
task that might have more ecological validity for people with OCD, 
particularly the contamination subtype, is the one used in the studies 
manipulating levels of moral self-sensitivity, which involved reading 
scenarios about contamination-related concerns such as food poisoning 
and then assessing urge to act and likelihood of acting (Doron et al. 
2012b). These scenarios would also be less ‘extreme’ than the ones used 
in this study, which may avoid the potential ceiling effect caused by drastic 
scenarios to which most participants might respond similarly; this is 
supported by research into decision-making by people with OCD which 
suggests that it is less drastic decisions that they find more difficult (Foa et 
al. 2003). However, as discussed in the Introduction, the contamination- 
related task assesses only self-report, not actual behaviour. The paradigm 
used in the ‘kiss’ studies, in which whether participants engage in actual 
‘washing’ behaviours (such as rinsing their hands, face or mouth) during a 
‘break’ after the experimental manipulation was assessed, could potentially 
be used, but has so far failed to detect an effect (Elliott & Radomsky, 2009). 
Therefore, not only was the task used in the present study able to detect an 
effect on actual morality-related behaviour in this study, but it also lends 
itself well to an online format.
Online Nature of Study
The online nature of the study was both a strength and a weakness. Being 
online made it very easy for participants to participate, which increased the 
sample size and also protected participants’ anonymity. Possible benefits 
for the diversity and generalisability of online sampling strategies have 
been mentioned above (Skitka & Sargis, 2005), although in this study the 
participants were still mainly university students and so the sampling 
strategy did not address the concerns about the limitations of using such a 
sample (Henrich et al. 2010). However, because the priming tasks and
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dependent variable tasks were not carried out under laboratory conditions, 
participants’ fidelity to task instructions cannot be guaranteed. A stronger 
priming effect and more consistent level of engagement with the moral 
dilemma task might be better-achieved with a laboratory-based experiment, 
in which participants would not be distracted by other activities. However, 
any variation in engagement should have been spread evenly across the 
conditions by random allocation and so should not have varied 
systematically with the experimental manipulation. Furthermore, quality 
control over the data was attempted through the data screening phase to 
compensate for these limitations of an online study. Also, software has 
been developed which allows researchers to record information about 
participants’ behaviour during online tasks e.g. whether they are engaged 
in other tasks at the same time (Stieger & Reips, 2010). This could allow for 
the study to be kept online but with a greater level of more systematic 
‘quality control’, ensuring that only participants who fully engaged with the 
priming and dependent variable tasks would be included in the analysis.
Future Research
As the above discussion has shown, this study has produced findings 
which could potentially develop the cognitive model of OCD and, hence, 
improve treatment rates. However, before this can be implemented, further 
research needs to be carried out to substantiate this study’s findings, due to 
various methodological limitations. By replicating this study with a larger 
sample size, the findings of the current study could be supported. By 
replicating this in a clinical population, the findings could be extended and 
shown to apply to people who actually have a diagnosis of OCD. Future 
studies could also include measures to explore which factors mediate the 
relationship between moral self-ambivalence and obsessive-compulsive 
behaviour. Examples of possible factors could be drawn from research into 
how factors other than appraisals of intrusive thoughts result in them 
escalating into obsessions, such as endorsement of efforts such as 
neutralising as a way of managing intrusive thoughts, and distress at 
failures to do so (Julien et al. 2007); and from research into factors that 
affect the outcome of thought suppression, such as hypervigilance for 
intrusive thoughts (Purdon et al. 2005). Measuring different dependent
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variables could allow for addressing both the possible issue of moral 
dilemmas not being a very sensitive measure, but also exploring different 
mediating factors. A particularly ecologically-valid measure has been 
described above -  the contamination-related scenarios used by Doron et 
al. (2012b). Further possibilities include using a spatial cueing task or dot 
probe paradigm, which could enable researchers to investigate the role 
vigilance for intrusions plays in OCD, and whether this is affected by self­
ambivalence. Previous studies using these dependent variable tasks have 
produced mixed results (Harkness et al. 2009; Cisler et al. 2010), and self­
ambivalence may be one avenue worth exploring in order to explain these 
mixed results. This is because self-ambivalence has not been measured in 
previous studies, and may have varied between participants, potentially 
accounting for why no clear picture has emerged as to whether people 
diagnosed with OCD display hypervigilance for intrusions; a hypothesis 
might be that those unsure of their own morality might become more aware 
of their intrusive thoughts (and failure to suppress these) as evidence of an 
immoral self (Purdon et al. 2004). As discussed in the Introduction, 
diagnostic categories may not be the best way to divide up participants; 
looking at the components that constitute disorders (such as self-structures 
like self-ambivalence) might prove more fruitful (Bentall, 2009) and lead to 
clearer differences between experimental groups. The case is currently 
being empirically made for a transdiagnostic approach to CBT (Mansell et 
al. 2009): reviews of evidence for the maintaining factors of disorders and 
of the efficacy of transdiagnostic treatments are suggesting that there are 
cognitive processes which exist across disorders and which can be 
effectively addressed in therapy. Moral self-ambivalence may be a further 
factor worthy of investigation in this context.
Conclusion
Previous questionnaire-based research has suggested an association 
between moral self-ambivalence and OCD (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007). By 
utilising a novel experimental manipulation and dependent variable task, 
this study has extended previous research by supporting the existence of a 
causal relationship between moral self-ambivalence and OCD in a certain 
subset of the population. Although the study had a number of
226
methodological limitations, the findings still support a development of the 
cognitive model of OCD to incorporate moral self-ambivalence as a 
potential higher-order vulnerability factor. Due to the low proportion of 
participants high in moral self-sensitivity, one has to be more cautious 
about interpreting the role of moral self-sensitivity in OCD based on this 
study. Future research could replicate and extend these findings, which 
could potentially improve therapeutic theory, practice and outcomes.
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Appendix I -  Self-Ambivalence Measure (Moral 
Ambivalence subscale)
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.
Indicate your answer by selecting the appropriate number on the scale 
beside each statement.
Not at all Agree a little Agree Agree a lot Agree totally
moderately
0 1 2 3 4
1 .1 fear I am capable of doing something terrible 0 12 3 4
2 .1 tend to think of myself in terms of categories such as 0 12 3 4 
"good" or "bad"
3. I question whether I am a moral person 0 12 3 4
4. If I inadvertently allow harm to come to others, this 0 12 3 4
proves I am untrustworthy
5 .1 am constantly worried about whether I am a good or 0 12 3 4 
bad person
6. I question whether I am morally a good or bad person 0 12 3 4
Appendix II -  Obsessive Compulsive Inventory 
(Revised)
Checking subscale
The following statements refer to experiences that many people have in 
their everyday lives. Circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH 
that experience has DISTRESSED or BOTHERED you during the PAST 
MONTH.
Not at All -  A little -  Moderately -  A lot -  Extremely
1 .1 check things more often than necessary. 0 12 3 4
2 .1 repeatedly check doors, windows, drawers, etc. 0 12 3 4
3 .1 repeatedly check gas and water taps and light 0 12 3 4
switches after turning them off.
Contamination subscale
The following statements refer to experiences that many people have in 
their everyday lives. Circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH 
that experience has DISTRESSED or BOTHERED you during the PAST 
MONTH.
Not at All -  A little -  Moderately -  A lot -  Extremely
1 .1 find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has 0 12 3 4
been touched by strangers or certain people.
2. I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply
because I feel contaminated. 0 12  3 4
3 .1 wash my hands more often and longer than
necessary. n 1 9 ^ a
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Appendix III -  Adult Self-Perception Profile (Morality 
domain)
These are statements which allow people to describe themselves. There 
are no right or wrong answers since people differ markedly.
Please read the entire sentence across. First decide which one of the two 
parts of each statement best describes you; then go to that side of the 
statement and check whether that is just sort of true for you or really true 
for you. You will just check ONE of the four boxes for each statement.
Really 
True 
for Me
Sort of 
True 
for Me
Sort of 
True 
for Me
Really 
True 
for Me
1. Some 
adults live 
up to their 
own moral 
standards
BUT Other
adults have 
trouble 
living up to 
their moral 
standards
2. Some 
adults would 
like to be a 
better 
person 
morally
BUT Other
adults think 
that they 
are quite 
moral
3. Some 
adults 
usually do 
what they 
know is 
morally right
BUT Other
adults often 
don’t do 
what they 
know is 
morally 
right.
4. Some 
adults often 
question the 
morality of 
their
behaviour.
BUT Other 
adults feel 
that their 
behaviour 
is usually 
moral.
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Appendix IV -  General Anxiety Disorder assessment 
(GAD-7)
Over the last 2 weeks, how often 
have you been bothered by any of 
the following problems?
Feeling nervous, anxious or on 
edge
Not being able to stop or control 
worrying
Worrying too much about different 
things
4 Trouble relaxing
Being so restless that it is hard to 
sit still
Becoming easily annoyed or 
irritable
Feeling afraid as if something 
awful might happen
More kl ,
Not Several than ear'
at all days half the ®yery
, day
0 1 2  3
0 1 2  3
0 1 2  3
0 1 2  3
0 1 2  3
0 1 2  3
0 1 2  3
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Appendix V -  Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9)
have you been bothered by any o f , than Nearly_ Not at Several . ,, 3the follow ing problems? ^__  half every
the day
days
I it+lci in+ûroct nr nlcmci im  in rlninn
1 4U. things
Over the last 2 weeks, how often More
 
all days
Little interest or pleasure in doing 0  ^ 2 3
Feeling down, depressed, or Q 2 3
hopeless
Trouble falling or staying asleep, 0 1 2 3
or sleeping too much
4 Feeling tired or having little energy 0 1 2 3
5 Poor appetite or overeating 0 1 2 3
Feeling bad about yourself — or
6 that you are a failure or have let 0 1 2 3
yourself or your family down
Trouble concentrating on things,
7 such as reading the newspaper or 0 1 2 3
watching television
Moving or speaking so slowly that 
other people could have noticed?
Or the opposite — being so fidgety 0 1 2 3
or restless that you have been 
moving around a lot more than 
usual
Thoughts that you would be better 
9 off dead or of hurting yourself in 0 1
some way
2 3
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Appendix VI - Unscrambling Sentences Priming Task
Thank-you for completing the questionnaires. You will now be asked to do 
something different.
This page contains a list of sets of 5 words. Please re-arrange each set into 
a sentence and type it into the space provided.
For example: flew eagle the slowly around
The eagle flew around slowly.
Moral Self-Ambivalence Condition
1. doing fear I immoral, something
2. texts studies She him with.
3. "good" either I’m "bad." or
4. send I Shall over? it
5. a I Am person? moral
6. from are They University Surrey.
7 .1 knows Everyone untrustworthy, am
8. great a What parrot, colourful
9. about worry I behaviour, my
10. the saw He leave, train
11. meet often They there, him
12. question constantly I conscience, my
13. play you Do too? football
14. meet cannot I standards, ethical
15. dancing go They weekend, every
16. a be Should person, better
17. clock the Replace soon, batteries
18. know don’t I right, what’s
19. cheapest the Buy online, ticket
20. questionable have I judgement, moral
Uncertainty Control condition
1. doing fear I ambiguous, something
2. texts studies She him with.
3. "sure" either I’m "unsure." or
4. send I Shall over? it
5. a I Am person? decisive
6. from are They University Surrey.
7 .1 knows Everyone uncertain, am
8. great a What parrot, colourful
9. worry about I decisions, my
10. the saw He leave, train
11. meet often They there, him
12. question constantly I doubts, my
13. play you Do too? football
14. meet cannot I standards, inconclusive
15. dancing go They weekend, every
16. a be Should person, certain
17. clock the Replace soon, batteries
18. know don’t I correct, what’s
19. cheapest the Buy online, ticket
20. questionable have I judgement. Everyday
Neutral Control condition
1. red the Throw silently ball.
2. people observes He him watching.
3. the wrap Please neatly gift.
4. the bought She item sentimental.
5. the wash I frequently clothes.
6. play us Let sing or.
7. makes sunlight Warm wrinkle raisins.
8. picked hardly They apples the.
9. drink black This bitter seems.
10. knits occasionally He jumpers them.
11. texts studies She him with.
12. send I Shall over? it
13. from are They University Surrey.
14. great a What parrot, colourful
15. the saw He leave, train
16. meet often They there, him
17. play you Do too? football
18. dancing go They weekend, every
19. clock the Replace soon, batteries
20. cheapest the Buy online, ticket
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Appendix VII -  Writing Sentences Priming Task 
Moral Self-Ambivalence condition
Please spend a few moments thinking about a time in your life when you 
felt uncertain about whether or not you were a good or a bad person. Then, 
write in the spaces provided a few words about three aspects o f this 
experience that made you feel most uncertain about whether you were a 
good or a bad person.
If it is difficult to recall a particular example, please imagine a situation in 
which you might feel uncertain about whether you are a good or bad 
person, and write about three aspects o f this imaginary situation.
Please write about three features of a time when you felt uncertain whether 
you were a good or a bad person:
1.
2 .
3.
Uncertainty Control condition
Please spend a few moments thinking about a time in your life when you 
felt uncertain. Then, write in the spaces provided a few words about three 
aspects of this experience that made you feel most uncertain
If it is difficult to recall a particular example, please imagine a situation in 
which you might feel uncertain, and write about three aspects o f this 
imaginary situation.
Please write about three features of a time when you felt uncertain:
1.
2.
3.
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Neutral Control condition
Please spend a few moments thinking about a time in your life when you 
had to make a decision. Then, write in the spaces provided a few words 
about three aspects of this experience.
If it is difficult to recall a particular example, please imagine a situation in 
which you have to make a decision, and write about three aspects of this 
imaginary situation.
Please write about three features of a time when you had to make a 
decision:
1.
2 .
3.
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Appendix VIII -  Manipulation Check (with distractor 
items)
Please take a moment to answer the following questions. Select one point 
on the scale to indicate how you are finding the survey.
How well do you feel you have understood what you have been asked 
so far?
Not understood at all [ooooooooooo] Understood perfectly
How would you rate your reading and writing speed?
Below Average [ooooooooooooo] Above Average
How confident do you feel about making the right decision about the 
moral scenarios in this survey?
Not at all confident [ooooooooooooo] Very confident
Appendix IX - Moral Dilemma task13
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You will now be presented with 5 imaginary scenarios. At the end of each 
scenario, you will be asked to make a decision about it.
Please read each scenario carefully before typing your decision into the 
box below it.
Work as quickly as you can but take as much time as you feel is necessary 
to make the right choice.
Please make sure you have given an answer for each scenario before you 
move onto the next page, as you will not be able to go back.
1. Runaway Trolley
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks towards five workmen who 
will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a 
footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five 
workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is a stranger who happens to be 
very large. The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push 
this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large body 
will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you do this, but the five workmen 
will be saved.
Is it right for you to push the stranger on to the tracks in order to save the 
five workmen? Why/Why not?
2. Sinking Lifeboat
You are on a cruise ship when there is a fire on board, and the ship has to 
be abandoned. The lifeboats are carrying many more people than they 
were designed to carry. The lifeboat you’re in is sitting dangerously low in 
the water—a few inches lower and it will sink. The seas start to get rough, 
and the boat begins to fill with water. If nothing is done it will sink before the 
rescue boats arrive and everyone on board will die. However, there is an 
injured person who will not survive in any case. If you throw that person 
overboard the boat will stay afloat and the remaining passengers will be 
saved.
Is it right for you to throw the injured person overboard in order to save the 
lives of the remaining passengers? Why/Why not?
13 In the actual study, dilemmas were presented on separate pages.
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3. Preventing the Spread
You are a waiter. You overhear one of your customers say that he is about 
to go to jail and that in his last forty-eight hours of freedom he plans to 
infect as many people as possible with HIV. You know him well enough to 
know that he is telling the truth and that he has access to many potential 
victims.
You happen to know that he has a very strong allergy to poppy seeds. If he 
eats even one he will go into convulsions and have to be hospitalized for at 
least forty-eight hours.
Is it right for you to cause this man to have a serious allergy attack in order 
to prevent him from spreading HIV? Why/Why not?
4. Kidnapped Ecologists
You are part of a group of ecologists who live in a remote stretch of jungle. 
The entire group, which includes eight children, has been taken hostage by 
a group of paramilitary terrorists. One of the terrorists takes a liking to you. 
He informs you that his leader intends to kill you and the rest of the 
hostages the following morning. He is willing to help you and the children 
escape, but as an act of good faith he wants you to kill one of your fellow 
hostages whom he does not like. If you refuse his offer all the hostages 
including the children and yourself will die. If you accept his offer then the 
others will die in the morning but you and the eight children will escape.
Is it right for you to kill one of your fellow hostages in order to escape from 
the terrorists and save the lives of the eight children? Why/Why not?
5. Submarine
You are the captain of a military submarine travelling underneath a large 
iceberg. An onboard explosion has caused you to lose most of your oxygen 
supply and has injured one of your crew who is quickly losing blood. The 
injured crew member is going to die from his wounds no matter what 
happens. The remaining oxygen is not sufficient for the entire crew to make 
it to the surface. The only way to save the other crew members is to shoot 
dead the injured crew member so that there will be just enough oxygen for 
the rest of the crew to survive.
Is it right for you to kill the fatally injured crew member in order to save the 
lives of the remaining crew members? Why/Why not?
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Appendix XI - Information page
Information about the Study
You are invited to participate in an online study. This is being conducted by 
Ramesh Perera-Delcourt, a graduate student of the University of Surrey, 
supervised by Dr. Robert Nash. This study has received a favourable 
ethical opinion from the University of Surrey Ethics Committee.
This study is examining the relationship between certain individual 
characteristics and moral decision-making behavior. You will be provided 
with full information about the background to the study after you complete 
it.
What will my involvement in the study be?
If you take part, you will be asked to do the following things online:
Fill out some questionnaires about yourself, on topics such as mood, 
anxiety and moral values;
Complete some tasks involving re-arranging words and typing;
Make decisions about fictional moral scenarios;
Provide some basic information about yourself (like your age and gender).
This will take about 25 minutes.
What will I get for participating in the study?
You do not have to participate in the study. However, as a reward for 
completing the study, you may choose to be entered into a prize draw for 
£25. There is approximately a 1 in 50 chance of winning one of the four 
available prizes. If you wish to be entered into the draw, you will need to 
provide an email address. This will be kept separate from your responses. 
However, it will also be possible to submit your responses without giving an 
email address if you prefer.
Confidentiality and safety of participants
You can withdraw from the study at any time simply by closing your web 
browser. After you have submitted your results they cannot be withdrawn 
(although they will be anonymous). Responses will be analysed on a group 
level, not individually. Therefore, I will not contact you about any responses 
you give during the survey. All of the information you give will be 
anonymised so that those reading reports from the research will not know
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who has contributed to it. Data will be stored securely in accordance with 
the Data Protection Act (1998).
The study is not designed to be invasive or distressing, but will involve you 
thinking about your feelings and your moral values. It will also involve 
reading and thinking about fictional scenarios which may contain potentially 
emotive material. We do not anticipate that completing the study will be 
upsetting, but if you are worried about any of the issues it raises, please 
seek support if you need it. The following two organisations might be 
helpful:
SANEIine
0845 767 8000
020 7375 1002
sanemail@sane.org.uk
6pm -11pm  daily
University Centre for Wellbeing
01483 68 94 98
centreforwellbeing@surrey.ac.uk 
9am -  5pm, Monday -  Friday
Please take some time to think about whether you’d like to take part before 
continuing. If you have further questions at this point or during the study, 
please contact the principal investigator:
r.perera-delcourt@surrey.ac.uk or his supervisor Dr Robert Nash, 
r.nash@surrey.ac.uk. Any complaint or concern about how you have been 
dealt with during the course of the study will be addressed.
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Appendix XII -  Consent page
I have read and understood the information provided about the study.
I have been told what I will be required to do and how long this is likely to 
take.
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about this and have 
understood any further information I may have requested.
I understand that my involvement in this study will remain strictly 
anonymous and confidential. Data I supply will be processed in accordance 
with the Data Protection Act (1998).
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw from the study before completing it without needing to justify my 
decision.
I acknowledge that in return for completing the study I may choose to be 
entered into a prize draw for the sum of £25 .1 recognise that I will be 
required to supply an email address if I wish to be entered into the draw
I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to 
participating in this study.
Yes
No
If you wish to proceed with the study, please check the box above and 
click the right-arrow button.
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Appendix XIII - Debrief page
YOUR RESPONSES HAVE NOT YET BEEN SAVED! PLEASE READ 
ON...
Thank you for completing the survey. Please read the following information 
before clicking the arrow at the bottom of the page.
Further information about the study
Now that you have completed the survey, I can provide you with more 
information about its purpose. As indicated, you did not receive complete 
information at the beginning of this survey, because sometimes people alter 
their responses if they are aware of what is being studied. We would like to 
stress that no extra information about you has been collected, and no 
diagnosis or ‘analysis’ of you has taken place.
The aim of this study is to investigate whether people’s certainty as to 
whether they are a good or bad person affects how long they take to make 
moral decisions.
The two tasks that were not what they seemed were the tasks that involved 
making sentences out of mixed-up words and writing about three aspects of 
a scenario: By exposing you to words and thoughts related to moral 
certainty, these tasks were designed to make you feel either more certain 
or less certain about your own morality. The effects of these tasks will likely 
already have worn off; if they have not, they will be very short-lived. In 
addition, the time you took to complete the moral dilemma task was 
recorded, together with the number of words you wrote. The other 
questionnaires and tasks were as they appeared.
If you have any queries about this study, please email r.perera- 
delcourt@surrey.ac.uk or my supervisor r.nash@surrey.ac.uk.
If you are worried about any of the issues raised by the study, please seek 
support if you need it.
The following two organisations might be helpful:
SANEIine 
0845 767 8000 
020 7375 1002 
sanemail@sane.org.uk 
6pm -  11pm daily
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University Centre for Wellbeing
01483 68 94 98
centreforwellbeing@surrey.ac.uk 
9am -  5pm, Monday -  Friday 
Benefits of this research
It is hoped that the results from this research will contribute to improving 
therapeutic models and treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). 
Findings from other, similar studies have provided valuable information that 
have helped us understand and treat OCD better. The study you have 
taken part in builds on previous research.
Submitting your responses
Thank-you again for your time. If, for any reason, you no longer wish to 
participate in the study, please close your browser window and your 
responses will not be used (this will mean you are not entered into the prize 
draw).
If you are still willing for your anonymous responses to be used, please 
click the arrow to submit your responses and be entered into the prize draw 
(if you have requested this by providing your email address).
